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Abstract
In recent years network intrusions have become a severe threat to the privacy and safety of
computer users. Recent cyber attacks compromise a large number of hosts to form botnets.
Hackers not only aim at harvesting private data and identity information from compromised
nodes, but also use the compromised nodes to launch attacks such as distributed denial-
of-service (DDoS) attacks.
As a counter measure, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are used to identify intrusions
by comparing observable behavior against suspicious patterns. Traditional IDSs monitor
computer activities on a single host or network traffic in a sub-network. They do not have a
global view of intrusions and are not effective in detecting fast spreading attacks, unknown,
or new threats. In turn, they can achieve better detection accuracy through collaboration.
An Intrusion Detection Network (IDN) is such a collaboration network allowing IDSs to
exchange information with each other and to benefit from the collective knowledge and
experience shared by others. IDNs enhance the overall accuracy of intrusion assessment as
well as the ability to detect new intrusion types.
Building an effective IDN is however a challenging task. For example, adversaries may
compromise some IDSs in the network and then leverage the compromised nodes to send
false information, or even attack others in the network, which can compromise the efficiency
of the IDN. It is, therefore, important for an IDN to detect and isolate malicious insiders.
Another challenge is how to make efficient intrusion detection assessment based on the
collective diagnosis from other IDSs. Appropriate selection of collaborators and incentive-
compatible resource management in support of IDSs’ interaction with others are also key
challenges in IDN design.
To achieve efficiency, robustness, and scalability, we propose an IDN architecture and es-
pecially focus on the design of four of its essential components, namely, trust management,
acquaintance management, resource management, and feedback aggregation. We evaluate
our proposals and compare them with prominent ones in the literature and show their
superiority using several metrics, including efficiency, robustness, scalability, incentive-
compatibility, and fairness. Our IDN design provides guidelines for the deployment of a
secure and scalable IDN where effective collaboration can be established between IDSs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In November 2008, a new type of computer worm started to spread quickly. It used three
different types of attack on Windows hosts: exploiting vulnerabilities, guessing passwords,
and infecting removable devices [14]. In three months it took over about 9 million Microsoft
Windows systems around the world and formed a massive botnet [3]. The estimated
economic loss brought by this worm was USD 9.1 billion [24]. The worm was named
“Conficker”, and it was only one of the thousands of other worms that appear every year.
Nowadays the vast majority of computers are connected to the Internet. A number of
applications used by billions of users on a day-to-day basis including email, web-browsing,
video/audio streaming, social networking, online gaming, e-commerce, and online chatting
rely on the Internet. At the same time, network intrusions have become a severe threat
to the privacy and safety of computer users. Each year billions of malicious cyber attacks
are reported [50, 115]. Attacks are becoming more sophisticated and stealthy, driven by
an “underground economy” [51]. By definition, network intrusions are unwanted traffic or
computer activities that may be malicious or destructive, including viruses, worms, tro-
jan horses, port scanning, password guessing, code injection, and session hijacking. The
consequences of a network intrusion can be user identity theft (ID theft), unwanted adver-
tisement and commercial emails (spam), the degradation or termination of the host service
(denial of service), or using fraudulent sources to obtain sensitive information from users
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(phishing). Network intrusions are usually accomplished with the assistance of malicious
code (a.k.a. malware). In recent years, network intrusions have become more sophisti-
cated and organized. Attackers can control a large number of compromised hosts/devices
to form Botnets [3], and then launch organized attacks, such as Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS)attacks.
As a countermeasure, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are used to identify intrusions
by comparing observable behavior against suspicious patterns [67]. Based on the technology
used for detection, IDSs can be categorized as signature-based or anomaly-based. Based
on the targets they are monitoring, they can be host-based or network-based. Examples
of IDSs include antivirus software [19, 2], Snort [17], Bro [4], Tripwire [21], OSSEC [13],
and HoneyNets [20]. Traditional IDSs monitor computer activities on a single host, or
monitor network traffic in a sub-network. They do not have a global (i.e., Internet-wide)
view of intrusions and are not effective in detecting fast-spreading attacks. In addition,
traditional IDSs acquire detection rules only from their corresponding vendors. Various
security vendors usually employ distinct intrusion detection technologies and knowledge. In
practice, no single security vendor has the entire knowledge to detect all types of intrusions.
Therefore, traditional IDSs are not effective in detecting unknown or new threats. In turn,
they can achieve better detection accuracy through collaboration. A good example for
this is anti-virus software, where it is common knowledge that a malware file that has
not been detected by one antivirus software may be detected by another. If IDSs are
allowed to communicate with each other and exchange intrusion information, each IDS
can benefit from the collective expertise of the others. Therefore, collaboration between
IDSs is envisioned to be a promising approach to improve intrusion detection.
Some early works on IDS collaboration include Indra [67] and DOMINO [120], where
IDSs shared information to prevent fast-spreading attacks, and IA-NSM [33], where in-
telligent agents (such as IDS) exchange observations to detect attacks such as doorknob
rattling [63] and IP spoofing [104]. However, their collaboration was limited to selected
nodes that followed predefined communication protocols such as DOMINO. Later, in 2008,
standardized models and communication protocols provided a method for various IDSs to
communicate with each other. The two important standards are IDMEF (Intrusion Detec-
tion Message Exchange Format) [10] and CIDSS (Common Intrusion Detection Signatures
Standard) [6]. IDMEF provides a communication standard enabling different intrusion
detection analyzers from different origins (commercial, open-source, and research systems)
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to report to a managing entity for data analysis, aggregation, correlation, etc. It is XML-
based and includes two types of messages: heartbeat messages sent periodically to state
that an IDS in the distributed system is still alive, and alert messages sent when a suspi-
cious event occurs. Those events can be augmented with additional information in the form
of XML compound classes such as the scanner type, timestamps, and classifications in the
case of an alert, or even self-defined attributes (see Appendix A). The IDMEF is specified
in RFC4765 [15] and implemented by many IDSs such as Snort and OSSEC. CIDSS defines
a common XML-based data format for storing signatures from different intrusion detection
systems and shares the signatures amongst them. In this way, it is primarily aimed at IDS
administrators to exchange, evaluate, and criticize signatures. Also, a future scenario is
considered in which independent contributors exist, enabling the provision of signatures
independent of a particular product or software.
The standardization of communication protocols between different IDSs allows each IDS
to obtain intrusion information and detection knowledge from other IDSs in the network.
An Intrusion Detection Network (IDN) is such a collaboration network, allowing IDSs to
exchange information with each other and to benefit from the collective knowledge and
experience shared by others. IDNs enhance the overall accuracy of intrusion assessment
as well as the ability to detect new intrusion types. There are two types of IDNs in
the literature: information-based and consultation-based. In an information-based IDN,
nodes share observations and detection knowledge with other nodes in the network, such
as observations related to new attacks. This type of IDN is effective in detecting fast-
spreading attacks such as worms. However, it may generate large communication overhead,
and not all exchanged information may be useful to others. In a consultation-based IDN,
when an IDS detects suspicious activities but does not have enough confidence to make a
decision, it may send consultation requests to others in the network. Feedback from the
collaborators can be used to make a final decision as to whether it is an intrusion or not.
Consultation-based IDNs have much lower communication overhead, are more effective in
terms of communication efficiency, and are the focus of this thesis.
Although communication and collaboration among IDSs is feasible, building an effective
IDN is a challenging task. For example, adversaries may compromise some IDSs in the
network and then leverage the compromised nodes to send false information and spam,
to free-ride, or even to attack other nodes in the network, which can compromise the
efficiency of the IDN. It is therefore important for an IDN to detect and isolate malicious
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insiders. Another challenge is how to make efficient intrusion detection assessments based
on the collective information and knowledge from other IDSs. Appropriate selection of IDN
participants and incentive-compatible resource management in support of IDS interactions
with peers are also key challenges in IDN design.
This thesis focuses on the design of IDNs leveraging effective and efficient collabora-
tion between participant IDSs. We emphasize “collaboration” from the perspective of an
IDS to provide a systematic approach for determining who to collaborate with and how to
make intrusion detection decisions based on collective knowledge. The thesis will answer
the following questions: why build intrusion detection networks; what are the problems
underlying the design of intrusion detection networks; and what are the solutions to those
problems? We overview existing IDN designs and discuss the underlying challenges, in-
cluding privacy, malicious insiders, scalability, free-riders, collaboration incentives, and
intrusion detection efficiency.
Privacy is important since IDN users may be discouraged to participate in IDNs if
there is potential information breaching during collaboration. In an IDN, participating
IDSs can be malicious. A trust management framework is required to identify dishonest or
malicious insiders. Our research results [56, 57, 53] show that an efficient trust management
system can effectively identify malicious/dishonest or incapable IDSs in the network, thus
improving the quality of collaboration by eliminating the impact of malicious IDSs. In
particular, we present in chapter 4 a Bayesian-learning-based trust management model
where each participanting IDS evaluates the trustworthiness of its collaborators through
past experiences with them. A Dirichlet model is described as a means to integrate past
experiences and calculate trust values as well as the confidence levels in the trust estimation.
Another important problem pertaining to IDS collaboration in an IDN is how IDSs use
others’ opinions to make a decision. The problem for IDSs in the IDN is to determine
whether to raise an intrusion alarm or not, based on the feedback from collaborators. In
our work [58], we consider two types of false decision cost: false positive cost and false
negative cost. We model the risk cost of decisions using a Bayesian hypothesis model
and choose the decision which has the lower risk cost. In our extended work [129], we
further investigate the minimum amount of feedback an IDS needs to achieve a low enough
cost. Chapter 5 first discusses how Bayesian decision models can be used to make optimal
intrusion decisions which have minimal false decision cost, and how sequential hypothesis
models can be used to decide the smallest list of collaborators to consult in order to
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achieve a decision satisfying a given confidence level. The optimal decision model is used
to compare the expected costs of raising or not raising an intrusion alarm, and then to
choose the decision which bears the lowest cost. The sequential hypothesis model is used
to find the minimal number of collaborators to consult before a confident decision is made,
which can effectively reduce the amount of communication overhead between IDSs.
Once collaboration connections are established, determining how many resources are
required for each collaborator in order to maintain a fair, incentive-compatible, and with no-
free-rider collaboration environment is another interesting research question. We adopt a
game-theoretic approach to model the resource allocation strategy of IDN participants [133,
132]. Specifically, as shown in Chapter 6, the nodes in the IDN are modeled as a set of
uncooperative game players, and all the nodes follow a predefined strategy to play the
game. The game strategy is for each node to decide how to allocate resources to their
neighbors fairly. We prove that the game has a Nash Equilibrium (NE), and under the NE
the amount of help received by each node is proportional to the amount of its contribution
to others. Free-riding is thus not practical under this resource allocation design.
In a dynamic IDS collaboration environment, participating IDSs may join, leave the
network, or become compromised. How to select and maintain collaborators effectively
is of paramount importance. We formulate the acquaintance selection as an optimization
problem [54, 55] where an optimal collaborator set should lead to minimal false decision
and maintenance costs. In Chapter 7, we describe a collaborator management model which
allows each IDS to select the best combination of collaborators to minimize its cost. Since
the optimal selection of collaborators is a NP hard problem, heuristic approaches are sought
to find near-optimal solutions.
As discussed above, this thesis not only discusses efficient IDN design, it also provides
a collection of solutions to key IDN design challenges and shows how various theoretical
tools can be used in this context. Another highlight of this thesis is the comprehensive
evaluation of IDN designs, including various evaluation metrics; e.g., efficiency of intrusion
detection, robustness against malicious insiders, fairness and incentive-compatibility for all
participants, and scalability in network size.
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of network intru-
sions, their potential damage, and corresponding detection methods. We then introduce
Intrusion Detection Systems and Intrusion Detection Networks. Chapter 3 discusses dis-
tributed IDN architecture design. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 are respectively dedicated
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to trust management and intrusion detection decision-making. Resource management and
collaborator management are discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 respectively. Chapter 8
summarizes and concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides an overview of cyber intrusions and the methodologies they use. It
then discusses intrusion detection systems and intrusion detection networks. Finally, it
provides a brief survey of existing intrusion detection networks.
2.1 Overview of Cyber Intrusions
There are many different ways to launch cyber intrusions, including malware infection,
software/service vulnerability exploitation, denial of service, or phishing. We describe
some of the major types of cyber intrusions and their potential damage in this section.
2.1.1 Malware
A network intrusion accomplishes its goal by executing malicious software/code on the
victim machine. Malware is a term for all software or code designed to cause damage to a
device or a network. There are many different types of malware, such as computer viruses,
worms, trojans, or spyware.
A computer virus is a computer program that can insert/copy itself into one or more
files without the permission or knowledge of the user, and then performs some (possibly
null) operations [32]. Malicious viruses may cause a program to run incorrectly or corrupt
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a computer’s memory, while non-malicious viruses may do no harm. A computer can be
infected with a virus when copying data from other computers or when using an infected
external drive such as a flash memory or removable disk. As their name suggests, viruses
can replicate themselves to infect other hosts, but typically do so after user interaction.
For instance, a virus received as an email attachment infects the user host when opened
by the user and eventually spreads to other hosts by sending the same email to contacts
in the user’s address book.
In general, most computer viruses do not actively search for victims through a network.
Malware which actively searches for victims is known as a worm. A computer worm is a
program which propagates itself through the network automatically by exploiting security
flaws in widely-used services [113]. Worms can cause the most extensive and widespread
damage of all types of computer attacks because of their automatic spreading capability. A
large number of different worms have been documented over the years. Some of the most
famous ones include Morris (1988), CodeRed (2001), SQL Slammer (2003), the Witty
worm (2004), the Conficker worm (2009), and Stuxnet (2010).
A distinguishing characteristic of computer viruses and worms is their ability to self-
replicate and spread within networks. There are some other types of harmful software/code
which do not self-replicate, such as Trojan horses (trojans). A trojan (also called a back-
door) is a program with an overt (documented or known) effect and a covert (undocumented
or unexpected) effect [32]. For many years, trojans have been the most widely used source
of malware by hackers [90]. Trojans appear to perform desirable functions, but in fact facil-
itate unauthorized access to users’ computers. A typical trojan requires interactions with
a hacker. Hackers can access the infected hosts and manipulate the hosts using commands.
Finally, spyware is a type of malware that is installed surreptitiously on a personal
computer to collect information about the user without their informed consent, such as
their browsing habits. Spyware can report user information to the attacker, such as email
addresses, credit card information, bank account information, passwords, and other sen-
sitive information. The difference between spyware and trojans is that spyware aims at
collecting information from users and a trojan allows hackers to access the infected host.
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2.1.2 Vulnerability and Service Attacks
In the past few years, a plethora of services and applications have become available online
and accessible by users worldwide. However, due to the increasing size and complexity
of these services and applications, design and implementation flaws are commonplace,
making them vulnerable to attackers. A software vulnerability is a weakness in a computer
program which can be exploited by an attacker and used to gain unauthorized access or
to degrade service performance. There are thousands of software vulnerabilities discovered
and documented each year in vulnerability databases such as the National Vulnerability
Database [12] and US-CERT [22]. An exploitable vulnerability is the combination of three
elements: a system flaw, attackers’ access to the flaw, and attackers’ capability to exploit
the flaw. To exploit a vulnerability, an attacker must have at least one applicable tool or
technique that allow to connect to a system weakness.
A vulnerability that is unknown or freshly discovered and not yet patched by system
developers is called a zero-day vulnerability. Attacks which are targeted at a zero-day
vulnerability are called zero-day attacks. Zero-day attacks occur during the vulnerable
time window that exists between the time the vulnerability is known to attackers and
when software developers start to patch and publish a countermeasure.
A typical example of vulnerability is the buffer overflow, where attackers can manipulate
an already-running program to overrun the buffer’s boundary and overwrite its adjacent
memory, and eventually cause the program to execute the attacker’s code. A buffer overflow
can be triggered by injecting malicious code through inputs when running the program.
Attackers can take advantage of the buffer overflow vulnerability of a service to crash the
service or run malware.
2.1.3 Web-based Attacks
Although malware is a very popular way to attack computers or devices on the Internet,
it usually requires victims to receive and run malicious code [40], which can be avoided by
careful Internet users. Web-based attacks are another type of attack on Internet users and
web services. Typical examples of web-based attacks include SQL-injection and cross-site-
scripting [40].
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SQL-injection is a way to exploit a type of vulnerability known as a command injection
vulnerability. Typically, SQL-injection arises when untrusted data is inserted for malicious
purposes into a query or command to a web service. SQL-injection attacks can be used
to retrieve information from compromised web services and thereby cause information
breaches. Information such as social security numbers, dates of birth, and maiden names
are collected by hackers, as part of identity theft. Another popular target of this type
of attack is unprotected credit card information. Massive credit card information loss can
cause significant damage to an organization’s most valued asset, its customers. Solutions to
mitigate the impact of SQL-injection attacks include applying data validation, encrypting
sensitive data in the database, and limiting privileges [40], among others. SQL-injection
attacks can be detected through anomaly detection methods (see Section 2.2) employed by
intrusion detection systems (IDS).
Cross-site-scripting (XSS) lies in the category of cross-domain security issues [40]. This
type of attack takes advantage of security vulnerabilities found in web applications, such as
web browsers. It allows attackers to inject client-side script into web pages and retrieve the
session data of the user. A cross-site scripting vulnerability may be used by attackers to
bypass access controls such as the same origin security policy. Cross-site scripting carried
out on websites accounted for roughly 84% of all security vulnerabilities documented by
Symantec, as of 2007 [108]. Solutions to prevent XSS attacks include input validation and
output sanitization, the usage of HTTP-only cookies, and binding session cookies to IP
addresses [40].
2.1.4 Organized Attacks and Botnets
Recent network intrusions have evolved to be more sophisticated and organized. Intruders
are able to control a group of compromised computers/devices to launch distributed at-
tacks; for example, the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Compromised nodes
which are infected with malware communicate with a master through a command and
control (C&C) server [111]. A group of compromised nodes and a master together form a
Botnet. The compromised nodes are called “Bot nodes”, and the master is called a “Bot
master”. Bot nodes can be used to commit profit-driven cyber crimes such as DDoS at-
tacks, spam propagation, ID theft, or phishing. A CSI report [94] indicates that in 2008,
the financial loss caused by “Bot” computers in US enterprises was the second-highest,
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following financial fraud. Another report [27] predicted that the percentage of computers
compromised into bot nodes worldwide would be 15% in 2009. Cooperative attacks are
complex forms of distributed attacks where compromised nodes are organized to play dif-
ferent roles in the entire attack scenario. In the next subsection, we give an example of a
botnet, which coordinates compromised nodes to launch phishing attacks.
2.1.5 Spam and Phishing
Spam is the activity of using electronic messaging systems to send unsolicited bulk messages
indiscriminately to users, especially for advertising products or services. While the most
well known spam is email spam, the term also applies to similar abuses in other media,
such as instant messaging spam, social network spam, and spam in blogs.
Spam is a widely used method for spreading malware, delivering advertisements, and
posting phishing links. For example, the famous “Love Letter” computer virus (2000) was
spread by sending emails with the subject line “I Love You” and the attachment “Love-
Letter-For-You.txt.vbs”. When the receivers opened the attached executable file, it then
activated the attached script and infected the host machine. The “Love Letter” worm
infected more than 50 million users in 10 days and caused at least a 2 billion USD loss
worldwide [65].
Another usage of spam emails is to post phishing weblinks. Phishing is a criminal
activity consisting of stealing users’ personal identity data and financial account credentials.
Phishing attacks typically use two mechanisms. The first mechanism, known as social
engineering, makes use of spoofed emails appearing to be from legitimate businesses and
agencies in order to lead consumers to counterfeit websites designed to trick recipients into
divulging personal data such as usernames and passwords. The second mechanism, known
as technical subterfuge, plants crimeware onto user computers to steal credentials directly
through intelligent keyloggers and/or by corrupting browser navigation in order to mislead
customers to counterfeit websites. Gartner estimated an increase in the cost of identity
theft from 2 billion USD to 3.2 billion USD in 2007 in the USA alone [66].
Like any large-scale online service, large-scale phishing web sites rely on online avail-
ability. Phishing sites, however, may be relatively easy to bring down if they use fixed IP
addresses. This is not only specific to phishing sites. In fact, any illegal online organiza-
tion which targets victims on a large scale requires high availability for the continuation
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of its operation. Recently, Fast-Flux Service Networks [25] have appeared to fulfill this
requirement ensuring a high availability yet evasiveness of illegal sites. Fast-Flux Service
Network (FFSN) is a term coined by the anti-spam community to describe a decentralized
botnet used to host online criminal activities. FFSNs employ domain name service(DNS)
techniques to establish a proxy network on the compromised machines. These compro-
mised machines are used to host illegal online services, like phishing websites, malware
delivery sites, etc., with very high availability. An FFSN generally has hundreds or even
thousands of IP addresses assigned to it. These IP addresses are swapped in and out of
flux with extremely high frequency, using a combination of round-robin IP addresses and
a very short Time-To-Live (TTL) for any given particular DNS Resource Record (RR).
Website hostnames may be mapped to a new set of IP addresses as often as every 3
minutes [25]. This makes it extremely hard to take down the actual service launcher, as the
control node (mothership) is not known. The proxy agents do the work for the control node,
and they also change rapidly. ATLAS is a system from Arbor Networks which identifies
and tracks new Fast-Flux Networks [87]. In an investigation conducted in 2008, ibank-
halifax.com was the largest detected fast flux domain, with a size of 100,379 hosts and a
DNS entry life of two months. When an FFSN is detected, the domain registrars can be
contacted to shut down the corresponding domain, hence removing the FFSN. Although
this mitigation technique sounds doable, it is often a tedious and time-consuming task
given the fact that not all registrars respond to abuse complaints [7].
2.1.6 Mobile Device security
With the rapid advances in the so-called “Internet of Things”, desktop computers are no
longer the dominant form of computing. For example, smartphone usage has been growing
exponentially and is replacing desktop usage to become the next popular tool for email,
news, chatting, and Internet access. Following the growth of smartphone use, smartphone
exploitation techniques are also growing. A key feature of modern smartphone platforms
is a centralized service for downloading third-party applications. The convenience to users
and developers of such an “app market” has led to an explosion in the number of apps
available. Apple’s App Store served nearly 3 billion application downloads after only 18
months [26]. Many of these applications combine data from remote cloud services with
information from local sources, such as a GPS receiver, camera, microphone, or accelerom-
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eter. Applications often have legitimate reasons for accessing this privacy-sensitive data,
but users may not be aware of whether their data is used properly or not. Many incidents
have occurred where developers relayed private information back to the cloud [41, 86], and
the privacy risks illustrate the danger [49].
In addition to the risk of downloading malware, mobile phone vulnerabilities are also
targets for exploitation. Hundreds of vulnerabilities were discovered in the years 2009 and
2010 [50]. While it may be difficult to exploit many of these vulnerabilities successfully,
there were two vulnerabilities affecting Apple’s iPhone iOS operating system that allowed
users to “jailbreak” their devices. The process of jailbreaking a device through exploits
is to install malicious code, which can gain the user root privileges through exploiting a
vulnerability of the iOS.
2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are software/hardware systems designed to monitor
network traffic or computer activities and emit alerts/alarms to administrators when sus-
picious intrusions are detected. Intrusion Detection Systems are different from firewalls.
A firewall is a device that filters all traffic between a protected or “internal” network and
a less trustworthy or “external” network, while IDSs sniff or monitor network traffic or
computer activities but do not drop or block them. A firewall can be used along with
an IDS to block identified malicious traffic in order to protect internal computers from
being further exploited. Based on the technology used for detection, IDSs can be divided
into signature-based and anomaly-based types. Also, based on data sources, they can be
host-based or network-based.
2.2.1 Signature-based and Anomaly-based IDSs
Signature-based IDSs compare data packets with the signatures or attributes of known
intrusions to decide whether the observed traffic is malicious or not. A signature-based
IDS is efficient in detecting known intrusions with monomorphic signatures. However, it
is not efficient in detecting unknown intrusions or intrusions with polymorphic signatures.
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Figure 2.1: An example of host-based IDS and Network-based IDS
Anomaly-based IDSs observe traffic or computer activities and detect intrusions by iden-
tifying activities distinct from a user’s or system’s normal behavior. Anomaly-based IDSs
can detect unknown intrusions or new intrusions. However, they usually suffer from a high
false positive rate. Most current IDSs employ both techniques to achieve better detection
capability.
2.2.2 Host-based and Network-based IDSs
A Host-based IDS (HIDS) runs on an individual host or device in the network (Figure 2.1).
It monitors inbound/outbound traffic to/from a computer as well as internal activities such
as system calls. A HIDS views an individual device only, and may not be aware of the
overall network environment. Examples of HIDSs include OSSEC [13] and Tripwire [21].
Tripwire is a brand of software used to ensure the integrity of critical system files and
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directories by identifying all changes made to them. Tripwire configuration options include
the ability to receive alerts via email if particular files are altered, and automated integrity
checking. Using Tripwire for intrusion detection and damage assessment helps in keeping
track of system changes and can speed up the recovery from a break-in by reducing the
number of files that must be restored to repair the system. Tripwire compares files and
directories against a baseline database of file locations, dates modified, and other data. It
generates the baseline by taking a snapshot of specified files and directories in a known
secure state. After creating the baseline database, Tripwire compares the current system
to the baseline and reports any modifications, additions, or deletions.
Network-based IDSs (NIDS) monitor network traffic to/from the network. A NIDS con-
tains sensors to sniff packets, and a data analyzer to process and correlate data. Alarms are
raised whenever suspected intrusions are found. However, a NIDS does not have knowl-
edge about the internal activities of individual computers. Examples of NIDSs include
Snort [17] and Bro [4].
Snort is a free and open-source network intrusion detection system (NIDS), created in
1998 and developed by Sourcefire. Snort has the ability to perform real-time traffic analysis
and packet logging on IP networks. Snort performs protocol analysis, content searching,
and content matching. It relies on a set of predefined policies named “Snort rules” to
detect suspicious traffic. The rules specify the patterns of potential attacks, including IP
addresses, port numbers, protocols, and pattern strings. Snort rules need to be updated
frequently to keep up with new attacks. Snort can also be used to detect probes or attacks,
including but not limited to operating system fingerprinting attempts, common gateway
interfaces, buffer overflows, server message block probes, and port scans.
2.2.3 Other Types of IDSs
Early intrusion detection systems, such as [43, 42] and [77], relied on logging the system
activities to spot potential misuses that had occurred. The administrator reviews the
outputs of the IDS to find attacks, remove threats, and patch vulnerabilities of the system.
Modern IDSs analyze network traffic and/or system logs and perform correlations in real-
time before sending alerts/alarms to administrators. Besides the traditional IDSs we listed
in previous sections such as Snort, Bro, OSSEC, other applications/devices can be used
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as intrusion detection systems. In this section, we briefly describe Honeypots, Antiviruse
systems, and firewalls.
Honeypots are systems set up for the purpose of trapping attackers/hackers and col-
lecting traces for security analysis. A honeypot generally consists of a computer, data, or
a network site that appears to be part of a network but is actually isolated and monitored,
and which seems to contain information or a resource of value to attackers. Based on their
level of interaction with attackers, honeypots can be divided into low-interaction honey-
pots and high-interaction honeypots [99]. Low-interaction honeypots are usually emulated
services that are frequently requested by attackers. They have limited interaction with
attackers since they are not real services. Most emulated services are only restricted to the
first few interactions. Examples of such honeypots include Honeyd [9], Spector [18], and
KFsensor [8]. High-interaction honeypots imitate real operating systems that host a variety
of services and applications. Therefore, an attacker may be allowed to perform many types
of attacks on this type of honeypot. An example of such a honeypot is Honeynets [20].
Antivirus systems are software systems which monitor, prevent, detect, and remove
malware such as computer worms, viruses, adware, Trojan horses, rootkits, and keylog-
gers. A variety of strategies are employed by antivirus systems. There is signature-based
detection, which involves searching for known patterns of data within executable code, and
heuristic-based detection, which can identify new viruses or variants of existing viruses by
looking for known malicious code, or slight variations of such code, in files. Some antivirus
systems also use anomaly detection techniques to identify malware by running it in a sand-
box and analyzing the behavior of a file under execution in order to detect any malicious
actions. Examples of antivirus software include Symantec [19], Avira [2], and Avast [1].
A firewall is a network security system that monitors the network’s incoming/outgoing
traffic and determines whether it should be allowed through or not, based on its firewall
rules. A network’s firewall is a bridge between the internal network or computer it protects
and external (inter)network, such as the Internet. Firewalls can use blacklists to detect
and block potential intruders. Firewalls can also work together to achieve higher intrusion
detection efficiency [109, 28, 46].
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2.2.4 Strength and Limitations of IDSs
Intrusion detection systems are constantly evolving. Research on IDSs began in the 1980s,
and products appeared in the 1990s. As new vulnerabilities and attack types become
known, IDSs evolve and become more and more sophisticated. Indeed, IDSs are improving
continuously and are able to detect an ever-growing number of attacks by including more
and more attack signatures and attack models. Recall that IDSs look for known vulnerabili-
ties and weaknesses, either through patterns of known attacks (signature-based) or models
of normal behavior (anomaly-based). Whenever new attacks are discovered, the corre-
sponding detection rules/signature are created by the IDS manufacture and distributed to
users’ IDSs. Many commercial IDSs are quite effective at identifying new attacks.
However, it is difficult for IDSs to detect all potential attacks. Indeed, attackers only
need to evade the IDS once to successfully compromise the system, while IDSs need to
know all possible attacks to guarantee successful defense. In practice, an IDS vendor has
knowledge about some attacks, but no single one knows all attacks.
Another limitation of IDSs is their sensitivity control. It is typically the case that a
sensitive IDS raises too many intrusion alerts (most of them are false positive alerts), which
makes it difficult for administrators to handle. However, when an IDS is less sensitive, it
may miss critical attacks (false negatives) and hence fail to protect networks and hosts.
Determining the optimal sensitivity of IDSs is a difficult problem.
2.3 Collaborative Intrusion Detection Networks
A Collaborative Intrusion Detection Network (IDN) is an overlay network that connects
IDSs so that they can exchange information, such as intrusion alerts, blacklists, signatures,
suspicious files, and intrusion detection rules. Several IDNs have been proposed in the past
few years. In an IDN, IDSs collect data from distributed peer IDSs and use it to achieve
better intrusion detection. In this section, we categorize IDNs using three features, namely
cooperation topology, cooperation scope, and specialization. We also provide a taxonomy
of some of the most prominent IDNs.
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2.3.1 Motivation for IDS Collaboration
Isolated intrusion detection systems rely strictly on security updates from their respec-
tive vendors and are vulnerable to new or unknown attacks. Collaboration between IDSs
allows each IDS to use collective knowledge from other IDSs to achieve more accurate
intrusion detection, which is particularly useful for preventing new attacks. For example,
when one IDS detects a new attack, it can alert its collaborators, which then can block
similar attacks when they occur. Through knowledge-sharing, collaboration between IDSs
intuitively benefits each participating IDS and allows the creation of an IDN with a much
stronger intrusion detection capability. Building an effective collaborative IDN, however,
raises a number of challenges, which we will discuss next.
2.3.2 Challenges of IDS Collboration
Collaboration among intrusion detection systems has the potential to improve the effec-
tiveness of intrusion detection, since IDSs leverage the collective intrusion detection infor-
mation received from their collaborators. As such participating IDSs are less likely to be
compromised by threats unknown to them. However, IDS collaboration introduces com-
munication overhead in the network. Since collaboration is based on information exchange,
each participant receives help from others in the network but also has to spend resources
(e.g., CPU, memory, network) to help others in return. Therefore, IDSs with low resource
capacity may be constrained in collaboration.
Another challenge for IDNs is that the participating IDSs may become the target of
malicious attacks. For example, adversaries may compromise some IDSs in the network
and then leverage the compromised nodes to send false information or spam, or even to
attack other nodes in the network, which can compromise the efficiency of the collaboration
network. Therefore, it is important for an IDN to detect and isolate malicious insiders in
order to eliminate their negative impact. In addition, how to make efficient intrusion
detection assessments based on the collective information and knowledge from other peers
is another challenge. In the following paragraphs, we discuss some of the key challenges
in IDN design including privacy, malicious insiders, free-riders, scalability, incentives, and
intrusion detection efficiency. Then we present an overview of some of the most prominent
IDN designs in the literature.
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Privacy is a primary issue, since IDN users can be discouraged from participating
in the IDN if there is potential information breaching during collaboration. To address
this issue, a trust management model can be used to identify dishonest and malicious
nodes. An effective trust management model should be able to distinguish honest nodes
from dishonest ones, and high-expertise nodes from low-expertise ones. Free-riding the
IDN is another important problem, where selfish nodes (a.k.a., free-riders) exploit the
network seeking knowledge from others but do not contribute themselves. To handle this
problem, an incentive-compatible resource allocation design can reward active participants
and discourage free-riders. A scalable IDN can accommodate a large number of nodes in
the network without overburdening any single node. A scalable IDN architecture design is
necessary for a large-scale collaboration network. Although IDS collaboration can improve
overall intrusion detection accuracy, its efficiency is limited by the quality of the individual
intrusion detection systems. Collaboration cannot detect an intrusion that no single IDS
in the network can detect. Therefore, improving the intrusion detection accuracy of each
IDS is still an essential problem to solve. In our work, we will demonstrate the effectiveness
of IDS collaboration and the amount of improvement in terms of detection accuracy over
individual IDSs.
2.4 Selected Intrusion Detection Networks
2.4.1 Indra
Indra [67] was one of the first to propose a cooperative intrusion detection system. In the
proposed system, host-based IDSs in a local area network take a pro-active approach and
send warnings to other trusted nodes about the intruder through a peer-to-peer network.
For example, as shown in Figure 2.2, if an attacker compromises node B and then launches
attacks from B to hosts in the trusted network, then node C detects the attack from B and
multicasts a security warning to its trusted neighbors. Subsequently, if B tries to attack
other nodes in the network, it will be repelled right away by the forewarned nodes. Indra
is a fully distributed system which is targeted towards local area networks.
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Figure 2.2: Indra Architecture (Adapted from [67])
2.4.2 DOMINO
DOMINO [120] is an IDS collaboration system which aims at monitoring Internet out-
breaks at large-scale. In DOMINO (Figure 2.3), heterogeneous IDSs located at diverse
locations share their intrusion information with each other. There are typically three
types of nodes: axis nodes, satellite nodes, and terrestrial contributors. Satellite nodes
are organized hierarchically and are responsible for gathering intrusion data and sending
them to parent nodes in the hierarchy. Parent nodes aggregate intrusion data and further
forward data up the hierarchy till they reach axis nodes. Axis nodes analyze intrusion data,
generate digested summary data and then multicast them to other axis nodes. Network-
based IDSs and active sink nodes (such as Honeypot [37]) are integrated into axis nodes to
monitor unused IP addresses for incoming worms. Terrestrial contributors do not follow
DOMINO protocols but can also contribute to the system through DOMINO access points.
In DOMINO, heterogeneous nodes are involved in the cooperation overlay. Information
from axis nodes, satellite nodes, and terrestrial contributors is distinguished by different
trust levels. This feature enables DOMINO to handle inter-administration-zone coopera-
tion. DOMINO is a decentralized system organized in a hierarchical structure for better
scalability.
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2.4.3 DShield
DShield [109] is a community-based firewall log correlation system. The central server
receives firewall logs from worldwide volunteers and then analyzes attack trends based on
the information collected. Similar systems include myNetWatchMan [11] and CAIDA [5].
DShield is used as a data collection engine behind the SANS Internet Storm Center (ISC)
[16]. Analysis provided by DShield has been used in the early detection of several worms,
such as “Code Red” and “SQL Snake”. Due to the number of participants and the volume
of data collected, DShield is a very attractive resource, and its data is used by researchers to
analyze attack patterns. However, DShield is a centralized system and it does not provide
real-time analysis or rule generation. Also, due to privacy issues, payload information and
some headers can not be shared, which makes classification of attacks often impossible.
2.4.4 NetShield
NetShield [35] is an IDN which uses the Chord DHT [102] to reduce communication over-
head. In this system, however, within the system architecture (Figure 2.4), IDSs contribute
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and retrieve information from the system through a P2P overlay (the Chord DHT). Each
IDS maintains a local prevalence table to record the number of occurrences of each con-
tent block signature locally as well as its corresponding source address and destination
address. An update will be triggered if the local prevalence of the content block exceeds
a local threshold (for example, site E in Figure 2.4). If the global prevalence is higher
than a given threshold, and the address dispersion exceeds a certain threshold, then an
alarm is raised regarding the corresponding content block. Netshield targets epidemic
worm outbreaks or DoS attacks. However, using content blocks as attack identification
is not effective against polymorphic worms (i.e., worms with changing signatures). Also,
NetShield assumes all IDN participants are honest, which makes it vulnerable to collusion
attacks and malicious nodes.
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2.4.5 CIDS
Another Collaborative Intrusion Detection System (CIDS) proposed in [127] also uses
Chord DHT system to organize IDSs into a peer-to-peer network. Each IDS shares its
blacklist with others through a fully distributed P2P overlay. If a suspicious IP address
is reported more than a threshold N , then all the IDSs which reported it will be notified.
CIDS is considered to be scalable and robust since it is built on a P2P overlay. However,
the limitation of this system is that it only identifies potential intruders by IP addresses.
Thus, it is not effective against worms having a spreading degree of less than N . Also, the
system can be vulnerable to colluding malicious nodes.
2.4.6 Gossip
Denver et al. [39] proposed a gossip-based collaborative worm detection system (Gossip)
for enterprise-level IDNs for host-based IDSs. A fully-distributed model is adopted to avoid
a single point of failure. In their system, host-based IDSs (local detectors) raise alerts only
if the number of newly-created connections per unit time exceeds a certain threshold. The
alert will then be propagated to neighbors for aggregation. A Bayesian network-based
alert aggregation model is used for alert aggregation at global detectors. Their proposed
system is aimed at detecting slow-propagating worms in a local area network. However,
their system only uses the new connection rate as a sign of possible worm spread. This is
not effective for worms that are spread in a connectionless manner, such as UDP worms.
2.4.7 Worminator
Worminator [76] was proposed to enable IDSs to share alert information with each other
to detect worm propagation. Alert correlation is used to gain better detection accuracy.
Different from most other systems, Worminator is concerned with the privacy of exchanging
alerts, and uses a bloom filter to encode IP addresses and port numbers in the alerts in order
to preserve the privacy of collaborators. The authors claimed that the system topology
can be either centralized or decentralized depending on the size of the network.
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2.4.8 ABDIAS
Ghosh et. al. proposed an Agent-Based Distributed Intrusion Alert System (ABDIAS)
[60]. In the architecture design (Figure 2.5), IDSs (agents) are grouped into communi-
ties (neighborhoods). Each agent collects information inside its neighborhood and uses a
Bayesian network analysis model to diagnose possible threats. Inter-neighborhood com-
munication only happens if a consensus cannot be reached within a neighborhood. This
system supports early warnings for pre-attack activities in order to gain time for adminis-
trators to respond to potential attacks. This system also supports a simple majority-based
voting system to detect compromised nodes.
A1
A2
A8
A7
A6
A3
A4
A5
Inter-communication
Intra-communication
Figure 2.5: ABDIAS Architecture (Adapted from [60])
2.4.9 CRIM
CRIM [36] is a cooperative IDS where alerts from individual IDSs are sent to a central
analyzer for clustering and correlation. A set of correlation rules are generated oﬄine by
security administrators by analyzing attack descriptions. These correlation rules are then
used to analyze alerts collected from IDSs in order to recognize global attack scenarios.
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CRIM is a semi-automatic alert correlation system, since it relies on human interactions
to define attack descriptions. It is also a centralized system.
2.4.10 ALPACAS
ALPACAS[124] is a cooperative spam filtering system that is aimed at preserving the
privacy of emails as well as maintaining the scalability of the system. The system is built
on a peer-to-peer overlay to avoid the deficiency of a centralized system. Spam mails
and Ham mails are distributed to agents based on the range of their feature signatures.
An email is divided into feature trunks, and trunks are digested into feature fingerprints
to preserve the content privacy of emails. The fingerprints of an email are then sent to
corresponding agents to compare with stored spam emails and Ham emails by estimating
the maximum signature overlap with spam (MOS) and the maximum signature overlap
with Ham (MOH). An email is labeled as spam if the difference between MOS and MOH
exceeds a certain threshold. ALPACAS is a fully distributed system.
2.4.11 CDDHT
The Cyber Disease Distributed Hash Table (CDDHT) [74] was proposed as a distributed
data fusion center. In its architecture, each node is a local intrusion detection system which
attempts to locally detect attacks and generate corresponding alerts. Each alert is assigned
a disease key based on the related intrusions. The alert is then sent to a corresponding
sensor fusion center (SFC) using a DHT-based P2P system. SFCs are selected among nodes
based on their capacity and resources. The goal of this system is to avoid the bottleneck
problem inherent to a centralized fusion center and to use alert categorization techniques
for balancing the load among the SFCs. CDDHT is a decentralized system.
2.4.12 SmartScreen Filter
SmartScreen Filter [23] is a tool in MicrosoftTM Internet Explorer 8 that helps users avoid
socially engineered malware phishing websites and online fraud when browsing the web. A
centralized mechanism is used to maintain a list of phishing sites and malicious websites
25
urls. Users browsing listed phishing sites or malicious websites will receive warnings to
prevent them from being defrauded. Users are allowed to report suspicious websites to the
central server through a secure channel. Users’ feedback is analyzed together with input
from the SmartScreen Spam filter and input from other trusted sources to generate the
urls blacklist. Other similar phishing filters are provided by EarthLink and eBay.
2.4.13 FFCIDN
Fast-flux service networks (FFSN) are one type of Botnet which uses compromised nodes to
form a robust phishing domain. To detect fast-flux networks and prevent them from causing
further damage, Zhou et al. [126], [125] proposed a collaborative IDN to detect FFSNs.
The work is based on an observation that the number of IP addresses returned after a DNS
request is larger than usual. The collaboration system collects query results from nodes
from different locations and correlates them to obtain the number of unique IP addresses
and the number of unique fast-flux domains. The relationship between the number of DNS
queries and the number of unique IP addresses and domains is traced. A corresponding
DNS query threshold is derived to speed up FFSN detection. Zhou et al.’s results showed
that detecting FFSNs using collaboration from nodes in different name domains is more
efficient than detecting them from a single node. This system is a centralized system.
2.5 Summary
IDSs are important countermeasure for cyber attacks. However, a single IDS is vulnerable
to attacks which are unknown to its security vendors of system administrators. Intru-
sion detection networks (IDNs) allow IDSs to exchange intrusion information and detec-
tion knowledge, hence improving the intrusion detection accuracy by using the collective
knowledge from others. Several IDNs have been proposed in literature. However, most
of them focused on designing efficient and scalable network overlays for the exchange of
intrusion information. Some IDNs investigated information aggregation, but only few have
addressed the problems of malicious insiders and free riders. Malicious insiders pose a sig-
nificant challenge to IDNs since adversaries have high motivation to attack and compromise
the IDSs in the network. Designing IDNs that are robust to malicious insiders is therefore
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of paramount importance. Free-riders also pose a significant challenge to collaboration in
an IDN. They are self-interested, do not share their resources, and try to take advantage
of the resources shared by others in the network. To address the free-rider problem, an
incentive mechanism design should be in place to discourage selfish behaviors. My goal, in
this thesis is to propose an IDN design which is not only scalable and efficient in intrusion
detection, but is also robust against malicious insiders and discourage free-riding.
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Chapter 3
Collaborative Intrusion Detection
Networks Architecture Design
A Intrusion Detection Network (IDN) is an overlay network which enables IDSs to exchange
intrusion information and knowledge in order to improve the overall detection accuracy. In
chapter 2, we surveyed a number of existing intrusion detection networks where IDSs share
information with others in order to detect intrusions which otherwise would not be detected
by a single IDS. However, most of the previous studies focused on the efficiency of infor-
mation exchange and the aggregation of collected information to make intrusion decisions.
Only few studies addressed the problems of malicious insiders, free-riders, and how to se-
lect and maintain IDN participants. In this work, we propose an IDN architecture design
for IDSs to communicate and enhance intrusion detection efficiency through collaboration.
We specifically focus on four IDN components design, namely, trust management, feedback
aggregation, resource management, and acquaintance management. Through simulation,
we show that our design is scalable in network size, efficient in intrusion detection, and
robust to various insider attacks.
3.1 Collaboration Framework
In our design, IDSs from different vendors or open source providers are connected in a
peer-to-peer overlay. As discussed in the introduction, we choose a consultation-based
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IDN design, where IDSs send consultation requests to collaborators to ask for a diagnosis
when suspicious activities are detected but the host IDS does not have enough confidence
to make a correct decision. For this purpose, each IDS maintains a list of “good” collab-
orators. For example, IDSs may choose to collaborate with other IDSs with which they
had good experience in the past (e.g., have been helpful in identifying intrusions). The
reason that we choose a peer-to-peer network structure instead of a cloud-based service
such as CloudAV [89] is that cloud-based services are centralized and may constitute a per-
formance bottleneck and a single point of failure. In turn, in a peer-to-peer IDN, workload
is distributed to all peers and there is no communication bottleneck. Also, IDNs are more
robust to failures and can scale indefinitely in network size. In our design, we consider
the case where the IDN participants have differing detection expertise levels and may act
dishonestly or selfishly in collaboration. For collaboration to be sustainable and efficient,
we identify the following IDN design requirements:
(1) IDN nodes should have an effective trust evaluation capability to reduce the negative
impact of dishonest and incompetent nodes.
(2) Allocation of IDN node resources for collaboration should be incentive-compatible to
discourage selfish behavior and encourage active collaboration.
(3) IDN nodes should possess an efficient feedback aggregation capability to minimize the
cost of false intrusion detections.
(4) The IDN should be robust against insider attacks.
(5) The IDN should be scalable in network size.
To satisfy the above requirements, we propose a Collaborative Intrusion Detection Net-
work (IDN) architecture design similar to a social network. The IDN topology, as shown in
Figure 3.1, consists of IDSs (nodes), which may be Network-based IDSs (NIDSs) or Host-
based IDSs (HIDSs). IDN nodes are connected if they have a collaborative relationship.
Each node maintains a list of other nodes which it currently collaborates with. We call
such nodes acquaintances. Each node in the IDN has the freedom to choose its acquain-
tances based on their trustworthiness. The communication between collaborating nodes
consists of intrusion evaluation requests and corresponding feedback. There are two types
of requests: intrusion consultations and test messages. The architecture of the IDN is
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Figure 3.1: Topology of a Collaborative Intrusion Detection Network.
shown in Figure 3.2. It is composed of seven components, namely, the intrusion detection
system, communication overlay, trust management, acquaintance management, resource
management, feedback aggregation, and mediator. In the following subsections, we will
describe the consultation and test messages and the functionality of each component in
the architecture.
3.1.1 Consultation Message
When an IDS detects a suspicious activity but is unable to make a decision as to whether
it should raise an alarm or not (e.g., anomaly detection detects suspicious activities but no
matching signature is found), it sends consultation requests to its acquaintances for diag-
nosis. Feedback from acquaintances is aggregated and a final intrusion detection decision
is made based on the aggregated results. The amount of information in the consultation
request depends on the trust level of each acquaintance. For example, a node may want
to share all alert information, including data payload, with the nodes inside its local area
network, and digest or even remove some alert information when sent to acquaintances in
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the broader Internet.
3.1.2 Test Messages
In order for the nodes in the IDN to gain experience with each other, we propose that IDSs
use test messages to evaluate the trustworthiness of others. Test messages are “bogus”
consultation requests which are sent to measure the trustworthiness of another node in the
acquaintance list. They are sent out in a way that makes them difficult to be distinguished
from a real consultation request. The testing node knows the true diagnosis result of the
test message and uses the received feedback to derive a trust value for the tested node.
This technique can discover inexperienced and/or malicious nodes within the collaborative
network. A test message can be a previous consultation message with which the ground
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truth has been verified, or a random pick taken from its knowledge base.
3.1.3 Communication Overlay
The Communication Overlay is the component which handles all the communications with
other peers in the collaborative network. The messages passing through the communication
overlay include: test messages from the host node to its acquaintances; intrusion consulta-
tions from the host node to its acquaintances; feedback from acquaintances; consultation
requests from acquaintances, and; feedback to acquaintances. The Communication Over-
lay dispatches incoming requests and messages to corresponding components in the system
and routes outgoing requests and messages to their destinations. For example, when the
Communication Overlay component receives a consultation request, it calls the local IDS
component for diagnosis and returns the received feedback (diagnosis result) back to the
sender.
3.1.4 Mediator
The mediator is the component which helps heterogeneous IDSs communicate with each
other. It translates consultation requests and consultation feedback into a common protocol
(such as IDMEF [10]) and data format understood by different IDSs.
3.1.5 Trust Management
The trust management component allows IDSs in the IDN to evaluate the trustworthiness
of others based on previous experience with them. The host node can use test messages
to gain experience quickly. Indeed, the verified consultation results can also be used as
experience. In our proposed IDN, we have adopted a Dirichlet-based trust management
model [57, 53] to evaluate the trustworthiness of IDSs. In this trust model, IDSs evaluate
the trustworthiness of others based on the quality of their feedback. The confidence of trust
estimation is modeled using Bayesian statistics, and the results show that the frequency
of test messages is proportional to the confidence level of trust estimation. The trust
management model is closely connected to the resource management and acquaintance
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management models, since the trust values of the collaborators are essential inputs for the
latter models.
3.1.6 Acquaintance Management
It is intuitive that when an IDS consults more acquaintances, it achieves higher accuracy
and confidence in intrusion detection. However, more acquaintances results in a higher
maintenance cost, since the IDS needs to allocate resources for each acquaintance because
sending and receiving test messages to those acquaintances is a necessary resource expen-
diture, and it is needed to maintain the confidence of trust evaluation and to maintain
the collaboration connection. In addition to the acquaintances list, our system also main-
tains a consultation list. The nodes on the consultation list are randomly selected from
the acquaintances which have passed the probation period. Test messages are sent to all
acquaintances, while consultation requests are only sent to the nodes in the consultation
list. The acquaintance list is updated on a regular basis to recruit new nodes or remove
unwanted ones. In our system, we use a dynamic acquaintance management system [54, 55]
to recruit higher-quality peers and remove less helpful peers based on their trustworthiness
and expertise in intrusion detection.
3.1.7 Resource Management
In an IDN, malicious or compromised peers can launch a Denial-of-Service attack by send-
ing a large number of consultation messages to overwhelm the targeted IDSs. Some peers
may also free-ride the system by only receiving help from others without contributing to
the collaboration network. To address the above problems, a resource management sys-
tem is required to decide whether the host should allocate resources to respond to a given
consultation request. An incentive-compatible resource management can assist IDSs to al-
locate resources to their acquaintances so that other IDSs are fairly treated based on their
past assistance to the host IDS. Therefore, an IDS which abusively uses the collaboration
resource will be penalized by receiving fewer responses from others. The resource alloca-
tion system also decides how often the host should send test messages to its acquaintances,
protecting the system from being overloaded. In our IDN, we use an incentive-compatible
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resource allocation system [132, 133] based on a multi-player non-cooperative game design
for IDSs in the IDN.
3.1.8 Feedback Aggregation
When the IDS of the host node cannot make a confident intrusion diagnosis for a suspi-
cious event, the host node may consult the other IDSs in the collaboration network for
opinions/diagnosis. The received feedback is then used to make a decision as to whether
the host IDS should raise an alarm to its administrator or not. The feedback aggregation
component is responsible for making a decision based on the feedback. It decides not only
on which criteria to use to measure the quality of decisions, but also on how to reach a
decision in an efficient way. This component is one of the most important, since it has
a direct impact on the accuracy of the collaborative intrusion detection. If an alarm is
raised, the suspicious intrusion flow will be suspended and the system administrator must
investigate the intrusion immediately. On one hand, false alarms may waste human re-
sources. On the other hand, undetected intrusions may cause damage. In this thesis, we
use a Bayesian approach [58, 129] to measure the rate of false alarms, i.e., false positive
(FP) rate, and the rate of missing intrusions, i.e., false negative (FN) rate, of participating
IDSs based on collected experience with them in the past. We model the cost of collabo-
rative decision-making using false positive cost and false negative cost. We then provide a
hypothesis testing model to find a decision which leads to minimum overall cost.
In the following chapters, we focus on four major components of the propose IDN archi-
tecture: trust management, acquaintance management, resource management, and feed-
back aggregation. For each component, we provide the underlying model and algorithms,
and evaluate their efficiency against several metrics, including robustness, scalability, effi-
ciency, fairness, and incentive-compatibility.
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Chapter 4
Trust Management
4.1 Introduction
Collaborative intrusion detection networks can be an effective way to improve intrusion
detection accuracy and detect new attacks. However, a malicious (or malfunctioning) IDS
can degrade the performance of others by sending false intrusion assessments. Furthermore,
if some nodes are controlled by the same adversaries, they can easily collude and send false
intrusion assessments. Moreover IDSs may have different levels of expertise in intrusion
assessment. To protect an IDN from malicious attacks as well as find expert IDSs to consult
for intrusion assessment, it is important to evaluate the trustworthiness of participating
IDSs. Since the trust model itself may also be the target of malicious attacks, robustness
is a desired feature of the trust management scheme in collaborative intrusion detection
networks.
In this chapter, we present a Bayesian trust management model that is robust, scalable,
and suitable for distributed IDS collaboration. More specifically, a Dirichlet trust model
is used for estimating the likely future behavior of an IDS based on its past history. This
theoretical model allows us to track the uncertainty in estimating the trustworthiness of
the IDS. The use of sophisticated trust model in IDN not only effectively improves the
intrusion detection efficiency of the IDN, it also improves the robustness of the system
against various insider attacks. Our proposals can be used to deploy a secure and scalable
IDN where effective collaboration can be established between IDSs.
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We evaluate our approach based on a simulated collaborative IDS network. The IDSs
are distributed and may have different expertise levels in detecting intrusions. An IDS may
also turn malicious due to runtime bugs, having been compromised, having been updated
with a faulty new configuration, or having been deliberately made malicious. We also
simulate several potential threats; e.g., betrayal attacks where malicious IDSs masquerade
as honest ones to gain trust, and then suddenly act dishonestly. Our experimental results
demonstrate that our trust management model yields a significant improvement in detect-
ing intrusions, is robust against various attacks, and improves the scalability of the system,
as compared to existing collaborative IDS systems.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The trust management model is
presented in Section 4.2. The scalability of the trust model is discussed in Section 4.3 and
its robustness against common threats in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 provides experimental
evidence of the efficiency, robustness and scalability of our approach. Section 4.6 surveys
related work. Section 4.7 summarizes our contributions and proposes future work.
4.2 Trust Management Model
In this section, we propose a robust and scalable trust model which uses a Bayesian ap-
proach to evaluate the trustworthiness between each pair of IDSs. Specifically, we use a
Dirichlet family of probability density functions to estimate the likely future behavior of an
IDS based on its past history. A weighted majority method is used to aggregate feedback
to make intrusion decisions.
4.2.1 Satisfaction Mapping
In our model, an IDS sends requests to its peers and evaluates the satisfaction level of
received feedback. Note that the request can be a test message or a real request. The true
answer of a test message is known beforehand, while that of a real request is verified by
administrators after some delay through the observed impact of the corresponding alert.
IDSs may have different metrics to rank alerts. Snort [17], for example, uses three
levels (low, medium, high), while Bro [4] allows up to 100 different levels. We assume the
existence of a function H, which maps an IDS alert ranking onto the [0,1] interval where
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0 denotes benign traffic and 1 highly dangerous intrusions. H preserves the “more severe
than” partial order relationship. That is, if alert aj is more severe than alert ai then H
preserves that relationship by having H(aj) > H(ai).
The satisfaction level of feedback is determined by three factors: the expected answer
(r ∈ [0, 1]), the received answer (a ∈ [0, 1]) and the difficulty level of the test message
(d ∈ [0, 1]). The larger is d the more difficult it is to correctly answer the request. Note that
the difficulty of the test message can be roughly estimated by the age of the corresponding
signatures or knowledge. For example, the difficulty level is low for test messages generated
from old signatures; medium difficulty is for test messages generated from new signatures;
high difficulty for malicious traffic taken from Honeypots and no local signature is able to
detect it.
To quantitatively measure the quality of feedback, we use a function Sat(r, a, d) (∈
[0, 1]) to represent the level of satisfaction of the received answer based on its distance to
the expected answer and the difficulty of the test message, as follows:
Sat(r, a, d) =

1−
(
a−r
max(c1r,1−r)
)d/c2
a > r
1−
(
c1(r−a)
max(c1r,1−r)
)d/c2
a ≤ r
(4.1)
where c1 ∈ R+ controls the extent of penalty for wrong estimates. c1 > 1 reflects the
situation that estimates lower than the exact answer get stronger penalty than those that
are higher. Parameter c2 ∈ R+ controls satisfaction sensitivity, with larger values reflecting
more sensitivity to the distance between the correct and received answers. The equation
also ensures that low difficulty level tests are more severe in their penalty to incorrect
answers. The shape of the satisfaction function is depicted in Figure 4.1.
4.2.2 Dirichlet-based Model
Bayesian statistics provides a theoretical foundation for measuring the uncertainty in a
decision that is based on a collection of observations. We are interested in knowing the
distribution of satisfaction levels of the answers from each peer IDS and, particularly, using
this information to estimate the satisfaction level of future consultations. For the case of a
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Figure 4.1: Satisfaction level for feedback (r=0.5, c1 = 2, c2 = 1)
binary satisfaction level {satisfied,¬satisfied}, a Beta distribution can be used as appeared
in [122]. For multi-valued satisfaction levels, Dirichlet distributions are more appropriate.
A Dirichlet distribution [95] is based on initial beliefs about an unknown event repre-
sented by a prior distribution. The initial beliefs combined with collected sample data can
be represented by a posterior distribution. The posterior distribution well suits our trust
management model since the trust is updated based on the history of interactions.
Let X be the discrete random variable denoting the satisfaction level of the feedback
from a peer IDS. X takes values in the set X = {x1, x2, ..., xk} (xi ∈ [0, 1], xi+1 > xi) of the
supported levels of satisfaction. Let ~p = {p1, p2, ..., pk} (
∑k
i=1 pi = 1) be the probability
distribution vector of X, i.e. P{X = xi} = pi. Also, let ~γ = {γ1, γ2, ..., γk} denote the
vector of cumulative observations and initial beliefs of X. Then we can model ~p using a
posterior Dirichlet distribution as follows:
f(~p|ξ) = Dir(~p|~γ) = Γ(
∑k
i=1 γi)∏k
i=1 Γ(γi)
k∏
i=1
pi
γi−1 (4.2)
where ξ denotes the background knowledge, which in here is summarized by ~γ.
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Let
γ0 =
k∑
i=1
γi (4.3)
The expected value of the probability of X to be xi given the history of observations ~γ is
given by:
E(pi|~γ) = γi
γ0
(4.4)
In order to give more weight to recent observations over old ones, we embed a forgetting
factor λ in the Dirichlet background knowledge vector ~γ as follows:
~γ(n) =
n∑
i=1
λti × ~Si + c0λt0 ~S0 (4.5)
where n is the number of observations; ~S0 is the initial beliefs vector. If no additional
information is available, all outcomes have an equal probability making S0j = 1/k for
all j ∈ {1, .., k}. Parameter c0 > 0 is a priori constant, which puts a weight on the
initial beliefs. Vector ~Si denotes the satisfaction level of the ith evidence, which is a tuple
containing k − 1 elements set to zero and only one element set to 1, corresponding to the
selected satisfaction level for that evidence. Parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] is the forgetting factor. A
small λ makes old observations quickly forgettable. Parameter ti denotes the time elapsed
(age) since the ith evidence ~Si was observed. Let ∆ti = ti − ti+1. For the purpose of
scalability, the ~γ(n) in Equation 4.5 can be rewritten in terms of ~γ(n−1), ~Sn and ∆tn as
follows:
~γ(n) =
{
c0 ~S0 n = 0
λ∆tn × ~γ(n−1) + ~Sn n > 0
(4.6)
4.2.3 Evaluating the Trustworthiness of a Peer
After a peer receives the feedback for an alert evaluation, it assigns a satisfaction value
to the feedback according to Equation 4.1. This satisfaction value is assigned with one
of the satisfaction levels in the set X = {x1, x2, ..., xk} that has the closest value. Each
satisfaction level xi also has a weight wi.
Let puvi denote the probability that peer v provides answers to the requests sent by
peer u with satisfaction level xi. Let ~p
uv = (puvi )i=1...k |
∑k
i=1 p
uv
i = 1. We model ~p
uv
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using Equation 4.2. Let Y uv be the random variable denoting the weighted average of the
probability of each satisfaction level in ~puv.
Y uv =
k∑
i=1
puvi wi (4.7)
The trustworthiness of peer v as noticed by peer u is then calculated as:
T uv = E[Y uv] =
k∑
i=1
wiE[p
uv
i ] =
1
γuv0
k∑
i=1
wiγ
uv
i (4.8)
where γuvi is the cumulated evidence that v has replied to u with satisfaction level xi. The
variance of Y uv is equal to (superscript uv is omitted for clarity):
σ2[Y ] =
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
wiwjcov[pi, pj] (4.9)
Knowing that the covariance of pi and pj (i 6= j) is given by:
cov(pi, pj) =
−γiγj
γ20(γ0 + 1)
(4.10)
We get:
σ2[Y ] =
k∑
i=1
w2i σ
2[pi] + 2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
wiwjcov[pi, pj]
=
k∑
i=1
w2i
γi(γ0 − γi)
γ20(γ0 + 1)
+ 2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=i+1
wiwj
−γiγj
γ20(γ0 + 1)
=
1
γ30 + γ
2
0
k∑
i=1
wiγi
(
wi(γ0 − γi)− 2
k∑
j=i+1
wjγj
)
(4.11)
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Let Cuv ∈ (−1, 1] be the confidence level for the value of T uv, and we describe it as:
Cuv = 1− 4σ[Y uv] (4.12)
where 4σ[Y uv] is roughly the 95% confidence interval.
Lemma 4.2.1 The confidence level Cuv formulated by Equation 4.12 lies in bound (-1, 1].
Proof From Equation 4.12 and Equation 4.11, we have,
Cuv = 1− 4√
1 + γ0
√√√√ k∑
i=1
w2i
γi
γ0
− (
k∑
i=1
wi
γi
γ0
)2 (4.13)
where wi ∈ [0, 1],∀i is the weight of the satisfaction level i, and γ0 =
∑k
i=1 γi > 0. To
prove the boundary of Cuv, we construct a discrete random variable Z ∈ {w1, w2, ..., wk},
where w1 ≤ w2 ≤ ... ≤ wk and P[Z = wi] = γiγ0 ,∀i. Then we have,
σ2[Z] = E(Z2)− E2(Z) =
k∑
i=1
w2i
γi
γ0
− (
k∑
i=1
wi
γi
γ0
)2 (4.14)
We can see that the variation of Z is the major component of Cuv. It is not difficult to
see that σ2[Z] reaches its maximum when P[Z = w1] = P[Z = wk] = 0.5 and P[Z = wj] =
0,∀j(1 < j < k). Therefore, we have 0 ≤ σ2[Z] ≤ 1
4
. After replacing Equation 4.14 back
into Equation 4.13, we have −1 < Cuv ≤ 1.
4.3 Test Message Exchange Rate and Scalability of
Our System
Each IDS u in our system maintains an acquaintance list and a probation list with maxi-
mum length lumax. This length can be fixed according to the resource capacity of node u or
slightly updated with the changes in IDN size. However, it is always set to a value small
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Table 4.1: Acquaintance Categorization
Peer category Criterion Rate
Highly Trustworthy 0 <th≤ Tl Rl
Trustworthy Tl <th≤ T Rh
Untrustworthy T <th≤ Th Rm
Highly Untrustworthy Th <th≤ 1 Rl
enough to account for scalability. Equation 4.6 ensures that the process of updating the
trustworthiness of a peer after the reception of a response is performed with only three
operations, making it linear with respect to the number of answers.
There is a trade-off to be resolved in order to account for scalability in the number of
messages exchanged in the IDN. On one hand, the forgetting factor in Equation 4.6 decays
the importance given to existing highly trusted peers. This implies that their corresponding
test message rates need to be above a certain minimal value. On the other hand, sending
too many requests to other peers may compromise scalability. To solve this issue, we adapt
the rate of test messages to a given peer according to its estimated trustworthiness. The
adaptation policy is provided in Table 4.1, where acquaintances are categorized into highly
trustworthy, trustworthy, untrustworthy, and highly untrustworthy. There are three levels
of test message rates: Rl < Rm < Rh. We can see in Table 4.1 that the test message rate to
highly trustworthy or highly untrustworthy peers is low. This is because we are confident
about our decision of including or not their feedback into the aggregation. A higher test
message rate is assigned to trustworthy or untrustworthy peers because their trust values
are close to the threshold and hence need to be kept under close surveillance.
Each peer in the system needs to actively respond to others’ requests in order to keep
up its trustworthiness and be able to receive prompt help when needed. However, actively
responding to every other peer may cause bandwidth and/or CPU overloading. Therefore,
as a consultant to others, a peer would like to limit the rate of answers it provides. In this
regard, each peer in our system would respond to requests with a priority proportional to
the amount of trust it places on the source of the request [133]. It will give higher priority
to highly trusted friends. This obeys the social norm: “Be nice to others who are nice to
you”, and also provides incentives for encouraging peers to act honestly in order to receive
prompt help in times of need.
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4.4 Robustness against Common Threats
Trust management can effectively improve network collaboration and detect malicious
peers. However, the trust management system itself may become the target of attacks
and be compromised. In this section, we describe common attacks and provide defense
mechanisms against them.
Sybil attacks
Sybil attacks occur when a malicious peer in the system creates a large amount of pseudonyms
(fake identities) [44]. Such a malicious peer uses fake identities to gain larger influence in
the network and use it in false ranking of alerts. Our defense against sybil attacks rely
on the authentication mechanism in place (e.g., a certificate issuing authority) and our
acquaintance management system. Authentication makes registering fake identities diffi-
cult. The registration of new user IDs requires puzzle solving (such as CAPTCHA) which
requires human intelligence to handle. In this way, creating a large number of fake IDs is
not practical for an attacker. In addition, our trust management model requires IDSs to
first build up their trust before they can affect the decision of others, which is costly to
do with many fake identities. This way, our security and trust mechanisms protect our
collaborative network from sybil attacks.
Newcomer attacks
Newcomer attacks occur when a malicious peer can easily register as a new user [92]. Such
a malicious peer creates a new ID for the purpose of erasing its bad history with other peers
in the network and create immediate damages. Our model handles this type of attacks by
assigning low trust values to all newcomers and enforcing the probation period for each
new node. In this way, their feedback on the alerts is simply not considered by other peers
during the aggregation process. Newcomers may gain more trust over time and eventually
move to acquaintance list if they behave consistently well.
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Betrayal attacks
Betrayal attacks occur when a trusted peer suddenly turns into a malicious one and starts
sending false feedbacks. A trust management system can be degraded dramatically because
of this type of attacks. We employ a mechanism which is inspired by the social norm: “It
takes a long-time interaction and consistent good behavior to build up a high trust, while
only a few bad actions to ruin it.” When a trustworthy peer acts dishonestly, the forgetting
factor (Equation 4.6) causes its trust value to drop down quickly, hence making it difficult
for this peer to deceive others or gain back its previous trust within a short time.
Collusion attacks
Collusion attacks happen when a group of malicious peers cooperate together by providing
false alert rankings in order to compromise the network. In our system, peers will not
be adversely affected by collusion attacks. In our trust model each peer relies on its own
knowledge to detect dishonest peers. In addition, we use test messages to uncover malicious
peers. Since the test messages are sent in a random manner, it will be difficult for malicious
peers to distinguish them from actual requests.
Inconsistency attacks
Inconsistency attacks happen when a malicious peer repeatedly changes its behavior from
honest to dishonest in order to degrade the efficiency of the IDN. Inconsistency attacks
are harder to succeed in the Dirichlet-based model because of the use of the forgetting
factor and the dynamic test message rate, which makes trust values easy to lose and hard
to gain. This ensures that the trust values of peers with inconsistent behavior remain low
and hence have little impact.
4.5 Simulations and Experimental Results
In this section, we present a set of experiments used to evaluate the efficiency, scalability
and robustness of our trust management model in comparison with existing ones [56][45].
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Table 4.2: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value Description
Rl 2/day Low test message rate
Rm 10/day Medium test message rate
Rh 20/day High test message rate
λ 0.9 Forgetting factor
th 0.8 Trust threshold for aggregation
c0 10 Priori Constant
c1 1.5 Cost rate of low estimate to high estimate
c2 1 Satisfaction sensitivity factor
s 4 Size of grid region
k 10 Number of satisfaction levels
Experiments are also carried out to demonstrate the desirable properties of our acquain-
tance management algorithm. Each experimental result presented in this section is derived
from the average of a large number of replications with an overall negligible confidence in-
terval.
4.5.1 Simulation Setting
We simulate an IDN environment with n IDS peers randomly distributed over an s×s grid
region. The proximity distance is given by the minimum number of square steps between
each two peers. The expertise level of a peer can be low (0.05), medium (0.5) or high (0.95).
In the beginning, each peer receives an initial acquaintance list containing neighbour nodes
based on proximity. The initial trust value of every peer in the acquaintance list is 0.5.
To test the trustworthiness of acquaintances, each peer sends out test messages following
a Poisson process with rates according to Table 4.1. The parameters we used are shown in
Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Decision Density Function for Expertise Levels
4.5.2 Modeling the Expertise Level of a Peer
To reflect the expertise level of each peer, we use a Beta distribution to simulate the
decision model of answering requests. A Beta density function is given by:
f(p|α, β) = 1
B(α, β)
pα−1(1− p)β−1
B(α, β) =
∫ 1
0
tα−1(1− t)β−1dt (4.15)
where f(p|α, β) is the probability that a peer with expertise level l answers with a value
of p ∈ [0, 1] to an alert of difficulty level d ∈ [0, 1]. Higher values for d are associated to
attacks that are difficult to detect, i.e. many peers fail to identify them. Higher values of
l imply a higher probability of producing correct alert rankings.
Let r be the expected ranking of an alert. We define α and β as follows:
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α = 1 +
l(1− d)
d(1− l)
√
r
1− r
√
2
l
− 1
β = 1 +
l(1− d)
d(1− l)
√
1− r
r
√
2
l
− 1 (4.16)
For a fixed difficulty level, the above model has the property of assigning higher proba-
bilities of producing correct rankings to peers with higher levels of expertise. A peer with
expertise level l has a lower probability of producing correct rankings for alerts of higher
difficulty (d > l). l = 1 or d = 0 represent the extreme cases where the peer can always
accurately rank the alert. This is reflected in the Beta distribution by α, β → ∞. Figure
4.2 shows the feedback probability distribution for peers with different expertise levels,
where we fix the expected risk level to 0.6 and the difficulty level of test messages to 0.5.
4.5.3 Deception Models
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Figure 4.3: Feedback Curves for Different Deception Strategies
A dishonest peer may adopt one of the four deception models: complementary, exag-
gerate positive, exaggerate negative, and maximal harm. The first three deception models
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are described in [121], where an adversary may choose to send feedback about the risk level
of an alert that is respectively opposite to, higher, or lower than the true risk level. We
propose a maximal harm model where an adversary always chooses to report false feed-
back with the intention to bring the most negative impact to the request sender. Figure
4.3 shows the feedback curve for the different deception strategies. For instance, when a
deceptive peer using the maximal harm strategy receives a ranking request and detects
that the risk level of the request is “medium”, it sends feedback “no risk” because this
feedback can maximally deviate the aggregated result at the sender side.
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Figure 4.4: Convergence of Trust Values for Different Expertise Levels
4.5.4 Trust Values and Confidence Levels for Honest Peers
We first evaluate the effectiveness of the collaboration and the importance of our trust
management. In this experiment, all peers are honest. We simulate the scenario where
each peer u has a fixed size Nu of its acquaintance list. The peers are divided into three
equally-sized groups of low, medium and high expertise levels respectively. The first phase
of the simulation is a learning period (50 days), during which peers learn about each other’s
expertise levels by sending out test messages. Figure 4.4 shows the resulting average trust
values of the 30 acquaintances of peer u. The trust values converge after 30 days of
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Figure 4.5: Confidence Levels of Estimation for Different Test Message Rates
simulation and the actual expertise levels of the peers are able to be effectively identified
by our trust model.
To study the impact of different test message rates on the confidence level of trust
estimation (Equation 4.12), we conduct a second experiment to let u use a fixed test
message rate in every simulation round. The rate of sending test messages starts with one
message per day and increases by five for every simulation round. We plot the confidence
level of trust evaluation for each test message rate in Figure 4.5. We can observe that
the confidence level increases with the increase of the test message rate. This confirms our
argument that sending more test messages improves the confidence of trust estimation. We
also observe that the confidence levels increase with the expertise levels. This is because
peers with higher expertise levels tend to perform more consistently.
4.5.5 Trust Values for Dishonest Peers
The purpose of this experiment is to study the impact of dishonest peers using the four
different deception strategies described in Section 4.5.3. To study the maximum impact
of these deception strategies, we only use peers with a high expertise level as deceptive
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Figure 4.6: Trust Values of Deceptive Peers with Different Deception Strategies
adversaries since they are more likely to know the true answers and can perform the
deception strategies more accurately.
In this experiment, we let peer u have an acquaintance list of 40 dishonest peers divided
into four groups. Each group uses one of the four deception models: complimentary,
exaggerate positive, exaggerate negative, and maximal harm. We use a dynamic test
message rate and observe the convergence curve of the average trust value for each group
of deceptive peers. Results are plotted in Figure 4.6.
We notice that the trust values of all adversary peers converge to stable values after
30 days of the learning phase. It is not surprising that adversary peers using the maximal
harm strategy have the lowest trust values, while adversary peers using the complimentary
strategy have the second lowest ones. The converged trust values of adversary peers using
exaggerate positives are higher than those using exaggerate negatives. This is because we
use an asymmetric penalization mechanism for inaccurate replies (c1 > 1 in Equation 4.1).
We penalize more heavily peers that untruthfully report lower risks than those which
untruthfully report higher risks.
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4.5.6 Robustness of Our Trust Model
The goal of this experiment is to study the robustness of our trust model against various
insider attacks. For the newcomer attack, malicious peers white-wash their bad history
and re-register as new users to the system. If the trust value of a newcomer can increase
quickly based on its short term good behavior, the system is then vulnerable to newcomer
attacks. However, a newcomer attack is difficult to succeed in our model. In our model,
we use parameter c0 in Equation 4.6 to control the trust value increasing rate. When c0 is
larger, it takes longer for a newcomer to gain a trust value above the trust threshold.
We compare our Dirichlet-based model with our previous model [56] and the model
of Duma et al. [45] in Figure 4.7. We observe that in the Duma et al. model, the trust
values of new users increase very fast and reach the aggregation trust threshold (0.8) in
the first day, which reveals a high vulnerability to newcomer attacks. The reason for this
is that their model does not have an initial trust to new peers and therefore their trust
values change fast in the beginning. In the model we developed in [56], the trust values
increase in a slower manner and reach the trust threshold after three days. However, that
model is not flexible in that it does not offer control over the trust increase speed. In the
Dirichlet-based model, the trust increase speed is controlled by the priori constant c0. For
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Figure 4.8: Trust of Malicious Peers under Betrayal Attack
c0 = 10, it takes a newcomer four to five days of consistent good behavior to reach the
same trust value. Larger values of c0 make it even slower to reach high trust, hence offering
robustness against newcomer attacks.
The second possible threat is the betrayal attack, where a malicious peer first gain a
high trust value and then suddenly starts to act dishonestly. This scenario can happen,
for example, when a peer is compromised. To demonstrate the robustness of our model
against this attack type, we set up a scenario where u has seven peers in its acquaintance
list, of which six are honest with an expertise level evenly divided between low, medium,
and high. The malicious one has high expertise and behaves honestly in the first 50 days.
After that, it launches a betrayal attack by adopting a maximal harm deceptive strategy.
We observe the trust value of the betraying peer and the satisfaction levels of aggregated
feedback in each day with respect to u.
Figure 4.8 shows the trust value of the betraying peer before and after the launching of
the betrayal attack when respectively using Duma et al., our previous and our current trust
models. For the Duma et al. model, the trust value of the malicious peer slowly drops
after the betrayal attack. This is because their model does not use a forgetting factor,
hence providing the previous honest behavior of a malicious peer with a heavy impact on
the trust calculation for a considerable amount of time. The trust value of the betraying
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Figure 4.9: Impact on Accuracy of Betrayal Attack
peer drops much faster using our previous model, while the fastest rate is observed when
using our Dirichlet-based model. This is because both models use a forgetting factor to
pay more attention to the more recent behavior of peers.
We also notice that the Dirichlet-based model has a slight improvement over our pre-
vious model. The Dirichlet-based model adopts the dynamic test message rate and can
react more swiftly. The rate of sending messages to malicious peers increases as soon as
they start behaving dishonestly. Higher rates of test messages help in faster detection of
dishonest behavior. However, in our previous model, the test message rate remains the
same. This phenomenon can be further observed in Figure 4.10.
The results for the satisfaction levels of aggregated feedback with respect to u before
and after the betrayal attack are shown in Figure 4.9. We notice that the satisfaction
level of u for the aggregated feedback drops down drastically in the first day following the
learning period and recovers after that in all three models. The recovery period is however
much shorter for the Dirichlet-based and our previous models. This is again attributed to
the use of the forgetting factor. The Dirichlet-based model has a slight improvement in the
recovering speed over our previous model. This is because in the Dirichlet-based model,
the trust values of betraying peers drop under the aggregation threshold faster than our
previous model. Therefore, the impact of betraying peers is eliminated earlier than that
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in the previous model.
4.5.7 Scalability of our Trust Model
The result of test message rates under betrayal attack is shown in Figure 4.10. We notice
that in our Dirichlet-based model, the average test message rates for highly trustworthy
as well as highly untrustworthy peers are the lowest. The average test message sending
rate to peers with the medium expertise level is higher but still below the medium rate
(Rm). Compared to our previous model, the average message sending rate is much lower,
which demonstrates the improved scalability of our Dirichlet-based model. Note that the
spike from the betraying group on around day 50 is caused by the drastic increment of
the test message rate. The sudden change of a highly trusted peer behavior will cause the
trust confidence level to drop down quickly. The rate of sending messages to this peer then
switches to Rh accordingly.
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4.5.8 Efficiency of our Trust Model
To demonstrate the efficiency of our Dirichlet-based trust model, we conduct another
experiment to evaluate the intrusion detection accuracy. In this experiment, we let peer
u have 15 acquaintances, which are evenly divided into low, medium, and high expertise
groups. Among the expert peers, some are malicious and launch inconsistency attacks
synchronously to degrade the efficiency of the IDN. More specifically, in each round of
behavior changing, these malicious peers adopt the maximal harm deception strategy for
two days followed by six days of honest behavior.
In Figure 4.11, we vary the percentages of malicious peers from 0% to 80%. We inject
daily intrusions to peer u with medium difficulty (0.5) and random risk levels. We then plot
the average satisfaction level for the aggregated feedback. We observe that our Dirichlet-
based model outperforms the others. This is because the dynamic test message rate in
Dirichlet-based model causes the trust of malicious peers to drop faster and increase more
slowly, hence minimizing the impact of dishonest behavior. Among the three models, Duma
et al. has the least satisfaction level because of its slow response to sudden changes in peer
behavior and its aggregation of all feedback from even untrustworthy peers.
Figure 4.12 shows the success rate of peer u in detecting intrusions. We notice that both
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Figure 4.12: Intrusion Detection Success Rate under Inconsistency Attack
our previous model and the Duma et al. model cannot effectively detect intrusions when
the majority of peers are malicious. Our Dirichlet-based model shows excellent efficiency
in intrusion detection even in the situation of a dishonest majority.
4.6 Related Work
Most of the existing work on distributed collaborative intrusion detection relies on the
assumption that all IDSs are trustworthy and faithfully report intrusion events. The In-
dra system [67] distributes among peers information about attack attempts on different
machines so as to proactively react and increase the chance of detecting an attack. This
system also allows peer neighbors to share information about intrusion attempts in order
to enhance the overall system security. Another example is the distributed intrusion alert
fusion system called Cyber Disease Distributed Hash Table (CDDHT) [75]. The CDDHT
system provides several load balancing schemes to evenly distribute intrusion alarms among
the sensor fusion centers in order to increase the scalability, fault-tolerance and robustness
of the system. However, the systems mentioned above are all vulnerable to malicious IDS
attacks. False information about intrusion events sent by malicious IDSs may heavily
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degrade the performance of these IDNs.
To protect an IDN, it is important to evaluate the trustworthiness of participating
IDSs. ABDIAS [60] is a community based IDN where IDSs are organized into groups
and exchange intrusion information to gain better intrusion detection accuracy. A simple
majority-based voting system was proposed to detect compromised nodes. However, such
system is vulnerable to colluded voting. Duma et al. [45] propose to address possibly
malicious IDSs (peers) by introducing a trust-aware collaboration engine for correlating
intrusion alerts. Their trust management scheme uses each peer’s past experience to predict
others’ trustworthiness. However, their trust model is simplistic and does not address
security issues within the collaborative network. For instance, in their system, the peer’s
past experience has the same impact on the final trust values of others, and therefore is
vulnerable to betrayal attacks where compromised peers suddenly change their behavior.
In our model, we use a forgetting factor when calculating trust, in order to rely more on
the peer’s recent experience and be robust to the changes of other peers’ behavior. Our
previous work [56] proposed a robust trust management model that uses test messages
to gain personal experience and a forgetting factor to emphasize most recent experiences.
However, this model needs to repeatedly aggregate all past experience with a peer when
updating its trust, which makes it not scalable over time. It uses a linear model to calculate
the average satisfaction levels of past interactions, and lacks a theoretical foundation. Also
this approach does not capture trust modeling uncertainties or provide statistical confidence
information on intrusion decisions. Our new model uses Dirichlet distributions to model
peer trustworthiness. It makes use of dynamic test message rates in order to allow for
better scalability. Also, our new model further improves robustness over our previous one
through the use of flexible test message rates.
The Dirichlet family has been used in reputation modeling to handle the multi-level
rating problem [70, 69]. Researchers in multi-agent systems have also been developing trust
models to evaluate the trustworthiness of buying and selling agents in e-marketplaces [122].
One of the earliest trust models developed by Marsh [79] computes the trustworthiness of
selling agents by taking into account direct interactions between buying and selling agents.
The trust-oriented learning strategy proposed by Tran and Cohen [106] uses reinforcement
learning to determine the trustworthiness of selling agents, after the true value of delivered
goods is evaluated and compared to the buying agent’s expected value for the goods.
Selling agents can be classified as untrustworthy if their trust values fall below a certain
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threshold and buying agents try to select the trustworthy selling agent with the highest
expected value for the goods. The Beta Reputation System (BRS) of Whitby et al. [114]
and the TRAVOS model of Teacy et al. [105] estimate the trustworthiness of a selling agent
by employing a Beta probability density function representing a probability distribution
of a continuous variable. The work of Zhang and Cohen [122] focuses on coping with
inaccurate reputation information about selling agents shared by malicious buying agents in
e-marketplaces. The REGRET model of Sabater et al. [96] offers a multi-dimensional view
of trust that includes a social dimension taking into consideration the social relationships
among agents. However, it is difficult to clearly determine social relationships among IDSs
in IDNs.
Our model is different from the above trust models in several aspects. First, our model
is focused on long-term collaboration trust. Repetitive direct interactions between two
agents are common in IDN environment. Second, the cost of experience in IDN is much
lower than in e-commerce and it allows IDSs to send test messages to better establish trust
relationships with others. Third, our model uses fine-grained experience quality rather than
a binary measurement such as “good” or “bad”. Instead, it is categorized into multiple
levels. Finally, our model uses direct trust modeling rather than reputation models. It
is because the latter may suffer from collusion attacks where a group of malicious IDSs
cooperate together by providing false reputation information about some IDSs to bad-
mouth these targets for example.
Different reputation models were proposed in distributed systems [68, 103, 80]. These
reputation models allow peers to get advice when evaluating the trustworthiness of other
peers. For example, [68] uses a global reputation management to evaluate distributed
trust by aggregating votes from all peers in the network. Sun et al. [103] propose for the
communication in distributed networks an entropy-based model and a probability-based
one. The models are used to calculate indirect trust, propagation trust and multi-path
trust. They however involve a lot of overhead which limits their scalability. Another
important concern is that IDSs can be easily compromised and become deceptive when
reporting the trustworthiness of others. The reputation models for peer-to-peer networks,
such as PowerTrust [91], TrustGuard [101], Malicious detector [82, 81], and Fine-Grained
reputation [123] are capable of detecting malicious peers. However, they are purposed to
detect deceiving nodes in a P2P network and can not be directly used in IDNs to improve
the intrusion detection accuracy. A trust model in IDN should not only detect malicious
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nodes but also improve the intrusion detection accuracy overall and offer robustness and
scalability.
4.7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we presented a trust management model for evaluating trustworthiness of
Intrusion Detection Systems in a Collaborative Intrusion Detection Network. Our trust
management uses Dirichlet density functions as its foundation, and is accordingly able to
measure the uncertainty in estimating the likely future behavior of IDSs. The measured
uncertainty allows our trust management to employ an adaptive message exchange rate, re-
sulting in good scalability. Equipped with a forgetting factor, it is also robust against some
common threats. The effectiveness, robustness and scalability of our trust management
have been further validated through experiments carried out in a simulated Collaborative
Intrusion Detection Network. IDSs in the conducted experiments have different levels of
expertise in detecting intrusions and adopt different deception strategies. The results show
that our trust management is more effective compared to existing trust models for intrusion
detection networks. This is an important step forward since effective trust management is
essential for the deployment of secure IDNs.
One possible direction for future work here is to incorporate a reputation model in
our trust management. This will require addressing the important issues of inaccurate
reputation information, scalability and collusion attacks.
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Chapter 5
Collaborative Decision
5.1 Introduction
Efficient and trustworthy feedback aggregation is a critical component in the design of
IDNs. In this chapter, we intruduce FADEX1, an efficient and trustworthy feedback ag-
gregation mechanism for our IDN. In FADEX, each IDS in the IDN evaluates its peer
collaborators based on their false positive and false negative rates, which can be estimated
from historical data and test messages. Accordingly assessments received from an incompe-
tent or malicious insider will have less weight in the final decisions. FADEX aggregation is
based on data analysis and hypothesis testing methods. Specifically we design optimal de-
cision rules that minimize Bayesian risks of IDSs in the network. In addition, for real-time
applications, a host IDS only needs to consult a subset of its acquaintances until desired
levels of performance, such as probabilities of detection and false alarm, are achieved. In
other words, FADEX provides a data-driven efficiently-distributed sequential algorithm for
IDSs to make decisions based on feedback from a subset of their collaborators. The goal
is to reduce communication overhead and the computational resources needed to achieve
a satisfactory feedback aggregation result when the number of acquaintances of an IDS
is large. We consider four possible outcomes of a decision: false positive (FP), false neg-
ative (FN), true positive (TP), and true negative (TN). Each outcome is associated with
a cost. Our proposed sequential-hypothesis testing-based feedback aggregation provides
1FADEX stands for “Feedback Aggregation for collaborative intrusion Detection nEtworKS”
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improved cost efficiency as compared to other heuristic methods such as the simple av-
erage model [93] and the weighted average model [45, 57]. Communication overhead is
reduced since the IDS aggregates feedback until a predefined FP and TP goal is reached.
An analytical model is used to estimate the number of acquaintances needed for an IDS
to reach its predefined intrusion detection goal. Such a result is crucial to the design of an
IDS acquaintance list in our IDN.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we survey some
IDN trust models and feedback aggregation techniques. The decision aggregation problem
is formulated in Section 5.3, where we use hypothesis testing to minimize the cost of
decisions, and sequential hypothesis testing to form consultation termination policy for
predefined goals is described in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, we use a simulations to evaluate
the effectiveness of FADEX and validate the analytical model. Section 5.6 concludes the
chapter and identifies directions for future research.
5.2 Related Work
Recent studies on IDNs [56, 57, 60] have proposed the use of trust models to identify dis-
honest peers. Intrusion assessments from nodes with different trust values are assigned with
different weights to improve intrusion detection accuracy. ABDIAS [60] is a community-
based IDN where IDSs are organized into groups and exchange intrusion information in
order to gain better intrusion detection accuracy. A simple majority-based voting system
is used to detect compromised nodes. However, this voting-based system is vulnerable to
colluded voting. Another solution to detect compromised nodes is a trust management
system where peers build trust with each other based on personal experience. Existing
trust management models for IDN include the linear model [45], [56] and the Bayesian
model [57, 53]. However, all these works used heuristic approaches to aggregate consulta-
tion results from other collaborators. In this chapter, we propose a Bayesian aggregation
model which aims at finding optimal decisions based on collected information.
Bayesian approaches have been used in distributed detection in the past. Existing
works, including [107] and [88], use Bayesian hypothesis testing methods to aggregate at
a central data fusion center feedback from sensors distributed in a local area network.
However, these methods require all participants to engage in every detection case, whereas
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in our context, IDSs may not be involved in all intrusion detections and the collected
responses may come from different groups of IDSs each time.
The trustworthiness of IDNs has been ensured at various levels of the system archi-
tecture. In [133] and [132], a communication protocol with the property of reciprocal
incentive compatibility has been used to provide IDS nodes incentives to send feedbacks
to their peers, and hence to prevent malicious free-riders, denial-of-service attacks and
dishonest insiders. However, this approach only ensures the reliability and trustworthiness
at the communication overlay of the IDN, and it does not directly deal with the content
of the feedback. In [131] and [52], a knowledge sharing mechanism has been proposed to
allow expert nodes to disseminate knowledge within the IDN to prevent zero-day attacks.
The communication protocols in [131] are implemented at the higher application layers of
the collaborative network. In our work, we aim at ensuring security and trustworthiness
at the “last mile” of the problem, i.e., feedback aggregation.
5.3 System Model
Consider a set of N nodes, N := {1, 2, · · · , N}, connected in a network, which can be
represented by a graph G = (N , E). The set E contains the undirected links between
nodes, indicating the acquaintances of IDSs in the network. An IDS node i ∈ N has a set
of ni acquaintances, denoted by Ni ⊆ N , with ni = |Ni|. When node i observes suspicious
activities and does not have enough experience to make an accurate evaluation of potential
intrusions, it can send out its observed intrusion information to its acquaintances to ask for
diagnosis. The feedback from its acquaintances can be used to make a final decision. The
input to the host IDS is the past history of each acquaintance regarding their detection
accuracy, as well as their current feedbacks. The output is a decision on whether to raise
an alarm or not.
Let Y ij , j ∈ Ni, be a random variable denoting the decision of peer IDS j, j ∈ Ni, on its
acquaintance list Ni of node i. The random variable Y ij takes binary values in Y := {0, 1}
for all j ∈ Ni, i ∈ N . In the intrusion detection setting, Y ij = 0 means that IDS j decides
and reports to IDS i that there is no intrusion, while Y ij = 1 means that IDS j raises an
alarm of possible detection of intrusion to IDS i. Each IDS makes its decision based upon
its own experience of the previous attacks and its own sophistication of detection. We let
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pij as the probability mass function defined on Y such that pij(Y ij = 0) and pij(Y ij = 1)
denote the probability of reporting no intrusion and the probability of reporting intrusion
from IDS j to IDS i, respectively.
We let Yi := [Y ij ]j∈Ni ∈ Yni be an observation vector of IDS i that contains feed-
backs from its peers in the acquaintance list. Each IDS has two hypotheses H0 and H1.
H0 hypothesizes that no intrusion is detected whereas H1 forwards a hypothesis that in-
trusion is detected and alarm needs to be raised. Note that we intentionally drop the
superscript i on H0 and H1 because we assume that each IDS attempts to make the same
type of decisions. Denote by pii0, pi
i
1 the apriori probabilities on each hypothesis such that
pii0 = P[H0], pii1 = P[H1] and pii0 +pii1 = 1, for all i ∈ N . Let pi be the probability measure on
Yni , for all i ∈ N . The conditional probabilities pi(Yi = yi|Hl), l = 0, 1, denote the prob-
abilities of a complete feedback being yi ∈ Yni given the hypothesis H0, H1, respectively.
Assuming that peers make decisions independently (this is reasonable if acquaintances are
appropriately selected), we can rewrite the conditional probability as
pi(Yi = yi|Hl) =
∏
j∈Ni
pij(Y
i
j = y
i
j|Hl), i ∈ N , l = 0, 1. (5.1)
Our goal is to decide whether the system should raise an alarm to the system admin-
istrator based on the current received feedbacks. We need to point out that the feedback
aggregation does not exclude the local diagnosis of the host IDS itself. If an IDS is capable
of making its own diagnosis, this one is aggregated with the feedbacks from its peers in
the acquaintances. Table 5.1 summarizes the notations we use in this section.
In the following subsections, we first model the past behavior of acquaintances and then
model the decision problem using Bayesian risk function.
5.3.1 Modeling of Acquaintances
The conditional probabilities pij(Y
i
j |Hl), i ∈ N , j ∈ Ni, l ∈ {0, 1}, are often unknown
to IDS nodes and they need to be learned from previous data. In this section, we use
the beta distribution and its Gaussian approximation to find these probabilities. We let
pij,M := p
i
j(Y
i
j = 0|H1) be the probability of miss of an IDS j’s diagnosis to node i’s request,
also known as the false negative (FN) rate; and let pij,F := p
i
j(Y
i
j = 1|H0) be the probability
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of false alarm or false positive (FP) rate. The probability of detection, or true positive
(TP) rate, can be expressed as pij,D = 1− pij,M .
Each IDS in the network maintains a history of data containing the diagnosis data
from past consultations. The accuracy of peer diagnosis will be revealed after an intrusion
happens. As mentioned in Section 3.1, test messages can also be used to assess the effec-
tiveness of IDSs even though no intrusion history has been collected. IDS i can use these
collected data from its peers to assess the distributions over its peer IDS j’s probabilities
of detection and false alarm using beta functions, denoted by pij,D and p
i
j,F , respectively.
The total reported diagnosis data from peer IDS j, j ∈ Ni, to IDS i is denoted by the set
Mij, and they are classified into two groups: one is where the result is either false positive
or true negative under no intrusion, denoted by the set Mij,0; and the other is where the
result is either false negative or true positive under intrusion, denoted by the set Mij,1.
Both sets are disjoint satisfying Mij,0 ∪Mij,1 =Mij and Mij,0 ∩Mij,1 = ∅.
We let the random variables pij,F and p
i
j,D take the form of beta distributions as follows:
pij,F ∼ Beta(xij|αij,F , βij,F ) =
Γ(αij,F+β
i
j,F )
Γ(αij,F )Γ(β
i
j,F )
(xij)
αij,F−1(1− xij)β
i
j,F−1, (5.2)
pij,D ∼ Beta(yij|αij,D, βij,D) =
Γ(αij,D+β
i
j,D)
Γ(αij,D)Γ(β
i
j,D)
(yij)
αij,D−1(1− yij)β
i
j,D−1, (5.3)
where Γ(·) is the Gamma function; xij, yij ∈ [0, 1]; αij,F , αij,D and βij,F , βij,F are beta function
parameters that are updated according to historical data as follows.
αij,F =
∑
k∈Mij,0
(λiF )
tij,krij,F,k, β
i
j,F =
∑
k∈Mij,0(λ
i
F )
tij,k(1− rij,F,k); (5.4)
αij,D =
∑
k∈Mij,1
(λiD)
tij,krij,D,k, β
i
j,D =
∑
k∈Mij,1(λ
i
D)
tij,k(1− rij,D,k). (5.5)
The introduction of the discount factors λiF , λ
i
D ∈ [0, 1] above allows more weights on
recent data from IDSs while less on the old ones. The discount factors on the data can
be different for false negative and false positive rates. The parameter tij,k denotes the time
when k-th diagnosis data is generated by IDS j, j ∈ Ni, to its peer IDS i. The parameter
rij,F,k, r
i
j,M,k ∈ {0, 1} are the revealed results of the k-th diagnosis data: rij,F,k = 1 suggests
that the k-th diagnosis data from peer j yields an undetected intrusion while rij,F,k = 0
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means otherwise; similarly, rij,D,k = 1 indicates the data from the peer j results in a correct
detection under intrusion, and rij,D,k = 0 means otherwise.
The parameters αij,F , β
i
j,F , α
i
j,D, β
i
j,D in the distribution above also provide an empirical
assessment of the trustworthiness of each peer of IDS i. They can be also seen as the
trust values of the collaborators. A peer who is either malicious or incompetent will result
in low values of αij,D and higher values α
i
j,D. To make the parametric updates scalable
to data storage and memory, we can use the following recursive formulae to update these
parameters as follows:
αij,e,k = (λ
i
e)
tij,k−tij,k−1αij,e,k−1 + r
i
j,e,k, k ≥ 1, (5.6)
βij,e,k = (λ
i
e)
tij,k−tij,k−1βij,e,k−1 + r
i
j,e,k, k ≥ 1, (5.7)
where e ∈ {F,D}; αij,D,k, βij,D,k, are parameter values up to k-th data point in their corre-
sponding data set Mij,1; αij,F,k, βij,F,k, are parameter values up to k-th data point in their
corresponding data set Mij,0. We can see that when λie = 0, the system becomes memo-
ryless, and when λie = 1, all past experiences are taken into account on equal basis. The
online iterative calculations also provide a method to assess the trust values with real time
data.
When parameters of the beta functions α and β in (5.2) are sufficiently large, i.e.,
enough data are collected, beta distribution can be approximated by a Gaussian distribu-
tion as follows:
Beta(α, β) ≈ G
(
α
α + β
,
√
αβ
(α + β)2(α + β + 1)
)
, (5.8)
where the arguments of G(·, ·) are the mean value and the standard deviation, respectively.
Note that we have dropped the superscripts and subscripts in (5.8) for generality as it can
be applied to all i and j in (5.2). Hence, using the Gaussian approximation and (5.4), the
expected values for pij,D and p
i
j,M are given by
E[pij,F ] =
αij,F
αij,F + β
i
j,F
, E[pij,D] =
αij,D
αij,D + β
i
j,D
. (5.9)
The mean values in (5.9) under large data can be intuitively interpreted as the proportion
of results of false alarm and detection in the set Mij,0 and Mij,1, respectively. They can
thus be used in (5.1) as the assessment of the conditional probabilities.
65
5.3.2 Feedback Aggregation
The feedback aggregation problem of IDS i can be seen as a hypothesis testing problem
in which one finds a decision function δi(Yi) : Yni → {0, 1} to minimize the Bayes risk of
IDS i
Ri(δi) = Ri0(δ
i|H0)pii0 +Ri1(δi|H1)pii1, (5.10)
where Ri(δi|H0) is the cost of false alarm and Ri(δi|H1) is the cost of missed detection.
An optimal decision function partitions the observation space Yni into two disjoint sets Y i0
and Y i1, where Y i0 = {yi : δi(yi) = 0}, and Y i1 = {yi : δi(yi) = 1}.
To find an optimal decision function according to some criterion, we introduce the cost
function Cill′ , l, l
′ = 0, 1, which represents IDS i’s cost of deciding that Hl is true when Hl′
holds. More specifically, Ci01 is the cost associated with a missed intrusion or attack and
Ci10 refers to the cost of false alarm, while C
i
00, C
i
11 are the incurred costs when the decision
meets the true situation. Let
Ri0(δ
i|H0) = Ci10pi[δi = 1|H0] + Ci00pi[δi = 0|H0], (5.11)
Ri1(δ
i|H0) = Ci01pi[δi = 0|H1] + Ci11pi[δi = 1|H1]. (5.12)
It can be shown that decision functions can be picked as function of the likelihood ratio
given by Li(yi) = p
i(yi|H1)
pi(yi|H0) (see [88, 107]).
A threshold Bayesian decision rule is expressed in terms of the likelihood ratio and is
given by
δiB(y
i) =
{
1 if Li(yi) ≥ τ i
0 if Li(yi) < τ i
, (5.13)
where the threshold τ i is defined by
τ i =
(Ci10 − Ci00)pii0
(Ci01 − Ci11)pii1
. (5.14)
If the costs are symmetric and the two hypothesis are equal likely, then the rule in
(5.13) reduces to the maximum likelihood (ML) decision rule
δiML(y) =
{
1 if pi(yi|H1) ≥ pi(yi|H0)
0 if pi(yi|H1) < pi(yi|H0) , (5.15)
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Assume that Ci00, C
i
11 = 0. Using the results in Section 5.3.1, we can obtain the following
decision rule for each IDS. The application of the optimal decision rules is summarized in
Algorithm 1.
Proposition 5.3.1 Let τ¯ i :=
Ci10
Ci10+C
i
01
and assume that historical data is relatively large.
The optimal decision rule of IDS i, i ∈ N , is
δi =

1 (Alarm) if P¯ i ≥ τ¯ i,
0 (No alarm) otherwise.
(5.16)
where P¯ i can be obtained by Gaussian approximation as follows:
P¯ i ≈ 1
1 +
pii0
pii1
∏ni
j=1
αij,D+β
i
j,D
αij,F+β
i
j,F
(
αij,F
αij,D
)y
i
j(
βij,F
βij,D
)1−y
i
j
.
The corresponding Bayes risk for the optimal decision is
Ri(δi) =

Ci10(1− P¯ i) if P¯ i ≥ τ¯ i,
Ci01P¯
i otherwise.
(5.17)
Proof The result follows directly from the applications of likelihood ratio test and the
Gaussian approximations of beta distributions under the assumption of large data sets.
5.4 Sequential Hypothesis Testing
The optimal decision rule in Section 5.3 requires each IDS to send requests to all the
acquaintances. As the number of collaborators increases, it creates a lot of communication
overhead and consumes a large amount of computational power to implement Algorithm
1. Instead, it is desirable that IDSs can choose a sufficient number of acquaintances to
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Algorithm 1 Optimal Decision Rule for an IDS i
Step 1: Send out requests to all acquaintances of IDS i and collect their feedback results.
Step 2: Use (5.16) to decide whether an intrusion occurs or not, and take corresponding
actions.
Step 3: Update the data setsMij,0,Mij,1, with the diagnosis results of each peer j, j ∈ Ni
when the fact has been revealed a posteriori.
Step 4: Calculate beta function parameters αij,F , α
i
j,D and β
i
j,F , β
i
j,F using iterative schemes
(5.6) and (5.7).
Step 5: Go to Step 1 when new decisions need to be made or the trustworthiness of new
acquaintances need to be evaluated using test messages.
guarantee a certain level of confidence in the final feedback aggregation. In this section,
we use sequential hypothesis testing to make decisions with minimum number of feedbacks
from peer IDSs, [112], [73]. An IDS asks for feedback from its acquaintances until a
sufficient number of answers is collected. Let Ωi denote all possible collections of feedback
from the acquaintance list of IDS i and ωi ∈ Ωi denotes a particular collection of feedback.
Let N i(ωi) be a random variable denoting the number of feedbacks used until a decision
is made. A sequential decision rule is formed by a pair (φ, δ), where φi = {φin, n ∈ N} is a
stopping rule and δi = {δin, n ∈ N} is the terminal decision rule. Introduce a stopping rule
with n feedback, φin : Y in :=
∏
j∈Ni,n Y → {0, 1}, where Ni,n is the set of nodes an IDS i
asks up to time n. φin = 0 indicates that IDS i needs to take more samples after n rounds
whereas φin = 1 means to stop asking for feedback and a decision can be made by the rule
δin. The minimum number of feedbacks is given by
N i(ωi) = min{n : φin = 1, n ∈ N}. (5.18)
Note that N i(ωi) is the stopping time of the decision rule. The decision rule δi is not used
until N. We assume that no cost has incurred when a correct decision is made while the
cost of a missed intrusion is denoted by Ci01 and the cost of a false alarm is denoted by
Ci10. In addition, we assume each feedback incurs a cost D
i. We introduce an optimal
sequential rule that minimizes Bayes risk given by
Ri(φi, δi) = R(φi, δi|H0)pii0 +R(φi, δi|H1)pii1, (5.19)
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where R(φi, δi|Hl), l = 0, 1, are the Bayes risks under hypotheses H0 and H1, respectively:
Ri(φi, δi|H0) = Ci10pi[δN(Y ij , j ∈ Ni,N) = 1|H0] +DiE[N |H0],
Ri(φi, δi|H1) = Ci01pi[δN(Y ij , j ∈ Ni,N) = 0|H1] +DiE[N |H1].
Let V i(pii0) = minφi,δi R
i(φi, δi) be the optimal value function. It is clear that when no
feedback are obtained from the peers, the Bayes risks reduce to
Ri(φi0 = 1, δ
i
0 = 1) = C
i
10pi
i
0, (5.20)
Ri(φi0 = 1, δ
i
0 = 0) = C
i
01pi
i
1. (5.21)
Hence, H1 is chosen when C
i
10pi
i
0 < C
i
01pi
i
1 or pi
i
0 <
Ci01
Ci10+C
i
01
, and H0 is chosen otherwise. The
minimum Bayes risk under no feedback is thus obtained as a function of pii0 and is denoted
by
T i(pii0) =
{
Ci10pi
i
0 if pi0 <
Ci01
Ci10+C
i
01
,
Ci01(1− pii0) otherwise.
(5.22)
The minimum cost function (5.22) is a piecewise linear function. For φi such that φi0 = 0,
i.e., at least one feedback is obtained, let the minimum Bayes risk be denoted by J i(pii0) =
min{(φi,δi):φi0=0}R
i(φi, δi). Hence, the optimal Bayes risk needs to satisfy
V i(pii0) = min{T i(pii0), J i(pii0)}. (5.23)
Note that J i(pii0) must be greater than the cost of one sample D
i as a sample request incurs
Di and J i(pii0) is concave in pi
i
0 as a consequence of minimizing the linear Bayes risk (5.19).
If the cost Di is high enough so that J i(pii0) > T
i(pii0) for all pi
i
0, then no feedback will be
requested. In this case, V i(pii0) = T
i(pii0), and the terminal rule is described in (5.22). For
other values of Di > 0, due to the piecewise linearity of T i(pii0) and concavity of J
i(pii0), we
can see that J i(pii0) and T
i(pii0) have two intersection points pi
i
L and pi
i
H such that pi
i
L ≤ piiH .
It can be shown that for some reasonably low cost Di and pii0 such that pi
i
L < pi
i
0 < pi
i
H , an
IDS optimizes its risk by requesting another feedback; otherwise, an IDS should choose to
raise an alarm when pii0 ≤ piiL and report no intrusion when pii0 ≤ piiL.
Assuming that it takes the same cost Di for IDS i to acquire a feedback, the problem
has the same form after obtaining a feedback from a peer. IDS i can use the feedback to
update its apriori probability. After n feedback are obtained, pii0 can be updated as follows:
pii0(n) =
pii0
pii0 + (1− pii0)Lin
; (5.24)
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where Lin :=
∏
j∈Ni,n
pi(yij |H1)
p(yij |H0)
. We can thus obtain the optimum Bayesian rule captured by
Algorithm 1 below, known as the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) for a reasonable
cost Di. The SPRT Algorithm 2 can be used to replace step 2 in Algorithm 1. In FADEX,
it is important to note that the choice between Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 1 depends on
the number of acquaintances of an IDS and its computational and memory resources. For
smaller scale IDS networks or new members of the IDN, Algorithm 2 is more desirable
because it allows IDSs to collect more data and learn the level of expertise and trustwor-
thiness of their peers. However, Algorithm 2 becomes more efficient when an IDS has a
large number of collaborators and limited resources.
Algorithm 2 SPRT Rule for an IDS i
Step 1: Start with n = 0. Use (5.25) as a stopping rule until φin = 1 for some n ≥ 0.
φin =
{
0 if piiL < pi
i
0(n) < pi
i
H ,
1 otherwise.
(5.25)
or in terms of the likelihood ratio Lin, we can use
φin =
{
0 if Ai < Lin < B
i
1 otherwise
,
where Ai =
pii0(1−piiH)
(1−pii0)piiH
and Bi =
pii0(1−piiL)
(1−pii0)piiL
.
Step 2: Go to Step 3 if φin = 1 or n = |Ni|; otherwise, choose a new peer from the
acquaintance list to request a diagnosis and go to Step 2 with n = n+ 1.
Step 3: Apply the terminal decision rule as follows to determine whether there is an
intrusion or not.
δin =
{
1 if pii0(n) ≤ piiL
0 if pii0(n) > pi
i
H
or δin =
{
1 if Lin ≤ Ai
0 if Lin > B
i
5.4.1 Threshold Approximation
In the likelihood sequential ratio test of Algorithm 2, the threshold values A and B need to
be calculated by finding piiL and pi
i
H from J
i(pii0) and T
i(pii0) in (5.23). The search for these
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values can be quite involved using dynamic programming. However, in this subsection, we
introduce an approximation method to find the thresholds. The approximation is based
on theoretical studies made in [112] and [73] where a random walk or martingale model
is used to yield a relation between thresholds and false positive and false negative rates.
Let P iD, P
i
F be the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm of an IDS
i after applying the sequential hypothesis testing for feedback aggregation. We need to
point out that these probabilities are different from the probabilities piD, p
i
F discussed in
the previous subsection, which are the raw detection probabilities without feedback in the
collaborative network. Let P¯ iD and P¯
i
F be reasonable desired performance bounds such that
P iF ≤ P¯ iF , P iD ≥ P¯ iD. Then, the thresholds can be chosen such that Ai = 1−P¯
i
D
1−P¯F
i
, Bi =
P¯ iD
P¯ iF
.
The next proposition gives a result on the bound of the users that need to be on the
acquaintance list to achieve the desired performances.
Proposition 5.4.1 Assume that each IDS makes independent diagnosis on its peers’ re-
quests and each has the same distribution pi0 = p¯0 := p¯(·|H0), pi1 = p¯1 := p¯(·|H1), p¯0(yi =
0) = θ0, p¯1(yi = 0) = θ1, for all i ∈ N .
Let DKL(p¯0||p¯1) be the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence defined as follows.
DKL(p¯0||p¯1) =
1∑
k=0
p¯0(k) ln
p¯0(k)
p¯1(k)
, (5.26)
= θ0 ln
θ0
θ1
+ (1− θ0) ln 1− θ0
1− θ1 (5.27)
and likewise introduce the K-L divergence DKL(p¯1||p¯0). Then on the average, an IDS needs
Ni acquaintances such that
Ni ≥ max
(⌈
− D
i
M
DKL(p¯0||p¯1)
⌉
,
⌈
DiF
DKL(p¯1||p¯0)
⌉)
, (5.28)
where DiM = PF ln
(
P iD
P iF
)
+PD ln
(
1−P iD
1−P iF
)
and DiF = P
i
F ln
(
1−P iD
1−P iF
)
+P iD ln
(
P iD
P iF
)
. If P iF  1
and P iM  1, we need approximately Ni acquaitances such that
Ni ≥ max
(⌈
P iD − 1
DKL(p¯0||p¯1)
⌉
,
⌈
− P
i
F
DKL(p¯1||p¯0)
⌉)
. (5.29)
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Proof The conditional expected number of feedback needed to reach a decision on the
hypothesis in SPRT can be expressed in terms of PF and PD, [112], [73].
E[N |H0] = 1−DKL(p¯0||p¯1)
[
P iF ln
(
P iD
P iF
)
+ P iD ln
(
1−P iD
1−P iF
)]
,
E[N |H1] = 1DKL(p¯1||p¯0)
[
P iF ln
(
1−P iD
1−P iF
)
+ P iD ln
(
P iD
P iF
)]
,
Hence, to reach a decision we need to have at least max{E[N |H0],E[N |H1]} independent
acquaintances. Under the assumption that both PF and P
i
M are much less than 1, we can
further approximate
E[N |H0] ∼ − 1− P
i
D
DKL(p¯0||p¯1) ,E[N |H1] ∼ −
P iF
DKL(p¯1||p¯0) .
These lead us to inequalities (5.29) and (5.28).
5.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we use a simulation approach to evaluate the efficiency of the FADEX
feedback aggregation scheme and compare it with other heuristic approaches, such as the
simple average aggregation and the weighted average aggregation (to be explained in more
details in this section).
We conduct a set of experiments to evaluate the average cost of the collaborative
detection using the FADEX aggregation model in comparison with the simple average
and the weighted average models. We validate and confirm our theoretical results on the
number of acquaintances needed for consultation. Each experimental result presented in
this section is derived from the average of a large number of replications with an overall
negligible confidence interval. The parameters we use are shown in Table I.
5.5.1 Simulation Setting
The simulation environment uses an IDN of n peers. Each IDS is represented by two
parameters, expertise level l and decision threshold τp. Expertise level l represents the
ability that the IDS catches suspicious traces from a given observation, and τp represents the
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sensitivity of the IDS (to be elaborated more in Section 5.5.2). At the beginning, each peer
receives an initial acquaintance list containing all the other neighbor nodes. In the process
of the collaborative intrusion detection, a node sends out intrusion information to its
acquaintances to request for an intrusion assessment. The feedbacks collected from others
are used to make a final decision, i.e., whether to raise an alarm or not. Different feedback
aggregation schemes can be used to make such decisions. We implement three different
feedback mechanisms, namely, simple average aggregation, weighted average aggregation,
and FADEX aggregation. We compare their efficiency by the average cost of false decisions.
Simple Average Model
If the average of all feedback is larger than a threshold, then raise an alarm.
δSA =

1 (Alarm) if
∑n
k=1 yk
n
≥ τSA,
0 (No alarm) otherwise,
(5.30)
where τSA is the decision threshold for the simple average algorithm. It is set to be 0.5 if
no cost is considered for making false decisions.
Weighed Average Model
Weights are assigned to feedbacks from different acquaintances to distinguish their detec-
tion capability. For example, high expertise IDSs are signed with larger weight compared
to low expertise IDSs. In [45], [56], and [57], the weights are the trust values of IDSs:
δWA =

1 (Alarm) if
∑n
k=1 wkyk∑n
k=1 wk
≥ τWA,
0 (No alarm) otherwise,
(5.31)
where wk is the weight of the feedback from acquaintance k, which is the trust value of
acquaintance k in [45], [56], and [57]. τWA is the decision threshold for the weighted
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average algorithm. It is fixed to be 0.5 since no cost is considered for FP and FN. In this
simulation, we adopt trust values from [57] to be the weights of feedbacks.
FADEX aggregation Model
As described in section 5.3.2, FADEX aggregation models each IDS with two parameters
(FP and TP) instead of a single trust value. It also considers the costs of false positive and
false negative decisions. The FADEX decision model investigates the cost of all possible
decisions and chooses a decision which leads to a minimal expected cost.
5.5.2 Modeling of a single IDS
To reflect the intrusion detection capability of each peer, we use a Beta distribution to
simulate the decision model of an IDS. A Beta density function is given by:
f(p¯|α¯, β¯) = 1
B(α¯, β¯)
p¯α¯−1(1− p¯)β¯−1;
B(α¯, β¯) =
∫ 1
0
tα¯−1(1− t)β¯−1dt, (5.32)
α¯ and β¯ are defined as follows.
α¯ = 1 +
l(1− d)
d(1− l)r,
β¯ = 1 +
l(1− d)
d(1− l)(1− r). (5.33)
where p¯ ∈ [0, 1] is the assessment result from the host IDS about the probability of
intrusion, and f(p¯|α¯, β¯) is the distribution of assessment p¯ from a peer with expertise level
l to an intrusion with difficulty level d ∈ [0, 1]. Higher values of d are associated with
attacks that are difficult to detect, i.e., many peers may fail to identify them. Higher
values of l imply a higher probability of producing correct intrusion assessment. r ∈ {0, 1}
is the expected result of detection. r = 1 indicates that there is an intrusion and r = 0
indicates that there is no intrusion.
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Figure 5.1: Expertise Level and detection rate
For a fixed difficulty level, the above model has the property of assigning higher proba-
bilities of producing correct rankings to peers with higher levels of expertise. A peer with
expertise level l has a lower probability of producing correct rankings for alerts of higher
difficulty (d > l). l = 1 or d = 0 represent the extreme cases where the peer can always
accurately rank the alert. This is reflected in the Beta distribution by α, β → ∞. Figure
5.1 shows the feedback probability distribution for peers with different expertise levels,
where we fix r = 1 and the difficulty level of test messages to 0.5.
τp is the decision threshold of p¯. If p¯ > τp, a peer sends feedback 1 (i.e., under-attack);
otherwise, feedback 0(i.e., no-attack) is generated. τp indicates the sensitivity of an IDS
detector, lower τ value implies a more sensitive detector. i.e., the IDS is more likely to
raise alert when suspicious trace is noticed. For a fixed difficulty level, the preceding model
assigns higher probabilities of producing correct intrusion diagnosis to peers with higher
level of expertise. A peer with expertise level l has a lower probability of producing correct
intrusion diagnosis for intrusions of higher detection difficulty (d > l). l = 1 or d = 0
represent extreme cases where the peer can always accurately detect the intrusion. This is
reflected in the Beta distribution by α¯, β¯ →∞.
Figure 5.2 shows that both the FP and FN decrease when the expertise level of an
IDS increases. We notice that the curves of FP and FN overlap. This is because the IDS
detection density distributions are symmetric under r = 0 and r = 1. Figure 5.3 shows
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that the FP decreases with the decision threshold while the FN increases with the decision
threshold. When the decision threshold is 0, all feedbacks are positive; when the decision
threshold is 1, all feedbacks are negative.
5.5.3 Detection Accuracy and Cost
One of the most important metrics to evaluate the efficiency of a feedback aggregation is
the average cost of incorrect decisions. We take into consideration the fact that the costs of
FP decisions and FN decisions are different. In the following subsections, we evaluate the
cost efficiency of the FADEX aggregation algorithm compared with other models under
homogeneous and heterogeneous network settings. Then we study the relation between
decision cost and the consulted number of acquaintances.
Cost Under Homogeneous Environment
In this experiment, we study the efficiency of the three aggregation models under a ho-
mogeneous network setting, i.e., all acquaintances have the same parameters. We fix the
expertise levels of all nodes to be 0.5 (i.e., medium expertise) and set C01 = C10 = 1 for the
fairness of comparison, since the simple average and the weighted average models do not
account for the cost difference between FP and FN. We fix the decision threshold for each
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IDS (τp) to 0.1 for the first batch run and then increase it by 0.1 in each following batch
run until it reaches 1.0. We measure the average cost of the three aggregation models. As
shown in Figure 5.4, the average costs on false decisions yielded by FADEX remains the
lowest among the three under all threshold settings. The costs of the weighted average
aggregation and the simple average aggregation are close to each other. This is because
under such a homogeneous environment, the weights of all IDSs are the same. Therefore,
the difference between the weighted average and the simple average is not substantial. We
also observe that changing the threshold has a big impact on the costs of the weighted
average model and the simple average model, while the cost of the FADEX model changes
only slightly with the threshold. All costs reach a minimum when the threshold is 0.5 and
increase when it deviates from 0.5.
Cost Under Heterogeneous Environment
In this experiment, we fix the expertise level of all peers to 0.5 and assign decision thresholds
ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 to node 1 to 9 respectively with an increment of 0.1. We set false
positive cost C10 = 1 and false negative cost C01 = 5 to reflect the cost difference between
FP and FN. We observe the detection accuracy in terms of FP and FN rates and the
average costs of false decisions at node 0 when three different feedback aggregation models
are used.
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Figure 5.5 shows that the average costs of the three different models converge after a
few days of learning process. The cost of FADEX model starts with a high value and drops
drastically in the first 10 days, and finally converges to a stable value on day 30. We then
plot in Figure 5.6 the steady state FP, FN, and the cost. We observe that the weighted
average model shows significant improvement in the FP and FN rates and cost compared
to the simple average model. The FADEX model has a higher FP rate and a lower FN
rate compared to the other two models. However, its cost is the lowest among the three.
This is because the FADEX model trades some FP with FN to reduce the overall cost of
false decisions.
Cost and the Number of Acquaintances
In this experiment, we study the relation between average cost due to false decisions and
the number of acquaintances that the host IDS consults. We fix the expertise level of all
IDSs in the network to 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8 respectively for different batch runs. Every IDS
decision threshold is fixed to τp = 0.5 in all cases. We observe in Figure 5.7 that, under all
cases, the average cost decreases when more acquaintances are consulted. We also notice
that for higher expertise acquaintances, fewer consultations are needed to reach the cost
goal. For instance, in our experiments, the host IDS only needs to consult 2 acquaintances
on average to reach a cost of 0.1, under the case where all acquaintances are with high
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expertise level 0.8. Correspondingly, the number of acquaintances needed are 4 and 15 on
average when the acquaintance expertise levels are 0.7 and 0.5 respectively. In the case
that all acquaintances are 0.3 (i.e., of low expertise), the utility goal can not be reached
after consulting a small number (i.e., < 20) of acquaintances.
In the next experiment, the expertise levels of all nodes remain 0.5 and their decision
thresholds vary from 0.1 to 0.9. We set C10 = C01 = 1 in the first batch run and increase
C01 by 1 in every subsequent batch run. We observe the costs under three different models.
Figure 5.8 shows that the costs of the simple average model and the weighted average model
increase linearly with C01 while cost of hypothesis testing model grows the slowest among
the three. This is because the hypothesis testing model has a flexible threshold to optimize
its cost. The hypothesis testing model has superiority when the cost difference between
FP and FN is large.
5.5.4 Sequential Consultation
In this experiment, we study the number of acquaintances needed for consultation to
reach a predefined goal. Suppose the TP lower-bound P¯D = 0.95 and FP upper-bound
P¯F = 0.1. We observe the change of FP rate and TP rate with the number of acquaintances
consulted (n). Figure 5.9 shows that FP rate decreases and TP rate increases with n.
Consulting higher expertise nodes leads to a higher TP rate and a lower FP rate. In the
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next experiment we implement Algorithm 1 on each node and measure the average number
of acquaintances needed to reach the predefined TP lower-bound and the FP upper-bound.
Figure 5.10 compares the simulation results with the theoretical results (see Equation
(5.29)), where the former confirms the latter. In both cases, the number of consultations
decreases quickly with the expertise levels of acquaintances. For example, the IDS needs to
consult around 50 acquaintances of expertise 0.2, while only 3 acquaintances of expertise
0.7 are needed for the same purpose. This is partly because low expertise nodes are more
likely to make conflicting feedbacks and consequently increase the number of consultations.
The analytical results can be useful for IDSs to design the size of their acquaintance lists.
5.5.5 Robustness and Scalability of the System
Robustness and scalability are two important features of an IDN. FADEX is robust to
malicious insiders since it has an inherent robust trust management model from [57] where
malicious insiders can be quickly discovered and removed from the acquaintance list. To
verify this, we simulate the scenario of betrayal attack under a homogeneous environment.
We fix all 10 IDSs with l = 0.5 and τp = 0.5. We let one IDS turn malicious at day 20
and start to give opposite diagnosis. We observe the FP and TP rate of a malicious node
and its impact on the decision of other nodes. From Figure 5.11 we can see that the FP
rate and TP rate of the malicious node raise/drop quickly after day 20. Figure 5.12 shows
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that the cost of false decision cost of other normal nodes raises quickly at day 20 and drop
back to normal after a few days. Compared with the other two aggregation models, the
FADEX model receives the least impact from the malicious node.
This IDN is scalable since the number of acquaintances needed for consultation only
depends on the expertise level of those acquaintances rather than the size of the network.
Hence the message rate from/to each IDS does not grow with the number of nodes in
the network. Furthermore, the dynamic consultation algorithm reduces the number of
consultation messages needed for collaborative intrusion detections.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed FADEX, a mechanism for trustworthy feedback aggrega-
tion. We have obtained optimal decision rules that minimize Bayes risks using hypothesis
testing methods, and provided a data-driven mechanism for real-time efficient, distributed
and sequential feedback aggregations. In FADEX, an IDS consults sequentially for peer
diagnoses until it is capable of making an aggregated decision that meets Bayes optimality.
The decision is made based on a threshold rule leveraging the likelihood ratio approximated
by beta distribution and thresholds by target rates. Our simulation results have shown
that FADEX is superior to other proposed models in the literature in terms of cost effi-
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ciency. Our simulation results have also corroborated our theoretical results on the average
number of acquaintances needed to reach the predefined false positive upper-bound and
true positive lower-bound. As future work, we want to investigate large-scale collaborative
networks and their topological impact. Another possible research direction is to integrate
FADEX with communication networks, and design defense mechanisms against different
cyber attacks such as denial of service, man-in-the-middle and insider attacks. Finally, our
results can be extended to deal with the case of correlated feedbacks.
82
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  2  4  6  8  10  12
PF
PD
R
at
e
Number of Acquaintances
Exp=0.4
Exp=0.6
Exp=0.8
FP Rate
TP Rate
Figure 5.9: FP, TP vs. Number of Acquaintances
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
 45
 50
 0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9
N
um
 o
f A
cq
ua
in
ta
nc
es
Expertise
Simulation Result
Theoretical Result
Figure 5.10: Number of Acquaintances vs. Expertise
83
Table 5.1: Summary of Notations
Symbol Meaning
N Set of IDSs in the collaborative network
Ni Set of acquaintances of IDS i, i ∈ N
ni number of acquaintances of IDS i, i ∈ N
Y ij , Reported decisions from IDS j to IDS i, i ∈ N , j ∈ Ni
Yi Vector of complete feedbacks from IDS i’s acquaintances
H0 Hypothesis that there is no intrusion
H1 Hypothesis that there is an intrusion
rij,F,k The diagnosis result at time k from acquaintance j to IDS i
given that there is no intrusion
rij,D,k The diagnosis result at time k from acquaintance j to IDS j
given that there is an intrusion
pii0, pi
i
1 Prior probability of no-attack and under-attack
τ¯ i Probability threshold for final decision
Li Likelihood ratio for IDS i’s decision
Lin Likelihood ratio for IDS i’s sequential decision at stage n
Ri Bayesian risk of IDS i
δi Aggregation decision rule of IDS i
φi Stopping decision rule of IDS i
DKL(p1||p2) Kullback-Leibler divergence between distributions p1 and p2
Ci10, C
i
01 Cost of making false positive and false negative decisions for IDS i
Ci00, C
i
11 Cost of making correct decisions for IDS i
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Table 5.2: Simulation parameters
Parameter Value Meaning
τSA 0.5 decision threshold of the simple average model
τWA 0.5 decision threshold of the weighted average model
n 10 number of IDSs in the network
d 0.5 difficulty levels of intrusions and test messages
λ 0.9 forgetting factor
pi0, pi1 0.5 probability of no-attack and under-attack
C00, C11 0 cost of correct decisions
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 5  10  15  20  25  30
Fa
ls
e/
Tr
ue
 P
os
itiv
e
Days
Normal node FP
Normal node TP
Betrayal node FP
Betrayal node TP
Figure 5.11: False positive and true positive of single IDS under Betrayal attack
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Chapter 6
Resource Management
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapters, collaborative intrusion detection networks can im-
prove the intrusion detection accuracy of participating IDSs. However, malicious insiders in
an IDN may compromise the system by providing false information/feedback or overload-
ing the system with spam. Also, “free riders” [71] can exploit the system by benefiting from
others without contributing themselves. This can discourage IDN participants and eventu-
ally degrade the overall performance of the collaboration system. To solve the problems of
malicious insiders and free-riders, a trust management is necessary to distinguish dishon-
est or malicious insiders, and an incentive-compatible resource allocation mechanism can
help participating IDSs contribute helping resources to collaborators in a fair manner (i.e.,
more active contributors should receive more helping resources). The resource allocation
mechanism itself should be robust against various insider attacks.
In this chapter, we propose a resource allocation mechanism, based on reciprocal incen-
tive design and trust management, where the amount of resources that each IDS allocates
to assist its neighbors is proportional to the trustworthiness and the amount of resources
allocated by its neighbors to help this IDS. The motivation for reciprocal incentive design
is to encourage participants to contribute more in collaboration so as to keep their IDS
knowledge up-to-date. This exchange of knowledge is particularly important in order for
IDSs to protect the system from new or zero-day attacks. We formulate an N−person (or
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peer) non-cooperative continuous-kernel game model to investigate incentive compatibil-
ity of the IDS collaboration system. In our design, each IDS finds an optimal resource
allocation to maximize the aggregated satisfaction levels of its neighbors. We show that
under certain controllable system conditions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. Our
experimental results demonstrate that an iterative algorithm which we introduce converges
geometrically to the Nash equilibrium, and that the amount of helping resource an IDS
receives is proportional to its helpfulness to others. We also demonstrate security features
of the system against free riders, dishonest insiders, and DoS attacks.
The main contributions of this work are: 1) A mechanism for optimal resource allocation
for each peer to maximize its social welfare with a convex utility function; 2) An N -person
non-cooperative game model and an iterative primal/dual algorithm to reach the Nash
equilibrium; and 3) Incentive compatibility and robustness that is derived from the resource
allocation scheme to tackle the “free riders”, dishonest insiders, and DoS attacks.
6.1.1 Related Work
Many IDS collaboration systems have been proposed in literature, such as [119],[116],
and [127]. They all assume IDSs cooperate honestly and unselfishly. The lack of trust
infrastructure leaves the systems vulnerable to malicious peers.
A few trust-based collaboration systems (e.g. [97] and [56]) and distributed trust man-
agement models (e.g. [56], [45], and [57]) have been proposed for effective IDS collabo-
ration. However, none of these proposed models studied incentives for IDS collaboration.
Our previous work proposed a trust management system where IDSs exchange test mes-
sages to build trust among themselves. The feedback from collaborators is evaluated and
a numerical trust value is assigned to reflect the level of truthfulness of collaborators. [56]
uses a simple weighted average model to predict the trust value while [57] uses a Bayesian
statistics model to estimate the trust value as well as the confidence level of the trust
estimation.
A variety of game-theoretic approaches have been applied to network resource allo-
cation in traditional routing networks and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. In traditional
routing networks, non-cooperative game models such as in [64] and [72] have been used in
a dynamic resource allocation context; authors of these reference works have considered a
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network with a general topology where each source has a window-based end-to-end flow
control. The available information for a user is the number of packets within the network
not yet acknowledged. Each user aims to maximize his own throughput, with bounded
delay, and hence faces a constrained optimization problem. The equilibrium obtained
is decentralized since each user has only local information on his own unacknowledged
packets. The focus has been on the maximal network performance with given resource
instead of incentive mechanisms. In peer-to-peer networks, Ma et al. [78] have used a
game-theoretical approach to achieve differentiated services allocation based on the peer’s
contribution to the community. Yan et al. [118] have proposed an optimal resource allo-
cation scheme for file providers. A max-min optimization problem has been constructed
to find the optimal solution which achieves fairness in the resource allocation. Both works
rely on an independent central reputation system. Reciprocity has not been incorporated.
Also the resilience and robustness of the system has not been their focus. Grothoff [62]
has proposed a resource allocation economic model to deal with malicious nodes in peer-
to-peer networks. It depends solely on the trust values of the peer nodes, and the resource
allocation is priority-based on the trust value of the request sender. Grothoff’s model can
effectively prevent malicious nodes from overusing the network resource since their requests
will be dropped due to their low trust. It is also reciprocal altruistic. However, this model
may result in unfairness since nodes with the highest trust may take the entire resource.
Our model differs from the above ones in that we have made use of the pair-wise nature
of the network for designing scalable network algorithms, ensuring secure and resilient
properties of the solution, and provide fairness and reciprocal incentive compatibility in
resource allocation.
Recently, game-theoretical methods have been used for intrusion detection where in a
two-player context, the attacker (intruder) is one player and the intrusion detection system
(IDS) is the other player. In [131], and [128], non-cooperative game frameworks have been
used to address different aspects of intrusion detection. In [117], Liu et al. use a Bayesian
game approach for intrusion detection in ad-hoc networks; a two-person non-zero-sum
incomplete information game is formulated to provide a framework for an IDS to minimize
its loss based on its own belief. Our previous work [133] provides a game-theoretical model
for IDSs to allocate collaboration resource to achieve the goal of fairness and incentive
compatibility. This chapter extends our previous work by integrating a complete IDN
framework and a robustness evaluation.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In section 6.2, we describe our incentive-
based resource allocation scheme for resource management in the IDN. In Section 6.3, we
devise a primal/dual algorithm to compute the Nash equilibrium, and in Section 6.4 we
evaluate the convergence and incentives of the resource allocation design. Finally, Section
6.5 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Resource Management and Incentive Design
In this section, we first mathematically model resource allocation in an IDN environment as
individual optimization problems for its member peers. A game problem (GP) can then be
introduced for each peer. We employ a Lagrangian approach to find the Nash equilibrium
of the constrained game. Finally, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in
the game and characterize the equilibrium solution in closed form.
6.2.1 Modeling of Resource Allocation
We consider a collaborative intrusion detection network (IDN) with N peers or nodes where
all the nodes adopt the same resource allocation scheme. Each IDS user can distribute
information to other IDS users in form of messages (in bytes). We denote the set of nodes
by N = {1, 2, · · · , N}. The set of neighbor nodes of peer u is denoted by Nu. The
communications between IDSs become constrained when the network size is large and the
number of collaborators |Nu| grows. Note that information in the network is symmetric.
If u is a neighbor of v, then v is also a neighbor of u. We can represent the topology of
an IDN by a graph G := (N , E), where E is the set of (u, v) pairs in the network. We use
rvu to denote the units of resource that node u should allocate in order to serve v with full
satisfaction. The minimum acceptable resource from u to v is mvu. Note that rvu,mvu are
chosen by node v and informed to node u during negotiation. Let puv ∈ R+ be the resource
that u allocates to v, for every u, v ∈ N . The parameter puv is a decision variable of peer
u and is private information between peer u and peer v. To satisfy neighbor v, node u
should allocate resource to v over the interval [mvu, rvu].
In this model, we assume that each node has its own mechanism to evaluate the trust
of its neighbors, and the trust values have already been determined. The trust evaluation
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mechanism has been discussed in Chapter 4. Let T uv ∈ [0, 1] be the trust value of peer v
assessed by peer u, representing how much peer u trusts peer v. The allocated resource
puv from peer u to v is closely related to the trust value T
u
v perceived by u.
Each peer maximizes its effort to help its neighbor nodes under its capacity constraint
Cu, which is dependent on its own resource capacity such as bandwidth, CPU, memory,
etc. Then, resource allocation should satisfy the following capacity constraint:∑
v∈Nu
puv ≤ Cu, for all u ∈ N . (6.1)
Our system introduces a utility function for each peer to model the satisfaction level of
its neighbors. The utility function Suv is given by
Suv =
ln
(
αpuv−mvu
rvu−mvu + 1
)
ln(α + 1)
, (6.2)
where α ∈ (0,∞) is a system parameter which controls the satisfaction curve and the term
ln(α + 1) in the denominator is the normalization factor. The function Suv is a concave
function on its domain under the condition α > 1. The choice of logarithmic functions is
motivated by the proportional fairness properties as in [84, 100] and has been used in the
literature on power control, congestion control and rate control in communication networks
[100, 134, 130].
Let Uu : RL(u)+ → R+ be the peer u’s aggregated altruistic utility, where L(u) =
card(Nu), the cardinality of the set Nu. Let the payoff function, Uu, for u be given by:
Uu =
∑
v∈Nu
wuvSuv, wuv = T
u
v pvu, (6.3)
where wuv is the weight on peer v’s satisfaction level Suv, which is the product of peer
v’s trust value and amount of helping resource allocated to u. A higher weight is applied
on peer v’s satisfaction level Suv if peer v is better trusted and more generous to provide
help to u. In this system, each peer u ∈ N in the IDN intends to maximize Uu within its
resource capacity. A general optimization problem (OP) can then be formulated as follows:
max{puv ,v∈Nu}
∑
v∈Nu wuvSuv (6.4)
s.t.
∑
v∈Nu puv ≤ Cu
mvu ≤ puv ≤ rvu,∀v ∈ Nu,
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where Suv and wuv are given by (6.2) and (6.3), respectively. The upper and lower bounds
on resources are imposed by the collaborators. The design of the utility function in OP is
built upon the intuition behind how people form collaborations in social networks. With
the freedom to choose and design collaborative schemes, we assume that all legitimate
agents in the network start with an intent to form collaborations with each other.
Every peer in the network is faced with an optimization problem (OP) to solve. (OP)
is a concave problem in which the objective function is a concave function in puv and the
constraint set is an L(u)-dimensional simplex, where L(u) = card(Nu), the cardinality of
the set Nu. Under the assumptions that the size of the network is large and peers can only
communicate locally within a distance d, we have N individual optimization problems in
the form of (OP) for each node. Hence, we can introduce a corresponding game (GP) by
the triplet 〈N , Au, Uu〉, where N is the set of players or peers, Au, u ∈ N , is the action
set of each peer, and Uu is the payoff function of peer u, defined in (6.3). An action of
a peer here is a decision on the resource allocated to a neighbor peer. The action set of
each peer Au is given by Au = A
1
u
⋂
A2u, where A
1
u = {pu ∈ RL(u)+ |
∑
v∈Nu puv ≤ Cu} and
A2u = {pu ∈ RL(u)+ | mvu ≤ puv ≤ rvu, v ∈ Nu}. It is not difficult to prove that under the
condition Cu ≥
∑
v∈Numvu, the action set is nonempty.
We note that the decision variable of each peer is a vector pu and the action sets of
players are not coupled. We thus can use Lagrangian relaxation to penalize the constraints
to solve for the Nash equilibrium. Let Lu(pu, σu, µu, λu) as follows denote the Lagrangian
of peer u’s optimization problem:
Lu =
∑
v∈Nu
T uv pvuSuv −
∑
v∈Nu
µuv(puv − rvu)
+
∑
v∈Nu
σuv(puv −mvu)− λu
(∑
v∈Nu
puv − Cu
)
, (6.5)
where µuv, σuv, λu ∈ R+ are the Lagrange multipliers. Using Lagrangian relaxation, we
can transform the game problem to its relaxed counterpart (RGP), where the abbreviation
“R” is short for “Relaxed”. The triplet of RGP is given by 〈N , A¯u,Lu〉, where A¯u is the
action set described by the base constraint puv ≥ 0, i.e., A¯u = {pu | puv ≥ 0, v ∈ Nu}; and
the payoff function is replaced by the relaxed Lagrangian function Lu. 1.
1In the definition of the relaxed game (RGP), we have chosen to relax simultaneously the two sets of
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By formulating the collaborative problem as a game, we use a non-cooperative ap-
proach to model altruistic behavior among peers. The non-cooperativeness is appropriate
here because there is no centralized control agent in the network, and communications
between peers are local and symmetric. The aggregated utility comes from peers’ general
intention to help other peers. We assume that peers intend to be altruistic when they
are introduced into the network. Free-riding peers are penalized via the weighting of the
aggregation function. When one peer appears to refuse to help other peers, the other peers
will correspondingly decline to assist in return, and as a result free-riding is avoided.
The framework described in this subsection can be potentially applied to a wide range
of collaborative networks where reciprocal altruism is desirable. However, many distinct
features of IDS networks have been incorporated into the design. Firstly, an attacker can
compromise nodes in the network and then start to spread malware to degrade the level
of protection provided by the collaborative network. The special structure of the utility
function together with the trust values have been used in the model to mitigate malicious
and dishonest behaviors of compromised nodes. Secondly, insider threats in IDS networks
have been considered by imposing upper and lower bounds on puv, which can be used to
prevent denial-of-service attacks from the insiders.
Remark 6.2.1 The choice of using the word collaborative networks is to distinguish this
approach from its cooperative counterpart. Cooperative networks often refer to a network
of nodes that are able to act as a team and then split the team utility among the members.
This will require global communications, coordination and bargaining. This appears to
be unrealistic for IDN systems. In collaborative networks, nodes behave strategically not
because they are selfish agents but because they are unable to coordinate or act as a team.
Our work is essentially different from non-cooperative network formation problems, where
all agents act selfishly to achieve their individual goals, which can be misaligned with each
other. In our IDN design, the players have their goals aligned in a certain way to achieve
efficient exchange of knowledge with each other. This is similar to classical strategic games
such as Battle of the Sexes and Bach and Stravinsky game [98]. However, the goals become
less aligned when agents have low trust values. This flexibility in the model essentially
attributes to the reciprocal altruism.
constraints, capacity constraint and range constraints. Instead, we could have relaxed only the capacity
constraint. In that case, the action set A¯u in the relaxed game would include a range constraint, i.e.,
A¯u = {pu | mvu ≤ puv ≤ rvu, v ∈ Nu} .
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6.2.2 Characterization of Nash Equilibrium
In this subsection, we solve the GP for its Nash equilibrium. Each peer u has a concave
optimization problem as in (6.4). Applying the first-order KKT condition as in [31] and
[34] to each peer’s concave problem in OP, ∂Lu
∂puv
= 0,∀v ∈ Nu, u ∈ N , we find
δuvT
u
v pvu
1 + α′uvpuv − α′uvmvu
= ξuv,∀v ∈ Nu, u ∈ N , (6.6)
where δuv =
α′uv
ln(1+α)
; ξuv = −σuv + µuv + λu, and α′uv = αrvu−mvu . In addition, from the
feasibility condition, it is required that an optimal solution satisfies the base constraints in
A¯u and the complimentary slackness conditions for every u ∈ N :
λu
(∑
v∈Nu
puv − Cu
)
= 0. (6.7)
σuv(puv −mvu) = 0,∀v ∈ Nu, (6.8)
µuv (puv − rvu) = 0, ∀v ∈ Nu . (6.9)
The variable ξuv is composed of three Lagrange multipliers. If ξuv 6= 0, we can further
simplify the first-order condition into
puv − T
u
v pvu
ξuv ln(1 + α)
=
(
1 +
1
α
)
mvu − 1
α
rvu. (6.10)
Definition 6.2.2 (Bas¸ar & Olsder, [29]) A Nash equilibrium p∗uv, u, v ∈ N for the game
(GP) is a point that satisfies Lu(p∗u,p∗−u) ≥ Lu(pu,p∗−u), ∀pu ∈ Au, u ∈ N , and puv =
pvu = 0, for v ∈ Nu\Nu and u ∈ N , where the vector p−u = {pi : i 6= u, i ∈ N} is
comprised of decision vectors of other peers.
Proposition 6.2.3 The game (GP) admits a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof The action set Au is a closed and bounded simplex and Uu is continuous in puv
for all u ∈ N , v ∈ Nu and concave in pu. By Theorem 4.4 in [29], there exists a Nash
equilibrium to (GP).
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With the existence of Nash equilibrium at hand, we can further investigate the solutions
to the relaxed game by looking at a pair of nodes u and v. Node u has its decision vector
pu satisfying (6.10) and similarly, node v has its decision vector pv satisfying (6.10) by
interchanging indices u and v. Hence, we obtain a pair of equations involving puv and pvu
and they are described by[
1 −T
u
v
ξuv(ln(1+α))−T vu
ξvu(ln(1+α))
1
][
puv
pvu
]
=
[ (
1 + 1
α
)
mvu − rvuα(
1 + 1
α
)
muv − ruvα
]
,
or in the matrix form, Muvquv = buv, where quv = [puv, pvu]
T , and buv is the right-hand
side vector and Muv is the incident matrix.
Definition 6.2.4 (M-matrix, [30]) An N by N real matrix A = [Aij] is called an M-
matrix if it is of the form A = θI − P, where P is entrywise nonnegative and θ is larger
than the spectral radius of P, i.e., θ > ρ(P). An M-matrix A has two key features:
(F1) the sign patterns aii > 0, i = 1, ..., N , and aij ≤ 0, i 6= j,
(F2) the eigenvalues of A have all positive real parts.
Theorem 6.2.1 (Berman and Plemmons, [30]) If A is an M-matrix, then A−1 > 0, i.e.
all of its entries are positive.
Using Theorem 6.2.1, we next state a result on uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for a
sufficiently large system parameter α.
Theorem 6.2.2 Suppose that only capacity constraints are active and α > max
u,v
{e T
u
v
ξuv , rvu
mvu
}−
1. Then, the game admits a unique Nash equilibrium. For each pair of peers u and v, the
equilibrium is given by q∗uv = M
−1
uv buv,∀u, v ∈ N .
Proof Under the condition that the capacity constraints are active, ξuv = kvλu > 0,
since the objective function is an increasing function. Firstly, we show that provided that
α > e
Tuv
ξuv − 1, we have the inequality 1 > Tuv
ξuv ln(1+α)
. For each pair of nodes u and v,
matrix Muv is an M−matrix in (6.10); hence, Muv are strictly diagonally dominant and
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thus non-singular; and by Theorem 6.2.1, the entries of the inverse matrix M−1uv is strictly
positive.
Secondly, provided that α > ruv
mvu
−1, the vector buv is positive, i.e.,
(
1 + 1
α
)
mvu >
1
α
ruv.
Thus, we arrive at a unique solution q∗uv, whose entries are all positive, residing in the base
constraint action set A¯u for all u. Since (6.10) holds for any interactive pair, the game
admits a unique Nash equilibrium under conditions in Theorem 6.2.2.
Note that Theorem 6.2.2 provides a condition to choose system parameter α. Since the
system can determine the value of α, the condition can be met easily.
Remark 6.2.5 Under general conditions, to have ξuv > 0 requires multipliers µuv, λu,
σuv to satisfy µuv + λukv > σuv. Since payoff function Uu is increasing in puv, λu > 0
and only µuv and σuv can be zero. To ensure ξuv > 0, we can separate into three cases
for general discussion: (1) when σuv = 0, µuv 6= 0, we require µuv + λukv > 0; (2) when
σuv = 0, µuv = 0, we require λukv > 0; (3) when σuv 6= 0, µuv = 0, we require λukv > σuv.
With an assumption as in Theorem 6.2.2 that only capacity constraint is active, it simply
leads to ξuv > 0 itself.
6.2.3 Incentive Properties
We call a network design reciprocal incentive compatible when at the steady state, the
helping resource puv from peer u to v increases as the helping resource pvu from peer v to
u also increases. In addition, it is also desirable to have puv to be proportional to the trust
value of v, i.e., the more peer u trusts peer v, the more help u is willing to give. We can
further study these properties of the solution obtained in Theorem 6.2.2.
Proposition 6.2.6 Under the conditions of Theorem 6.2.2, the Nash equilibrium solution
of the game (GP) is reciprocal incentive compatible, i.e.,
1. The helping resource puv from u to v increases with helping resource pvu from v to u;
2. When the system parameter α increases, the marginal helping resource from u to v
decreases for all u and v;
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3. When peer u trusts v more, i.e., T uv increases, the marginal helping resource from u
to v increases.
Proof Using (6.6), we take the derivative with respect to pvu and let ∂puv/∂pvu denote
the marginal helping rate from u to v.
Since T uv > 0, ξuv > 0, under the conditions in Theorem 6.2.2, we have ∂puv/∂pvu > 0,
and thus puv is increasing with pvu at Nash equilibrium. The incentive compatibility results
follow.
In the following, we study the incentives of nodes that decide on the lower and upper
bounds on desired reply rates. We assume that the lower bound on reply rates are uniformly
determined by the system once they join the network, i.e., mvu = m¯ for all v ∈ N , u ∈ Nv.
Lemma 6.2.7 Nodes do not have incentives to overstate their upper bound on the reply
rate rvu, v ∈ N , u ∈ Nv.
Proof From (6.6), we can observe that ∂puv
∂rvu
= −1/α < 0. Hence, a higher level of request
results in a lower value of puv.
Lemma 6.2.7 admits an intuitive interpretation. When a request level is high, it becomes
harder for a node to satisfy it and the node will allocate resources to satisfy other ones
with lower request levels first. Hence, a higher level of request will result in a lower reply
rates.
In the following, we study the effect of understating the upper bound. We first introduce
the notion of -resilience and then derive a condition for achieving it.
Definition 6.2.8 The Nash equilibrium p∗uv under truthful r
∗
vu is -resilient if a deviation
rvu from r
∗
vu results in an equilibrium puv such that ‖p∗uv − puv‖ ≤ ‖r∗vu− rvu‖ for all pairs
of (u, v) ∈ E.
Proposition 6.2.9 Suppose m¯ is sufficiently small and only capacity constraints are ac-
tive. The Nash equilibrium, if it exists, is -resilient if α ≥ 1

max(u,v)∈E
∣∣∣ Tuv pvu∑
v∈Nu pvuT
u
v
− 1
∣∣∣ .
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Proof Let r∗vu be the true upper bound, under which the reply rates are
pˆ∗uv = min{max{m¯, p∗uv}, r∗vu} ≤ r∗vu,
where
p∗uv =
(
1 +
1
α
)
m¯− 1
α
r∗vu +
T uv pvu
ξ∗uv ln(1 + α)
.
For any other rvu < r
∗
vu, the allocated resource is pˆuv = min{max{m¯, puv}, rvu} ≤ ruv < r∗vu,
where
puv =
(
1 +
1
α
)
m¯− 1
α
rvu +
T uv pvu
ξuv ln(1 + α)
.
Suppose that m¯ is sufficiently small. Due to the assumption that only capacity constraints
are active, we only need to study the case where puv ≤ rvu. Then, from Lemma 6.2.7,
we obtain puv > p
∗
uv since rvu < r
∗
vu, and hence p
∗
uv < puv ≤ rvu < r∗vu. Therefore,
‖pˆuv − pˆ∗uv‖ = ‖puv − p∗uv‖ and we have
‖puv − p∗uv‖ ≤
∥∥∥∥− 1α(rvu − r∗vu) + T uv pvuln(1 + α)
[
1
ξuv
− 1
ξ∗uv
]∥∥∥∥ .
Under the relaxed conditions, we can use the closed form expression of Lagrangian mul-
tiplier (6.16), which is derived later in Section 6.3, to obtain 1
ξuv
− 1
ξ∗uv
= 1
λu
− 1
λ∗u
=
ln(1+α)
αPT
(rvu − r∗vu). Hence combining with the result above, we arrive at
‖puv − p∗uv‖ ≤
1
α
∥∥∥∥T uv pvuPT − 1
∥∥∥∥ ‖rvu − r∗vu‖.
Therefore, to ensure -resiliency, we need ‖puv−p
∗
uv‖
‖rvu−r∗vu‖ ≤
1
α
∥∥∥Tuv pvuPT − 1∥∥∥ ≤ , which leads to the
result.
6.3 Primal / Dual Iterative Algorithm
In this section, we introduce a dynamic algorithm to compute the unique Nash equilibrium.
Let puv(t) be the resource from peer u to v at step t. Consider the algorithm:{
puv(t+ 1) = suv + tuvpvu(t)
pvu(t+ 1) = svu + tvupuv(t)
, (6.11)
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where suv =
(
1 + 1
α
)
mvu − 1αrvu, tuv = T
u
v
ξuv(ln(1+α))
, and svu, tvu are defined similarly by
interchanging indices u and v, with initial conditions puv(0) = min
{
Cu
Nu , ruv.
}
,∀u, v ∈ N .
Proposition 6.3.1 Suppose that capacity constraints are active, and rvu and muv are
chosen such that the associated constraints become inactive constraints, i.e., σuv = 0, µuv =
0 in (6.8) and (6.9). Given a Lagrange multiplier λ∗u 6= 0 and provided that α > e
Tuv
λu − 1,
algorithm (6.11) converges to the unique Nash equilibrium in Theorem 6.2.2 at dual optimal
λ∗u.
The algorithm described in (6.11) depends on the Lagrange multiplier λu. We can
exploit duality to devise an iterative algorithm for the Lagrange multiplier. Let Du(λu)
be the dual functional given by Du(λu) = maxpu Lu(pu, λu). The dual function Du(λu) is
a convex function and a dual optimal λ∗u solves the dual optimization problem (DOP)
2
min
λu>0
Du(λu). (6.12)
Using the solution from Theorem 6.2.2, we can obtain Du(λu) as follows.
Du = λu
(
Cu +
KR
α
+
(
1 +
1
α
)
KM
)
+
PT − PT
ln(α + 1)
,
and its first-order derivative as follows:
D′u = Cu −
∑
v∈Nu pvuT
u
v
λu ln(1 + α)
+
1
α
∑
v∈Nu
rvu − α + 1
α
∑
v∈Nu
mvu,
where PT =
∑
v∈Nu pvuT
u
v is the sum of the weights; KM =
∑
v∈Numvu; KR =
∑
v∈Nu rvu.
KM and KR can be interpreted as the total request weighted by marginal costs; and
PT =
∑
v∈Nu
pvuT
u
v ln
(
α
ln(α + 1)
pvuT
u
v
λu(rvu −mvu)
)
. (6.13)
2Peer u’s dual function is expressed in terms of λu and p−u, and the decision variable for peer u changes
from a multi-dimensional vector pu to a scalar variable λu. Using the dual function, we can reduce the
dimension of the game and turn a constrained game into an unconstrained one.
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The gradient of the dual function is dependent on the local capacity of node u and the
information sent by the neighbor node v of peer u such as the helping resource pvu, and
the maximum (minimum) requested resources rvu (mvu) from v. All the information is
available to peer u to calculate the gradient locally at each λu.
By taking the second-order derivative of the dual function, we obtain
D′′u(λu) =
∑
v∈Nu pvuT
u
v
λ2u ln(1 + α)
. (6.14)
The dual function in (6.12) is not only a convex function but also a strong convex function,
whose Hessian is bounded uniformly as in L1 ≤ ∇2Du(λu), for some L1 [34]. In addition,
provided that the sum of weights wuv is bounded from above, i.e.,∑
v∈Nu
pvuT
u
v ≤M, (6.15)
for some M ∈ R++, then ∇2Du(λu) ≤ L2, for some constant L2.
Proposition 6.3.2 Suppose that the sum of weights is bounded as in (6.15). The dual
function Du is strongly convex and its Hessian is bounded from above and below uniformly.
Proof Firstly, λu is bounded from above by some constant λ¯u since the dual problem is
feasible. Thus, 1 ≤ λu ≤ λ¯u, 1 > 0. In addition,
∑
v∈Nu wuv 6= 0; otherwise, the primal
problem is trivial because wuv = 0, for all v. Therefore, 2 ≤
∑
v∈Nu wuv ≤ M, 2 > 0.
Hence, the statement is true.
Strong duality ensures a unique optimal solution. The unique dual optimal λ∗u can be
found explicitly by applying the unconstrained optimality condition, i.e., D′u(λu) = 0. As
a result, we obtain
λ∗u =
PT(
Cu −KM + 1α(KR −KM)
)
ln(1 + α)
. (6.16)
To find the dual optimal, we can also devise a dynamic algorithm that can be used in
conjunction with Algorithm (6.11). An iterative algorithm based on gradient methods to
find λu is given by
λu(t+ 1) = λu(t)− βuD′u(λu(t)),∀u ∈ N , (6.17)
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where βu ∈ (0, 1) is the step size. The gradient algorithm in (6.17) is distributed over the
network. Each peer needs to collect openly accessible information from its neighboring
peers to evaluate KM , KR and PT . With the property of strong convexity, we can show in
the following the fast convergence of the algorithm to (6.16).
Proposition 6.3.3 Suppose that D′u(λu) is Lipschitz with Lipschitz constant L3 and Du(λu)
is strongly convex with D′′u(λu) ≥ L1. The dual algorithm (6.17) converges geometrically to
dual optimal λ∗u in (6.16) with step size βu <
min(2,L1)
L3
.
Proof We can use the technique in [34] to prove the proposition. Using the property of
strong convexity and Lipschitz property, we obtain
‖λu(t+ 1)− λ∗u‖2
= ‖λu(t)− λ∗u‖2 − 2βuD′u(λu(t))(λu(t)− λ∗u)
+ β2u‖D′u(λu(t))‖2
≤ ‖λu(t)− λ∗u‖2 − 2βu(Du(λu(t))−Du(λ∗u))
+ β2uL3‖λu(t)− λ∗u‖2
≤ ‖λu(t)− λ∗u‖2 − βuL1‖λu(t)− λ∗u‖2
+ β2uL3‖λu(t)− λ∗u‖2
= (1− βuL1 + β2uL3)‖λu(t)− λ∗u‖2.
Hence, when βu <
min(2,L1)
L3
, we have a contraction. In addition, ‖λu(t + 1) − λ∗u‖2 ≤
(1− βuL1 + β2uL3)t+1‖λu(0)− λ∗u‖2. Hence, the convergence rate is geometric.
Note that the condition of strong convexity can be easily satisfied from (6.14) if we eliminate
trivial cases that all trust values of neighbors or pvu are zeros.
6.4 Experiments and Evaluation
In this section, we perform numerical experiments and evaluate the trust and resource
management capabilities of the resource allocation system as described in Sections 6.2
and 6.3. We follow two different approaches to evaluate the Nash equilibrium of the
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Figure 6.1: Helping Resources v.s. Time - First Approach
collaborative system. In the first experiment, we implement the dynamic algorithm in
Section 6.3 to find the Nash equilibrium. We show that the algorithm yields the Nash
equilibrium of the game at the steady state and the system is incentive compatible under the
equilibrium. In the second experiment, we use a stochastic discrete-event based simulation
to model an IDS network. In the simulation, peers estimate the resources received from
the other peers and adjust their allocations of resources to the others accordingly. We are
interested in finding the Nash equilibrium and verifying the incentives in the collaborative
system at the equilibrium.
6.4.1 Nash Equilibrium Computation
In this section, we implement the dynamic algorithm described in Section 6.3 to calculate
the Nash equilibrium centrally. We simulate a three-node network with initial trust values
0.2, 0.6, 1.0, respectively. For the ease of demonstration, we assume that the trust between
peer nodes is homogeneous. i.e., the trust value of node i is the same to all other nodes.
We set the minimum demand of resource to 1 unit and the maximum to 20 units for all
nodes. Every node has an equal capacity of 20 units and the system parameter α = 100.
We find that, if all peers have the same trust values, then the resource is fairly and evenly
distributed among all peers. When the trust values are different, peers with higher trust
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Figure 6.2: Helping Resource Received Varies with Trust Value - First Approach
values receive more resources. Fig. 6.1 shows that the resources received by three peers
with different trust values converge fast within two or three iterations. A peer with higher
trust value receives more help than a peer with lower trust value.
Fixing the resource capacity of all peers to 20 units and the trust values of two of the
nodes to 0.5, we vary the trust value of the third peer from 0.1 to 1.0. In Fig. 6.2, we
observe that the resource received by the third peer increases with its trust value under
different α values. We also see that all curves cross at trust value 0.5 and resource 20
units. This is because all peers should receive equal amount of resources when they are
identically configured, regardless of the α value we choose. By fixing the trust values of all
nodes to 1.0 and varying the resource capacity of the third peer from 3 to 30, we observe
in Fig. 6.3 that the amount of resources a peer receives is roughly linearly proportional to
the resources it provides to the others. Similarly, all curves intersect at capacity 20 and
resource 20. These results further confirm our theoretical analysis in Section 6.2. Figs.
6.2 and 6.3 also reveal that a larger α value leads to a lower marginal helping resource. A
smaller α value provides stronger incentive to the participants.
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Figure 6.3: Helping Resource Received Varies with Resource Contribution - First Approach
6.4.2 Nash Equilibrium using Distributed Computation
In this experiment, we use a stochastic discrete-event based simulation to model the IDN.
Discrete-event simulation is commonly used to aid strategic decision making since it has
the capability of emulating complex real world problems. It concerns the modeling of a
system as it evolves over time by representing the changes as separate events. It bridges
over our model and a real-life IDS network. In this simulation, each node collaborates
with others by sending out requests and waits for their responses. At the beginning of
each day, nodes send resource upper-bound/lower-bound to all their neighbors and wait
for the resource quota from them. The resource quota allocation is determined through
optimizing (6.4). The consultation requests are generated randomly following a Poisson
process with an average arrival rate equal to the resource quota they receive. Upon the
arrival of a request at its destination queue, it will be replied by the corresponding peer on
a first-come-first-serve basis. Each peer estimates the resource it receives from other peers
by calculating the average number of consultation requests answered by each peer. In this
experiment, all peers initialize with an unbiased allocation, and then apply the resource
allocation scheme.
For the purpose of comparing with the numerical experiment, we use the same exper-
iment configuration as in Section 6.4.1, i.e., we simulate a network of 3 nodes; we set the
minimum resource requirement to 1 request/day and the maximum to 20 requests/day for
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Figure 6.4: Helping Resources v.s. Time - Second Approach
all peers; each peer has a capacity of 20 requests; we set α = 100 and the trust values of
nodes to be 0.2, 0.6, and 1.0, respectively.
Fig. 6.4 illustrates the received resources for all three nodes with respect to time. We
note that the helping resource converges to the Nash equilibrium at steady state, and nodes
with higher trust values obtain more resource. This confirms that our resource allocation
scheme provides incentives in the collaborative network.
By fixing the resource capacity of all peers to 20, the trust values of two of the peers
to 0.5, and varying the trust values of the third peer from 0.1 to 1.0, we obtain in Fig. 6.5
that the received resource of the third peer increases with its trust value under different
α values. Fixing the resource capacity of the first two peers to 20 requests/day and trust
values to 1.0 for all peers, we vary the capacity of the third peer from 3 requests/day to 30
requests/day and observe that the resource received by the third node also increases with
its resource capacity under different α values, as shown in Fig. 6.6. The simulation results
are consistent with the theoretical results obtained in Section 6.2 and the ones in Section
6.4.1.
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Figure 6.5: Helping Resource Received Varies with Trust Value - Second Approach
6.4.3 Robustness Evaluation
Robustness is a required and important feature for the design of an IDN. In this subsection,
we discuss a few common insider threats against the incentive-based resource allocation
mechanism, and we show how our design is robust to these attacks. Note that all par-
ticipants in the IDN have to abide by the protocols with a given flexibility in parameters
tuning. However, due to the reciprocity of the mechanism, IDSs with selfish or dishon-
est behaviors will be penalized and eventually removed from the network. This execution
process is an integrated part of the IDN.
Free Riding
Free riders are nodes that enjoy resources from others while not contributing themselves [48,
61]. A free rider in the IDN may collaborate with a large number of IDSs, aiming at re-
ceiving a good amount of accumulated resources m¯ from the large number of collaborators.
However, our IDN design is not beneficial to free riders. First, the amount of help that
a node receives is proportional to the resources it allocates to others. Second, the larger
the number of collaborators a node has, the more demanding it is for the node to main-
tain the collaboration since each collaborator needs minimum resource m¯ to be satisfied.
Therefore, a node that does not contribute to the collaboration will end up receiving bare
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Figure 6.6: Helping Resource Received Varies with Resource Contribution - Second Ap-
proach
minimum helping resources from others. We simulate a scenario where a free rider with
initial trust value 1.0 switches to a free riding mode at day 200 (Fig. 6.8). We notice
that the amount of helping resources received by the free rider drops quickly and converges
to a low level. This is because the collaborators of the free rider can notice the drop of
contributed resources from the free rider and adjust their resource allocation according
to (6.4). The result corroborates that free riding is not practical in the IDN with such a
resource allocation design.
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks
DoS attacks happen when malicious nodes send a large amount of information to overload
the victim [85]. In our IDN, the amount of information exchanged between participant
nodes is negotiated beforehand. A quota is calculated and sent to all nodes. If a node
sends more data than the given quota, then it is considered malicious, and hence will be
removed from the collaboration network.
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Figure 6.7: Resource received vs. exchanged upper-bound.
Dishonest Insiders
In the IDN, dishonest nodes can report false information to gain advantages. For example, a
dishonest node can misinform about its upper-bound and lower-bound requests for gaining
more resources from its collaborators. We imposed a maximum lower-bound m¯ for all
nodes. In addition, experimental results in Fig. 6.7 show that claiming a higher upper-
bound than the true value lowers received resource, while claiming a lower upper-bound
may lead to a bounded gain that is controllable by system parameter α. A lower upper-
bound will not lead to full satisfaction of the node when resource constraints are inactive.
6.4.4 Large-Scale Simulation
Previous experiments are based on a small-scale network. In this subsection, we design
numerical experiments to study the resource allocation in a large-scale intrusion detection
network. We set up a network of 100 nodes, which are randomly scattered in a 100× 100
square. Each node shares its resources with the other nodes in the vicinity at a distance
of 5. The trust values are generated according to a uniform distribution from 0 to 1.0.
The lower bound and the upper bound on the requests are 1 and 20, respectively, for each
node. We separate nodes into two groups: one group with a capacity of 20 units and the
other with 40. In Fig. 6.9, we can see that, in both groups, nodes with higher trust values
108
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 190  195  200  205  210  215  220  225  230
H
el
pi
ng
 R
es
ou
rc
e
Days
Peer1 (Free Rider)
Peer2 (trust=1.0)
Peer3 (trust=1.0)
Figure 6.8: Resource received after free riding attack
tend to receive more assistance. The response to trust value appears to be more prominent
for the group with capacity of 40 units. It can be explained by the fact that when the
resource capacity is low, most of the resource is used to satisfy the lower bound of all the
neighbors and little is left to allocate based on incentives. In the second experiment, we
fix trust values of all nodes to 1.0 and randomly choose the resource capacity of each node
between 0 and 30. Fig. 6.10 shows the resource received by nodes with different resource
capacities. We note that, on the average, nodes with higher resource capacities receive
more resources. This confirms the incentives under a large collaboration group.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed incentive-based resource allocation mechanism based
on trust management in the context of an IDN. By formulating an associated continuous-
kernel non-cooperative game, we have shown that a Nash equilibrium exists and is unique
under certain system conditions. We have also shown that the unique Nash equilibrium
possesses features that allow peers to communicate in a conducive environment in which
peers endeavor to contribute knowledge and resource to assist neighbor nodes. Any selfish
or free-riding behavior will receive a tit-for-tat response from the neighbors as a conse-
quence. The dynamic algorithm proposed in the chapter is used to compute the Nash
109
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
H
el
pi
ng
 R
es
ou
rc
e 
Re
ce
ive
d
Trust Value
cap=40
cap=20
Figure 6.9: Resource received for peers with different trust values
equilibrium. Experimental results showed that the algorithm converges to the Nash equi-
librium at a geometric rate, further corroborating the theoretical results. We have also
discussed the resistance of our IDN design to common insider attacks, such as free-riding,
dishonest insiders, and DoS attacks. As a future work, one can study other potential
attacks to the IDN system, for example, the collusion attacks.
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Chapter 7
Collaborators Selection and
Management
7.1 Introduction
As discussed in precious chapters, malicious insiders in an IDN may send false information
to mislead other IDSs into making incorrect intrusion decisions. This may render the col-
laboration system ineffective. Furthermore, IDSs in the collaboration network may have
different intrusion detection expertise levels and capabilities. An effective trust manage-
ment model should be capable of distinguishing honest participants from malicious ones,
and low-expertise IDSs from high-expertise IDSs. Chapter 4 describes a Bayesian learning
model for IDSs to evaluate the trustworthiness of their collaborators. However, a collab-
oration relationship is a mutual agreement between both participants, and it should only
occur when both parties agree to collaborate with each other. As we discussed in Chap-
ter 5, the expected cost of false decisions decreases when receiving feedback from more
collaborators. However, it takes more computing resources to maintain a collaboration
relationship; for example, sending test messages and responding to consultation requests
from other collaborators requires CPU/memory and bandwidth to proceed. The extra cost
of recruiting a new collaborator may exceed the benefit from that collaborator. How IDSs
select collaborators to achieve optimal cost efficiency is an important problem to solve for
an IDN. We define an IDN acquaintance management as the process of identifying, select-
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ing, and maintaining collaborators for each IDS. An effective acquaintance management
model is crucial to the design of an IDN.
The purpose of the work in this chapter is to seek an effective acquaintance management
mechanism with which IDSs can selectively recruit collaborators that can bring maximal
benefit, taking into account both the false decision cost and maintenance cost. We propose
a Bayesian learning technique that helps each IDS identify expert nodes and novice nodes
based on past experience with them, specifically, the false positive (FP) rate and false
negative (FN) rate of each collaborator. Dishonest collaborators are identified and removed
from the collaborator list. We define feedback aggregation in the IDN as a decision-making
method as to whether or not to raise an alarm based on the collected opinions (feedback)
from collaborator IDSs. We propose a Bayesian decision model for feedback aggregation.
Bayes theory is used to estimate the conditional probability of intrusions based on feedback
from collaborators. A cost function is modeled to include the false positive decision cost
and false negative decision cost. A decision as to whether to raise an alarm or not is made
in order to achieve the minimum cost of false decisions.
For collaborator selection, an IDS may add all honest IDSs to its collaborator list to
achieve maximized detection accuracy. However, including a large list of collaborators may
result in a high maintenance cost. We define an acquaintance selection as the process of
finding the optimal list of collaborators to minimize false decision and maintenance costs.
Existing approaches for acquaintance management often set a fixed number of collabora-
tors [121] or a fixed accuracy threshold to filter out less honest or low-expertise collabo-
rators [122, 57, 53]. These static approaches lack flexibility, and the fixed acquaintance
length or accuracy threshold may not be optimal when the context changes (e.g., some
nodes leave the network and some new nodes join the network). Our proposed acquain-
tance management algorithm can dynamically select collaborators in any context setting
to obtain high efficiency at minimum cost.
For collaborator maintenance, the IDSs in our system periodically update their collab-
orator lists to guarantee an optimal cost. A probation list is used to explore and learn the
quality of new potential collaborators. New collaborators stay in the probation list for a
certain period before their feedback is considered for intrusion decision.
We evaluate our system using a simulated collaboration network using a Java-based
discrete-event simulation framework. The results show that the proposed Bayesian deci-
sion model outperforms the threshold-based model [89], which only counts the number of
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intrusion reports, in terms of false decision cost. The results also show that our dynamic
acquaintance management algorithm outperforms the static approaches of setting a fixed
acquaintance length or accuracy threshold. Finally, our approach also achieves several
desired properties, such as efficiency, stability, robustness, and incentive-compatibility.
Major contributions of our work are summarized as follows:
1. An acquaintance selection algorithm is devised to optimally select collaborators,
which leads to minimal overall cost, including false decision cost and maintenance
cost;
2. A dynamic acquaintance management algorithm is proposed to integrate the concept
of probation period and consensus negotiation;
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we discuss some related
work; Section 7.3 describes the formalization of our IDS learning model and feedback aggre-
gation. Acquaintance selection and management algorithms are presented in Section 7.4.
We then present evaluation results demonstrating the effectiveness of our acquaintance
management and its desired properties in Section 7.5. We conclude this chapter in Sec-
tion 7.6.
7.2 Related Work
Various approaches have been proposed to evaluate IDSs, and all have used a single trust
value to measure whether an IDS will provide good feedback about intrusions based on
past experience with that IDS. For example, Duma et al. [45] introduced a trust-aware
collaboration engine for correlating intrusion alerts. Their trust management scheme uses
each peer’s past experience to predict others’ trustworthiness. Our previous work [57, 53]
uses Dirichlet distributions to model peer trust, but it does not investigate conditional
detection accuracy such as false positives and false negatives. In this work, we use both
false positive and true positive rates to represent the detection accuracy of an IDS, based on
a Bayesian learning approach. The methods for aggregating feedback provided by Duma et
al. [45] and our previous work [57, 53] are also simplistic. They both use a weighted average
approach to aggregate feedback. Another broadly accepted decision model in IDNs is the
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threshold-based, which is used in AVCloud [89]. In this model, when the total number
of collaborators raising alarms exceeds a fixed threshold, an alarm will be raised. In this
chapter, we apply the well established Bayes’ theorem for feedback aggregation which
achieves better performance. Our previous work [57, 53] focuses on the trust evaluation
with a simple threshold-based acquaintance selection. This work focuses on the optimal
collaboration decision and optimal acquaintance selection.
Most previous approaches set a fixed length of the acquaintance list, such as in [121].
Others use a trust threshold to filter out less honest acquaintances [122, 57]. The advantage
of the threshold based decision is its simplicity and ease of implementation. However, it
is only effective in a static environment where collaborators do not change, such as that
presented in [89]. In a dynamic environment, nodes join and leave the network and the
acquaintance list changes over time. Therefore, finding an optimal threshold is a difficult
task. Our Bayesian decision model is efficient and flexible. It can be used in both static
and dynamic collaboration environments. Equipped with this Bayesian decision model,
our acquaintance selection algorithm can find the smallest set of best acquaintances that
can maximize the accuracy of intrusion detection. Based on this acquaintance selection
algorithm, our acquaintance management method uses a probation list to explore potential
candidates for acquaintances and balances the cost of exploration and the speed of updating
the acquaintance list.
7.3 IDS Detection Accuracy Evaluation and Feedback
Aggregation
To select collaborators, an IDS should first learn the qualification of all candidate IDSs.
In this section, we first introduce a Bayesian learning model to evaluate the detection
accuracy of the candidates. A Bayesian decision model is then used to optimally aggregate
feedback from acquaintances.
7.3.1 Detection Accuracy for a Single IDS
To better capture the qualification of an IDS, we use both false positive (FP) and true
positive (TP) rates to represent the detection accuracy of an IDS. Let A denote the set of
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Table 7.1: Summary of Notations
Symbol Meaning
X ∈ {0, 1} Random variable denoting whether there is an attack or not
Y ∈ {0, 1} Random variable of positive or negative diagnose from an IDS
y A feedback instance vector from acquaintances
Y Feedback vector from acquaintances
C Set of acquaintance candidates
A Set of Acquaintances
l The acquaintance list length
δ The decision of raising alarm or not
R(.) The risk cost of false alarms and miss intrusions
M(.) The maintenance cost of acquaintances
Cfp, Cfn Unit cost of false alarm and miss intrusion
Ca Unit cost of maintaining each acquaintance
pi0, pi1 Priory probability of no-intrusion and with-intrusion
Ti, Fi True positive rate and false positive rate of IDS i
λ Forgetting factor of the past experience
acquaintances and random variables Fk and Tk denote the FP and TP rates of acquaintance
k ∈ A respectively. FP is the probability that the IDS gives a positive diagnosis (under-
attack) under the condition of no-attack, and TP is the probability that the IDS gives
a correct positive diagnosis under the condition of under-attack. Let random variable
X ∈ {0, 1} represent the random event on whether there is an attack or not, and let
random variable Y ∈ {0, 1} denote whether the IDS makes a positive diagnosis or not.
Then FP and TP can be written as P[Y = 1|X = 0] and P[Y = 1|X = 1], respectively.
The list of notations is summarized in Table 7.1.
Let Fk and Tk be the probability density functions of Fk and Tk whose support is [0, 1].
We use the notation Z0 : Yk = 1|X = 0 and Z1 : Yk = 1|X = 1 to represent the conditional
variables that acquaintance k gives positive decision under the conditions where there is no
attack and there is an attack respectively. They can be seen as two independent random
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variables satisfying Bernoulli distribution with successful rates Fk and Tk, respectively.
The past experience with acquaintance k can be seen as the samples from the Bernoulli
distributions. According to the Bayesian probability theory [59], the posterior distribution
of Fk and Tk given a set of observed samples can be represented using a Beta function,
written as follows:
Fk ∼ Beta(xk|α0k, β0k) = Γ(α
0
k+β
0
k)
Γ(α0k)Γ(β
0
i )
x
α0k−1
k (1− xk)β
0
k−1, (7.1)
Tk ∼ Beta(yk|α1k, β1k) = Γ(α
1
k+β
1
k)
Γ(α1k)Γ(β
1
i )
y
α1k−1
k (1− yk)β
1
k−1, (7.2)
where Γ(·) is the gamma function [70], and its parameters α0k, α1k and β0k , β1k are given by
α0k =
u∑
j=1
λt
0
k,jr0k,j β
0
k =
u∑
j=1
λt
0
k,j(1− r0k,j);
α1k =
v∑
j=1
λt
1
k,jr1k,j β
1
k =
v∑
j=1
λt
1
k,j(1− r1k,j), (7.3)
where α0k, β
0
k , α
1
k, β
1
k are the cumulated instances of false positive, true negative, true posi-
tive, and false negative, respectively, from acquaintance k. r0k,j ∈ {0, 1} is the jth diagnosis
result from acquaintance k under no-attack. r0k,j = 1 means the diagnosis from k is pos-
itive while there is actually no attack happening. r0k,j = 0 means otherwise. Similarly,
r1k,j ∈ {0, 1} is the jth diagnosis data from acquaintance k under attack where r1k,0 = 1
means that the diagnosis from k is positive under attack, and r1k,0 = 0 means otherwise.
Parameters t0k,j and t
1
k,j denote the time elapsed since the jth feedback is received. λ ∈ [0, 1]
is the forgetting factor on the past experience. A small λ makes old observations quickly
forgettable. We use exponential moving average to accumulate past experience so that old
experience takes less weight than new experience. u is the total number of no-attack cases
among the past records and v is the total number of attack cases.
To make the parametric updates scalable to data storage and memory, we can use the
following recursive formula to update α0k, α
1
k and β
0
k , β
1
k :
αmk (tj) = λ
(tmk,j−tmk,j−1)αmk (t
m
k,j−1) + r
m
k,j;
βmk (tj) = λ
(tmk,j−tmk,j−1)βmk (t
m
k,j−1) + r
m
k,j, (7.4)
where l = 0, 1 and j − 1 indexes the previous data point used for updating αmk or βmk .
Through this way, only the previous state and the current state are required to be recorded,
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which is efficient in terms of storage compared to when all states are recorded in Equa-
tion 7.3.
7.3.2 Feedback Aggregation
When an IDS detects suspicious activities and is not confident about its decision, it sends
out the description of the suspicious activities or the related executable files to its collabo-
rators for consultation. The node receives diagnosis results from its collaborators, denoted
by vector y = {y1,y2, ...,y|A|}, where yi ∈ {0, 1}, for 0 < i < |A|, is the feedback from ac-
quaintance i. We use X ∈ {0, 1} to denote the scenario of “no-attack” or “under-attack”,
and Y ∈ {0, 1}|A| to denote all possible feedback from acquaintances. The conditional
probability of an IDS being “under-attack” given the diagnosis results from all acquain-
tances can be written as P[X = 1|Y = y]. Using Bayes’ Theorem [95] and assuming that
the acquaintances provide diagnoses independently and their FP rate and TP rate are
known, we have
P[X=1|Y=y]= P[Y=y|X=1]P[X=1]
P[Y=y|X=1]P[X=1]+P[Y=y|X=0]P[X=0]
=
pi1
∏|A|
k=1 T
yk
k (1− Tk)1−yk
pi1
∏|A|
k=1 T
yk
k (1− Tk)1−yk + pi0
∏|A|
k=1 F
yk
k (1− Fk)1−yk
,
where pi0 = P[X = 0] and pi1 = P[X = 1], such that pi0 + pi1 = 1, are the prior probabilities
of the scenarios of “no-attack” and “under-attack”, respectively. yk ∈ {0, 1} is the kth
element of vector y.
Since Tk and Fk are both random variables with distributions as in Equations (7.1) and
(7.2), we can see that the conditional probability P[X = 1|Y = y] is also a random variable.
We use a random variable P to denote P[X = 1|Y = y]. Then P takes a continuous value
over domain [0, 1]. We use fP (p) to denote the probability density function of P .
When α and β are sufficiently large, a Beta distribution can be approximated by Gaus-
sian distribution according to Beta(α, β) ≈ N
(
α
α+β
,
√
αβ
(α+β)2(α+β+1)
)
. Then the density
function of P can be also approximated using Gaussian distribution. By Gauss’s approxi-
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mation formula, we have,
E[P ] ≈ 1
1 +
pi0
∏|A|
k=1 E[Fk]
yk (1−E[Fk])1−yk
pi1
∏|A|
k=1 E[Tk]
yk (1−E[Tk])1−yk
=
1
1 + pi0
pi1
∏|A|
k=1
α1k+β
1
k
α0k+β
0
k
(
α0k
α1k
)yk(
β0k
β1k
)1−yk
. (7.5)
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
τ
R
[δ]
E[P]
δ=0 δ=1
Parameters:
Cfp=1, Cfn=5
Figure 7.1: Bayes Risk for Optimal Decisions when Cfp = 1 and Cfn = 5
Let Cfp and Cfn denote the marginal cost of a FP decision and a FN decision. We
assume there is no cost when a correct decision is made. We use marginal cost because
the cost of a FP may change in time depending on the current state. Cfn largely depends
on the potential damage level of the attack. For example, an intruder intending to track a
user’s browsing history may have lower Cfn than an intruder intending to modify a system
file. We define a decision function δ(y) ∈ {0, 1}, where δ = 1 means raising an alarm and
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δ = 0 means no alarm. Then, the Bayes risk can be written as:
R(δ) =
∫ 1
0
(Cfp(1− x)δ + Cfnx(1− δ))fP (x)dx
= δCfp
∫ 1
0
(1− p)fP (p)dp+ (1− δ)Cfn
∫ 1
0
pfP (p)dp
=
∫ 1
0
CfnxfP (x)dx+ δ
(
Cfp − (Cfp + Cfn)
∫ 1
0
xfP (x)dx
)
= CfnE[P ] + δ(Cfp − (Cfp + Cfn)E[P ]), (7.6)
where fP (p) is the density function of P . To minimize the risk R(δ), we need to minimize
δ(Cfp − (Cfp + Cfn)E[P ]). Therefore, we raise an alarm (i.e. δ = 1) if
E[P ] ≥ Cfp
Cfp + Cfn
. (7.7)
Let τ =
Cfp
Cfp+Cfn
be the threshold. If E[P ] ≥ τ , we raise an alarm, otherwise no alarm is
raised. The corresponding Bayes risk for the optimal decision is:
R(δ) =

Cfp(1− E[P ]) if E[P ] ≥ τ ,
CfnE[P ] otherwise.
(7.8)
An example of the Bayes risk for optimal decisions when Cfp = 1 and Cfn = 5 is illustrated
in Figure 7.1.
7.4 Acquaintance Management
Intuitively when an IDS consults a larger number of acquaintances, it can achieve higher
detection accuracy and lower risk of being compromised. However, having more acquain-
tances causes higher maintenance cost since the IDS needs to allocate resources for each
node in its acquaintance list. When an IDS makes a decision about how many acquain-
tances to recruit, both the intrusion risk cost and the maintenance cost should be taken
into account. When adding a node as an acquaintance does not lower the total cost, then
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the node shall not be added into the acquaintance list. However, how to select acquain-
tances and how many acquaintances to include are crucial to build an efficient IDN. In this
section, we first define the acquaintance selection problem, then a corresponding solution
is devised to find the optimal set of acquaintances. Finally, we propose an acquaintance
management algorithm for IDSs to learn, recruit, update, or remove their acquaintances
dynamically.
7.4.1 Problem Statement
LetAi denote the set of acquaintances of IDS i. LetMi(Ai) be the cost for IDS i to maintain
the acquaintance set Ai. We use Ri(Ai) to denote the risk cost of missing intrusions and/or
false alarms for IDS i, given the feedback of acquaintance set Ai. In the rest of this section,
we drop subscript i from our notations for the convenience of presentation.
Our goal is to select a set of acquaintances from a list of candidates so that the overall
cost R(A) +M(A) is minimized. We define the problem as follows:
Given a list of acquaintance candidates C, we need to find a subset of acquaintances
A ⊆ C, such that the overall cost R(A) +M(A) is minimized.
In practice, maintenance cost of acquaintances may not be negligible since acquain-
tances send test messages/consultations periodically to ask for diagnosis. It takes resources
(CPU and memory) for the IDS to receive, analyze the requests, and reply with correspond-
ing answers. The selection of Mi(.) can be user defined on each host. For example, a simple
maximum acquaintance length restriction can be mapped to M(A) = C max(|A| − L, 0),
where L ∈ N+ is the acquaintance length upper-bound and C ∈ [0,∞) is the penalty of
exceeding the bound.
The risk cost can be expressed as:
R(A) = CfnP [δ = 0|X = 1]P [X = 1]
+ CfpP [δ = 1|X = 0]P [X = 0]
where Cfn, Cfp denote the marginal cost of missing an intrusion and raising a false alarm,
respectively. P [X = 1] = pi1, P [X = 0] = pi0 are the prior probabilities of under-attack
and no-attack, where pi0 +pi1 = 1. Note that in practice pi1 can be learned from the history
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and be updated whenever a new threat is found. A moving average method can be used
to update the estimated value.
The above equation can be further written as:
R(A) = Cfnpi1
∑
∀y∈{0,1}|A||δ(y)=0
P [Y = y|X = 1] (7.9)
+ Cfppi0
∑
∀y∈{0,1}|A||δ(y)=1
P [Y = y|X = 0]
= Cfnpi1
∑
∀y∈{0,1}|A||δ(y)=0
|A|∏
i=1
(Ti)
yi(1− Ti)1−yi
+ Cfppi0
∑
∀y∈{0,1}|A||δ(y)=1
|A|∏
i=1
(Fi)
yi(1− Fi)1−yi
= Cfnpi1
∑
∀y∈{0,1}|A||f(y)<1
|A|∏
i=1
(Ti)
yi(1− Ti)1−yi
+ Cfppi0
∑
∀y∈{0,1}|A||f(y)≥1
|A|∏
i=1
(Fi)
yi(1− Fi)1−yi
=
∑
y∈{0,1}|A|
min{Cfnpi1
∏
i
T yii (1− Ti)1−yi ,
Cfppi0
∏
i
F yii (1− Fi)1−yi}
where Ti, Fi are the TP rate and FP rate of acquaintance i respectively.
f(y) =
Cfnpi1
∏|A|
i=1 (Ti)
yi(1− Ti)1−yi
Cfppi0
∏|A|
i=1 (Fi)
yi(1− Fi)1−yi
.
∀y ∈ {0, 1}l|δ(y) = 1 refers to the combination of decisions which causes the system to
raise an alarm and vice versa.
7.4.2 Acquaintance Selection Algorithm
To solve such a subset optimization problem, the brute force method is to examine all
possible combinations of acquaintances and select the one which has the least overall cost.
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However, the computation complexity is O(2n). It is not hard to see that the order of
selecting acquaintances does not affect the overall cost. We propose an acquaintance se-
lection algorithm based on a heuristic approach to find an acquaintance set which achieves
satisfactory overall cost. In this algorithm, the system always selects the nodes which bring
the lowest overall cost.
For the ease of demonstration, We assume the maintenance cost can be written as
follow:
M(A) = Cal = Ca|A| (7.10)
where Ca is the unit maintenance cost of each acquaintance, which includes the cost of
communication, detection assistance, and test messages. Note that any other form of
maintenance cost can be easily included into the algorithm.
As shown in Algorithm 1, in the beginning, the acquaintance list is empty. The initial
cost is the minimum cost of the decision based only on the prior information (line 3). For
each loop, the system selects a node from the acquaintance candidate list which brings the
lowest overall cost and stores it into emax (lines 7-14), where U − R(A) −M(A) is the
amount of cost reduced by adding a node into the acquaintance list. When such a node is
found, it is then moved to the acquaintance list if the current acquaintance length is less
than Lmin or the cost is reduced by adding the new node and the acquaintance length does
not exceed Lmax. The loop stops when no node can be added into A any further.
7.4.3 Acquaintance Management Algorithm
In the previous section, we devised an algorithm to select acquaintances from a list of
candidates. However, collaboration is usually based on mutual consensus. If node A
selects B as an acquaintance but B does not select A (non-symmetric selection), then the
collaboration is not established.
We propose a distributed approach for an IDS in the IDN to select and manage acquain-
tances and a consensus protocol to allow an IDS to deal with the non-symmetric selection
problem. To improve the stability of the acquaintance list, we propose to use a probation
period on each new node for the IDS to learn about the new node before considering it
as an acquaintance. For this purpose, each IDS maintains a probation list, where all new
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Algorithm 3 Acquaintance Selection (C, Lmin, Lmax)
Require: A set of acquaintance candidates C
Ensure: A set of selected acquaintances A with minimum length Lmin and max length
Lmax which brings the minimum overall cost
1: Quit = false //quit the loop if Quit = true
2: A ⇐ ∅
3: U = min(pi0Cfp, pi1Cfn) //initialize the overall cost while there is no acquaintance.
min(pi0Cfp, pi1Cfn) is the cost when a node makes a decision without feedback from
collaborators
4: while Quit = false do
5: //select the node that reduces cost most in each iteration
6: Dmax = −MAXNUM //initialize the maximum cost reduction to the lowest possi-
ble
7: for all e ∈ C do
8: A = A ∪ e
9: if U −R(A)−M(A) > Dmax //see Equation (7.9) and Equation (7.10) for R(A)
and M(A) then
10: Dmax = U −R(A)−M(A)
11: emax = e
12: end if
13: A = A \ e //remove e from A
14: end for
15: if (Dmax > 0 and |A| < Lmax) or |A| < Lmin then
16: A = A ∪ emax
17: C = C \ emax //remove emax from C
18: U = U −Dmax
19: else
20: Quit = true
21: end if
22: end while
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Algorithm 4 Managing Acquaintance & Probation Lists
1: Initialization :
2: A ⇐ ∅ //Acquaintance list.
3: P ⇐ ∅ //Probation list.
4: lp = lini //initial Probation length
5: //Fill P with randomly selected nodes
6: while |P| < lp do
7: e⇐ select a random node
8: P ⇐ P ∪ e
9: end while
10: set new timer event(tu, “SpUpdate”)
11: Periodic Maintenance:
12: at timer event ev of type “SpUpdate” do
13: //Merge the first mature node into the acquaintance list.
14: e⇐ selectOldestNode(P)
15: C ⇐ A //C is the temporary candidate list
16: if te > tp //te is the age of node e in the probation list then
17: P ⇐ P \ e
18: if Te > Tmin and Fe < Fmax //Te and Fe are the true positive rate and false positive
rate of the node e then
19: C ⇐ C ∪ e
20: end if
21: end if
22: //Consensus protocol
23: S =Acquaintance Selection(C, lmin,max(lmin, q
q+1
lmax))
24: //Send requests for collaboration and receive responses
25: Saccp ⇐ RequestandReceiveCollaboration(S, ttimeout)
26: A ⇐ Saccp //Only nodes that accept the collaboration invitations are moved into the
acquaintance list
27: //Refill P with randomly selected nodes
28: while |P| < max(q|A|, lmin) do
29: e⇐ Select a random node not in A
30: P ⇐ P ∪ e
31: end while
32: set new timer event(tu, “SpUpdate”)
33: end timer event 125
nodes remain during their probation periods. A node also communicates with nodes in
its probation list periodically to evaluate their detection accuracy. The purpose of the
probation list is thus to explore potential collaborators and keep introducing new qualified
nodes to the acquaintance list.
Suppose that node i has two sets Ai and Pi, which are the acquaintance list and the
probation list respectively. The corresponding false positive rate and true positive rate
of both sets are FAi , T
A
i and F
P
i , T
P
i . To keep learning the detection accuracy of the
acquaintances, a node sends test messages to nodes in both the acquaintance list and the
probation list periodically, and keeps updating their estimated false positive rates and
true positive rates. Let lmax be the maximum number of IDSs in both the acquaintance
and the probation list. We set this upper-bound because the amount of resources used for
collaboration is proportional to the number of acquaintances it manages. lmax is determined
by the resource capacity of each IDS. Let lmin be the minimum length of a probation list
and q be the parameter that controls the length of the probation list lp compared to the
length of acquaintance list la, such that lmin ≤ lp ≤ qla. The parameters lmin and q are
used to tune the trade-off between the adaptability to the situation where nodes join or
leave the network frequently (“high churn rate”), and the overhead of resources used for
testing new nodes.
The acquaintance management procedure for each node is shown in Algorithm 2. The
acquaintance list A is initially empty and the probation list P is filled by lini random
nodes to utilize the resources in exploring new nodes. An acquaintance list updating
event is triggered every tu time units. A is updated by including new trusted nodes from
P . A node that stays at least tp time units in probation is called a mature node. Only
mature nodes are allowed to join the acquaintance list (lines 15-21). Mature nodes with bad
qualification will be abandoned right away. After that the acquaintance selection algorithm
is used to find the optimal candidate list. Collaboration requests are sent out for nodes
which are selected in the optimal list. If an acceptance is received before expiration time
then the collaboration is confirmed, otherwise the node is abandoned (lines 22-26). Then,
P is refilled with new randomly chosen nodes (lines 28-31).
Several properties are desirable for an effective acquaintance management algorithm,
including convergence, stability, robustness, and incentive-compatibility for collaboration.
When our acquaintance management is in place, we are interested to know with whom the
IDS nodes end up collaborating with and how often they change their collaborators. We
126
also expect to see cooperative nodes are rewarded and dishonest nodes penalized.
In Section 7.5 we evaluate our acquaintance management algorithm, to determine
whether it achieves the above properties.
7.5 Evaluation
In this section, we describe the conducted simulation to demonstrate the desirable prop-
erties of our acquaintance management algorithm. We evaluate the cost efficiency of our
Bayesian decision model, cost and time efficiency of the acquaintance selection algorithm,
and several desired properties of the acquaintance management algorithm. Each simulation
result presented in this section is derived from the average of a large number of replications
with an overall negligible confidence interval.
Table 7.2: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Range Value Description
R [0,∞) 10/day Test message rate
λ [0, 1] 0.95 Forgetting factor
Cfp/Cfn [0,∞) 20/100 Unit cost of false positive/negative decisions
Ca [0,∞) 0.01 Maintenance cost of one acquaintance
tp [0,∞) 10 days Probation period
tu [0,∞) 1 day Acquaintance list update interval
lini N+ 10 Initial probation length
lmax N+ 20 Maximum total number of acquaintances
lmin N+ 2 Minimum probation list length
Tmin [0,1] 0.5 Minimum acceptable true positive rate
Fmax [0,1] 0.2 Maximum acceptable false positive rate
q [0,∞) 0.5 Length ratio of probation to acquaintance list
pi1 [0, 1] 0.1 Prior probability of intrusions
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7.5.1 Simulation Setting
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Figure 7.2: The Convergence of Learning Speed and the Test Message Rate
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We simulate an environment of n IDS peers collaborating together by adding each other
as acquaintances. We adopt two parameters to model the detection accuracy of each
IDS, namely, false positive rate (FP) and false negative rate (FN). Notice that in reality
most IDSs have low FP (< 0.1) and FN is normally in the range of [0.1, 0.5] [89]. This
is because false positives can severely damage the reputation of the product, so vendors
strive to control their FP rate at a low level. In our experiment, we select parameters
which reflect real world properties. To test the detection accuracy of acquaintances, each
peer sends test messages where their correct answers are known beforehand. Test messages
are sent following a Poisson process with average arrival rate R. R will be determined in
the next subsection. We use a simulation day as the time unit in our experiments. The
diagnosis results given by an IDS are simulated following a Bernoulli random process. If
a test message represents a benign activity, the IDS i raises alarm with a probability of
FPi. Similarly, if the test message represents intrusions, an alarm will be raised with a
probability of 1-FNi. All parameter settings are summarized in Table 7.2.
7.5.2 Determining the Test Message Rate
The goal of our first experiment is to study the relationship between test message rates
and FP, FN learning speed. We simulate two IDSs A and B. A sends B test messages to
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ask for diagnosis, and learns the FP and FN of B based on the quality of B’s feedback.
The learning procedure follows Equations (7.1), (7.2), and (7.3). We fix the FN of B to
0.1, 0.2, and 0.3 respectively. Under each case, we run the learning process under different
test message rates, 2/day, 10/day, and 50/day respectively. We observe the change of
estimated FN over time, plotted in Figure 7.2. We see that when R is 2/day, the estimated
FN converges after around 30 days in the case of FN=0.2. The converging time is slightly
longer and shorter in the cases of FN=0.3 and FN=0.1, respectively. When R is increased
to 10/day, the converging time decreases to around 10 days. In the case of R=50/day,
the corresponding converging time is the shortest (around 3 days) among the three cases.
Increasing the test message rate R to 50/day does not reduce much learning process time.
Based on the above observation, we choose R=10/day and the probation period tp to be
10 days as our system parameters. In this way, the test message rate is kept low and the
learned FN and FP values converge after the probation period.
The second experiment is to study the efficiency of learning results after our chosen
probation period. We fix R=10/day, tp=10/day, and randomly choose FN of node B
uniformly among [0, 1]. We repeat the experiments 100 times with different FNs. The FNs
estimated using our learning process till the end of probation period are plotted in Figure
7.3. We can see that in all different settings of FNs, the estimated FN rates are close to
the actual FN rates after the probation period.
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Figure 7.7: The Running Time using Different Acquaintance Selection Algorithms
7.5.3 Efficiency of our Feedback Aggregation
In this experiment, we evaluate the effectiveness of our Bayesian decision based feedback
aggregation by comparing it with a threshold based aggregation. We have described our
Bayesian decision model in Section 7.3.2. In a simple threshold based feedback aggregation
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method, if the number of IDSs reporting intrusions is larger than a predefined threshold,
then the system raises an alarm. The threshold-based decision is used in N-version cloud
anti-virus systems [89].
We set up eight IDSs {IDS0, IDS1, ..., IDS7} with their FP and FN rates randomly
chosen from the range [0.1, 0.5]. IDS0 sends consultations to all other IDSs, collects and
aggregates feedback to make intrusion decisions. The costs of false positive and false
negative decisions are Cfp=20 and Cfn=100 respectively. We compare the average false
detection cost using the Bayesian decision model and the simple threshold-based approach.
Figure 7.4 shows that the cost of threshold decision largely depends on the chosen threshold
value. An appropriate threshold can significantly decrease the cost of false decisions. In
contrast, the Bayesian decision model does not depend on any threshold setting and prevails
over the threshold decision under all threshold settings. This is because the threshold
decision treats all participants equally, while the Bayesian decision method recognizes
different detection capabilities of IDSs and takes them into account in the decision process.
For example, if an IDS asserts that there is intrusion, our Bayesian model may raise an
alarm if the IDS has a low FP rate and ignores the warning if the IDS has a high FP rate.
However, the threshold based decision model will either raise an alarm or not based on the
total number of IDSs which raise warnings and compare it with a predefined threshold,
irrespective of the individual that issued the warning.
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7.5.4 Cost and the Number of Collaborators
We define risk cost to be the expected cost from false decisions such as raising false alarms
(FP) and missing the detection of an intrusion (FN). We show that introducing more
collaborators can decrease the risk cost. In this experiment, we study the impact of the
133
number of collaborators on the risk cost. We set up four groups with an equal number of
IDSs. Nodes in all groups have the same FP rate of 0.03, but their FN rates vary from
0.1 to 0.4, depending on the group they are in. Inside each group every node collaborates
with every other node. We are interested in the risk cost as well as the maintenance cost.
The maintenance cost is the cost associated with the amount of resource that is used to
maintain the collaboration with other nodes, such as answering diagnosis requests from
other IDSs. Since our purpose is to capture the concept of maintenance cost but not to
study how much it is, we assume the maintenance cost to be linearly proportional to the
number of collaborators with a unit rate Ca=0.01 (see Table 7.2).
We increase the size of all groups and observe the overall cost of nodes in each group.
From Figure 7.5, we can see that in all groups, the costs drop down fast in the beginning
and slow down as the groups’ sizes increase. After an optimal point (marked by large solid
circles), the costs slowly increase. This is because when the number of collaborators is large
enough, the cost saving by adding more collaborators becomes small, and the increment of
maintenance cost becomes significant. We find that groups with higher detection accuracy
have lower optimal costs. Also they need a smaller number of collaborators to reach the
optimal costs. For example, in the case of FN = 0.4, 13 collaborators are needed to reach
the optimal cost, while the number of collaborators required is 5 in the case of FN = 0.1.
7.5.5 Efficiency of Acquaintance Selection Algorithms
We learned in the previous section that when the number of collaborators is large enough,
adding more collaborators does not decrease the overall cost because of the associated
maintenance cost. An acquaintance selection algorithm is proposed in Algorithm 3. In this
section, we compare the efficiency of acquaintance selection using the brute force algorithm
and our acquaintance selection algorithm. We create 15 IDSs as candidate acquaintances
with FP and FN rates randomly chosen from intervals [0.01, 0.1] and [0.1, 0.5], respectively.
Both algorithms are implemented in Java and run on a PC with AMD Athlon dual core
processor 2.61GHZ, and with 1.93 GB RAM. We start the candidate set size from 1 and
gradually increase the size. We observe the cost efficiency and running time efficiency of
both algorithms.
Figure 7.6 shows that the brute force algorithm performs slightly better with respect
to acquaintance list quality since the overall cost using its selected list is slightly lower.
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However, Figure 7.7 shows that the running time of the brute force method increases
significantly when the candidate set size exceeds 11, and continues to increase exponentially,
while our algorithm shows much better running time efficiency. These experiments suggest
to use the brute force method only when the size of candidates list is small (≤ 11). When
the candidates list is large, our greedy algorithm should be used to select acquaintances.
7.5.6 Evaluation of Acquaintance Management Algorithm
In this experiment, we study the effectiveness of our acquaintance management algorithm
(Algorithm 4). We set up a simulation environment of 100 nodes. For the convenience of
observation, all nodes have fixed FP rate 0.1 and their FN rates are uniformly distributed
in the range of [0.1, 0.5]. All nodes update their acquaintance list once a day (tu=1). We
observe several properties: convergence, stability, robustness, and incentive-compatibility.
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Convergence
Our first finding about our acquaintance management algorithm is that IDSs converge
to collaborating with other IDSs with similar detection accuracy levels. We observed
through experiments that IDSs collaborate with random other nodes in the network in the
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beginning (Figure 7.8). After a longer period of time (200 days), all IDSs collaborate with
others with similar detection accuracy, as shown in Figure 7.9. Our explanation is that
the collaboration between pairs with high qualification discrepancy is relatively not stable
since our collaboration algorithm is based on mutual consensus and consensus is hard to
reach between those pairs.
Figure 7.10 plots the average overall cost in the first 365 days of collaboration for three
nodes with FN values 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 respectively. In the first 10 days, the costs for
all nodes are high. This is because all collaborators are still in probation period. After
day 10, all cost values drop down significantly. This is because collaborators pass the
probation period and start to contribute to intrusion decisions. The cost for high expertise
nodes continues to drop while the cost for low expertise nodes increases partially after
around day 20, and stabilizes after day 50. This is because the acquaintance management
algorithm selects better collaborators to replace the initial random ones. We can see that
the collaboration cost of nodes converges with time and becomes stable after the initial
phase.
Stability
Collaboration stability is an important property since the collaboration between IDSs is
expected to be long term. Frequently changing collaborators is costly because IDSs need to
spend considerable amount of time to learn about new collaborators. In this experiment,
we record the average time span of all acquaintances from the time they pass the probation
period till they are replaced by other acquaintances. The result is shown in Figure 7.11,
where the average collaboration time spans for three selected nodes are shown with different
point shapes. We can see that collaboration among nodes with similar expertise levels is
more stable than that between nodes with different expertise levels. For example, nodes
with low FN = 0.1 form stable collaboration connections with other nodes with low FN
(around 180 days in average), while the collaboration with IDSs with high FN is short
(close to 0 day in average).
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Incentive-compatibility
Collaboration among IDSs is expected to be a long term relationship. Incentive is im-
portant for the long term sustainability of collaborations since it provides motivation for
peers to contribute [47, 38]. We compare the average overall cost of all nodes with different
FN rates under three different conditions, namely, no collaboration, fixed acquaintances
collaboration (acquaintance length (acqlen)=8), and dynamic acquaintance management
collaboration. Figure 7.12 shows the distribution of the converged cost of all nodes. We
can observe that the cost of all IDSs is much higher when no collaboration is performed
in the network. On the other hand, collaborating with random fixed acquaintances can
significantly reduce the cost of false decisions, however, the cost of high expertise nodes
and low expertise nodes are very close. With our dynamic acquaintance management, high
expertise nodes achieve much lower cost than nodes with low expertise, which reflects an
incentive design of the collaboration system. Therefore, the system provides motivation
for nodes to update their knowledge base and behave truthfully in cooperation.
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Robustness
Robustness is a desired property of an IDN since malicious users may try to attack the col-
laboration mechanism to render it ineffective. In this experiment we focus on the Betrayal
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attack. To study the impact from one malicious node, we set up a collaboration scenario
where IDS0 is collaborating with a group of other IDSs with FP = 0.1 and FN = 0.2.
Among the group, one IDS turns to be dishonest after day 50 and gives false diagnoses.
We observe the FP rate and FN rate of this malicious node perceived by IDS0, and the
impact on the risk cost of IDS0 under various collaborator group sizes. Figure 7.13 shows
the perceived FP and FN rate of the malicious node during each simulation day. We can
see that the perceived FP and FN increase fast after day 50. The malicious node is then
removed from the acquaintance list of IDS0 when its perceived FP and FN are higher
than a predefined threshold. The cost of IDS0 under betrayal attack is depicted in Fig-
ure 7.14; we notice that the betrayal behavior introduces a spike of cost increment under all
group sizes, but the magnitude of increment decreases when the number of collaborators
increases. However, the system can efficiently learn the malicious behavior and recover to
normal by excluding malicious nodes from the acquaintance list.
7.6 Conclusion and Future Work
We proposed a statistical model to evaluate the tradeoff between the maintenance cost
and intrusion cost, and an effective acquaintance management method to minimize the
overall cost for each IDS in an IDN. Specifically, we adopted a Bayesian learning approach
to evaluate the accuracy of each IDS in terms of its false positive and true positive rates
in detecting intrusions. The Bayes’ theorem is applied for the aggregation of feedback
provided by the collaborating IDSs. Our acquaintance management explores a list of
candidate IDSs and selects acquaintances using an acquaintance selection algorithm. This
algorithm is based on a greedy approach to find the smallest number of best acquaintances
and minimize the cost of false intrusion decisions and maintenance. The acquaintances list
is updated periodically by introducing new candidates which pass the probation period.
Through a simulated IDN environment, we evaluated our Bayesian decision model
against threshold-based decision models, and acquaintance selection algorithm against a
brute force approach. Compared to the threshold-based model, our Bayesian decision
model performs better in terms of cost of false decisions. Compared to the brute force
approach, our algorithm achieves similar performance but requires much less computation
time. Our acquaintance management is also shown to achieve the desirable properties of
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convergence, stability, robustness, and incentive-compatibility.
As future work, we plan investigate other more sophisticated attack models on the col-
laboration mechanism and integrate corresponding defense techniques. Robustness of the
acquaintance management system is particularly critical if extended to support IDS peer
recommendations. In this case, malicious IDSs may provide untruthful recommendations
about other IDSs [110, 122, 83], or worse collude to collaboratively bring the system down.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
Intrusion detection networks (IDNs) are collaboration networks used by intrusion detec-
tion systems (IDSs) to exchange information and knowledge, in order to collectively achieve
higher intrusion detection accuracy. However, building an IDN is a challenging task. Intru-
sion detection efficiency, robustness against malicious insiders, incentive compatibility, and
scalability are four desired features of IDNs. In this thesis, we have proposed a distributed
IDN design (Chapter 3), where IDSs are connected to their collaborators in a peer-to-peer
overlay. IDSs in the IDN send consultation messages to their collaborators when they do
not have enough information to make a confident intrusion decision, and aggregate the
feedback from collaborators to make a final intrusion decision. The proposed IDN archi-
tecture includes a number of components essential for IDS collaboration, four of which
were developed in detail throughout this thesis, namely, trust management, collaborative
intrusion decision, resource management, and acquaintance management.
As part of the trust management component (Chapter 4), we proposed a Dirichlet-
based Bayesian learning model to calculate the trust values of collaborators based on past
experiences. We showed that this model not only provides an efficient way to estimation
trust values, but also provides the confidence levels in trust estimations. In Chapter 5,
we modeled the collaborative intrusion decision problem as a Bayes optimization problem.
We obtained optimal decision rules that minimize Bayes risks using hypothesis testing
methods and provided a data-driven mechanism for real-time efficient, distributed, and se-
quential feedback aggregation. As part of the resource management component (Chapter
6), a continuous-kernel non-cooperative game model was introduced to solve the problem
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of fair and incentive-compatible resource allocation. Finally, for the acquaintance man-
agement component (Chapter 7), we proposed a statistical model to evaluate the trade-off
between the maintenance cost and intrusion cost, and an effective acquaintance manage-
ment method to minimize the overall cost for each IDS in the network by appropriately
selecting acquaintances.
We evaluated the thesis contribution primarily using a simulated IDN considering the
desired properties of effective collaborative IDNs previously mentioned. Specifically, we
identified a set of metrics to evaluate the performance of the collaboration networks,
namely, intrusion detection accuracy, robustness against malicious insiders, incentive-
compatibility in resource allocation, and scalability in network size.
The obtained results showed that the proposed IDN design and the IDN architecture
components developed in this thesis are indeed efficient, incentive-compatible, scalable and
robust. In particular and to evaluate collaborative IDN robustness, we have studied various
attack models and corresponding defence mechanisms. Finally though the collaboration
management mechanism were developed for intrusion detection networks in this thesis, we
believe they can be useful for other types of collaboration networks with untrusted node
such as social networks, mobile ad hoc networks, vehicular networks, and sensor networks.
The novelty of this work can be summarized as follows: First, we applied trust evalua-
tion, Bayesian decision, and game theoretical modelling to solve intrusion detection prob-
lems; second, we introduced the concept of test messages to evaluate the trustworthiness
and expertise levels of participating IDSs; third, we defined a resource-aware collabora-
tion model, where the communication overhead and helping resources between IDSs are
constrained and controlled.
As a future work, we plan to contribute to the design of the architecture components not
addressed in this thesis, namely the communication overlay component and the mediator.
For an extension of the trust management component, it will be interesting to tune some
of the model’s parameters such as c1, c2 (Equaltion 4.1) to evaluate their impact on the
performance. A possible extension of the feedback aggregation component is to the optimal
aggregation method for correlated feedbacks. For the resource management component,
we plan to investigate other types of attacks that malicious insiders can do to game the
system, for instance when a node does not follow the predefined resource allocation rules.
A possible extension of the acquaintance management component is to study on how
to select proper length of the probation period to achieve optimal effect. Moreover, we
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also would like to investigate more sophisticated collusion attacks and their corresponding
defence strategies. As an application of the work presented in this thesis, we are currently
working on malware detection using collaborative antiviruses. In this project, file scanning
results from different antivirus programs are aggregated to make a more accurate malware
detection within acceptable time frame. The ultimate goal of this thesis is to provide
guidelines for the deployment of a secure and scalable IDN where effective collaboration
can be established between IDSs.
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Appendix A
An Example of IDMEF format
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<idmef:IDMEF-Message xmlns:idmef="http://iana.org/idmef" 
version="1.0">
  <idmef:Alert messageid="123456789abc">
    <idmef:Analyzer analyzerid="sensor01">
      <idmef:Node category="dns">
        <idmef:name>sensor.abc.com</idmef:name>
      </idmef:Node>
    </idmef:Analyzer>
    <idmef:CreateTime 
ntpstamp="0xbc89f6f9.0xef669437">2012-09-09T10:01:25.93464Z</
idmef:CreateTime>
    <idmef:Source ident="a0b2" spoofed="yes">
      <idmef:Node ident="a0b2-1">
        <idmef:Address ident="a1a2-2" category="ipv4-addr">
          <idmef:address>192.0.1.100</idmef:address>
        </idmef:Address>
      </idmef:Node>
    </idmef:Source>
    <idmef:Target ident="b5b6">
      <idmef:Node>
        <idmef:Address ident="b5b6-1" category="ipv4-addr">
          <idmef:address>192.0.1.10</idmef:address>
        </idmef:Address>
      </idmef:Node>
    </idmef:Target>
    <idmef:Target ident="c7c8">
      <idmef:Node ident="c7c8-1" category="nisplus">
        <idmef:name>hipo</idmef:name>
      </idmef:Node>
    </idmef:Target>
    <idmef:Target ident="d1d2">
      <idmef:Node ident="d1d2-1">
        <idmef:location>Waterloo B10</idmef:location>
        <idmef:name>Cisco.router.b10</idmef:name>
      </idmef:Node>
    </idmef:Target>
    <idmef:Classification text="Ping-of-death detected">
      <idmef:Reference origin="cve">
        <idmef:name>CVE-1999-128</idmef:name>
        <idmef:url>http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?
name=CVE-1999-128</idmef:url>
      </idmef:Reference>
    </idmef:Classification>
  </idmef:Alert>
</idmef:IDMEF-Message>
Figure A.1: Example of intrusion alert in IDMEF format
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